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Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences

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Abstract

We offer a general approach to describing power indices that account for preferences as suggested by F. Aleskerov. We construct two axiomatizations of these indices. Our construction generalizes the Laruelle-Valenciano axioms for Banzhaf (Penrose) and Shapley-Shubik indices. We obtain new sets of axioms for these indices, in particular, sets without the anonymity axiom.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Higher School of Economics, State University, Moscow, Russia

    D. A. Shvarts

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  1. D. A. Shvarts
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Additional information

Original Russian Text © D.A. Shvarts, 2010, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2010, No. 1, pp. 144–158.

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 08-01-00039a.

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Shvarts, D.A. Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences. Autom Remote Control 71, 128–141 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117910010108

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117910010108

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