Abstract
The paper presents two new definitions of equilibrium for arbitrary game problems. The new definitions allow finding a unique solution for a significantly wider class of problems.
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Original Russian Text © E.R. Smol’yakov, 2009, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2009, No. 8, pp. 58–69.
This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no.09-01-00-655-a, the research was conducted under the RAS program “Fundamentals of Information Technologies and Systems,” project no. 1–3.
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Smol’yakov, E.R. Two strong equilibria for game problems. Autom Remote Control 70, 1317–1326 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117909080050
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117909080050