On stable solutions to the Ordinal Social Choice problem
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A concept of k-stable alternatives is introduced. Relationship of classes of k-stable alternatives with dominant, uncovered and weakly stable sets is established.
KeywordsSocial Choice Condorcet Winner Collective Choice Majority Relation Stable Alternative
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