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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 79, Issue 7, pp 1319–1341 | Cite as

Static Models of Coordination of Social and Private Interests in Resource Allocation

  • O. I. Gorbaneva
  • G. A. Ougolnitsky
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
  • 6 Downloads

Abstract

This paper analyzes conditions of system compatibility in the game-theoretic models of resource allocation between social and private activities. We describe economic and administrative control mechanisms for system compatibility.

Keywords

hierarchical games control mechanisms resource allocation system compatibility 

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer SciencesSouthern Federal UniversityRostov-on-DonRussia

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