Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 76, Issue 11, pp 2070–2077 | Cite as

Formation of new coalitional structures in voting games

Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
  • 42 Downloads

Abstract

This paper is dedicated to analysis and solution of an extended voting game. According to the extension, a new player enters the voting game, seeking to maximize a power index (i.e., its component of the Shapley–Shubik value) under a given capital. By assumption, other players sell their stocks (in full or in part) to the new player without hindrance and any benefits gained.

Keywords

Remote Control Power Index Coalitional Structure Evaluation Algorithm Vote Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Petrosian, L.A., Zenkevich, N.A., and Shevkoplyas, E.V., Teoriya igr (Game Theory), St. Petersburg: BKhV-Peterburg, 2012.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Hu, X., An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index, Int. J. Game Theory, 2006, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 229–240.MATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M., A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 1954, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 787–792.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M., On Market Games, J. Econom. Theory, 1969, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 9–25.MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

Personalised recommendations