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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 67, Issue 3, pp 480–492 | Cite as

Analytical expression of the expected values of capital at voting in the stochastic environment

  • P. Yu. Chebotarev
Control in Social Economic Systems

Abstract

In the simplest variant of the model of collective decision making in the stochastic environment, the participants were segregated into egoists and a group of collectivists. “Proposal of the environment” is the stochastically generated vector of algebraic increments of capitals. The social dynamics was defined by the sequence of proposals accepted by threshold-majority voting. Analytical expressions of the expected values of the capitals of participants, collectivists and egoists were obtained. Distinctions of some principles of group voting were discussed.

PACS number

89.65.-s 89.65.Ef 

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. Yu. Chebotarev
    • 1
  1. 1.Trapeznikov Institute of Control SciencesRussian Academy of SciencesMoscowRussia

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