Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 389–407 | Cite as

A man for all seasons: Woodrow Wilson, transatlantic relations and the war against militarism

  • Ashley CoxEmail author
Themed Section: Wilsonianism and Transatlantic Relation Introduction


This paper investigates the role of transatlantic Wilsonian values in the entry of the United States in to the First World War. Arguing that the offshore balancing thesis and economic rational are not sufficient to explain US entry and we must engage with Wilsonian explanations to understand this conflict.


Woodrow Wilson First World War transatlantic 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SOAS, University of LondonLondonUK

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