Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 15, Issue 4, pp 348–365 | Cite as

A view from the South: the Falklands/Malvinas and Latin America

  • Stella KreppEmail author


This paper examines the traces the development of the conflict, which ultimately culminated in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, in Latin America. Utilising sources from the Organization of American States and recently declassified Brazilian documents from the National Archive and the Foreign Ministry, the paper relates the specific Latin American perspective on the conflict and highlights what role the South Atlantic occupied in the regional and national imaginaries of Latin Americans.


Falklands/Malvinas Latin America South Atlantic Organization of American States Brazil 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of HistoryBern UniversityBernSwitzerland

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