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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 284–305 | Cite as

The Soviet use of the Moscow-Washington Hotline in the Six-Day War

  • Eszter SimonEmail author
  • Agnes Simon
Article

Abstract

This article examines the role the Moscow-Washington Hotline played in the 1967 Six-Day War, focusing on the Soviet side. We argue that the Soviet Union used the Direct Communication Link much more broadly than had been intended when the Hotline was agreed on in 1963 mainly because Moscow did not assign the Hotline any special diplomatic significance. We also show that the Hotline is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed. Finally, we challenge the existing debate in the historiography of the Six-Day War, arguing for the importance of studying the implications of Soviet behaviour rather than Soviet intentions.

Keywords

Hotline diplomacy Middle East Cold War Soviet Union 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Conflict, Cooperation and SecurityUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceSaginaw Valley State University, University CenterUSA
  3. 3.Department of International Relations and European StudiesMasaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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