Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 121–142 | Cite as

Anglo American military cooperation in Afghanistan 2001–2014

  • Warren ChinEmail author


This paper explores a paradox. On the one hand it is believed that 9/11 rekindled the UK-US special relationship, but at the same time it has been argued that British mismanagement of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused relations to deteriorate. Whilst I agree with part of this analysis in that Iraq represented a nadir in Anglo American relations I believe Afghanistan did not follow this trajectory. A wide range of factors help to explain this change in fortune, but I focus on the role played by the British military in restoring the trust and confidence of its US counterpart and argue that this institutional relationship was and is a vital component in the Anglo American Alliance.


Transatlantic cooperation military alliances counterinsurgency war on terror Afghanistan 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Defence Studies, King’s College LondonJoint Services Command and Staff CollegeShrivenhamUK

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