Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp 237–251 | Cite as

NATO’s next secretary general: Rasmussen’s leadership legacy for Jens Stoltenberg

  • Ryan C. HendricksonEmail author


Former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg became NATO’s secretary general on 1 October 2014, succeeding Anders Fogh Rasmussen. As NATO’s leader, Rasmussen aggressively pushed this military alliance in new and challenging directions. He also viewed his leadership post in a fundamentally different way when compared to his predecessors. His legacy provides his successor with more opportunities to serve as a ‘general’, rather than solely as a ‘secretary’. This article addresses Rasmussen’s influence on the office of secretary general, and also examines two additional personality trait variables of previous NATO leaders that may shape Stoltenberg’s term at the alliance’s helm.


NATO NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen Jens Stoltenberg transatlantic security 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceEastern Illinois UniversityCharlestonUSA

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