Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 263–278 | Cite as

East-West relations in the civil aviation sector between 1945 and 1963

  • Peter SvikEmail author


The present article addresses East-West relations in the civil aviation sector — a subject largely neglected and overlooked in current historiography of the Cold War. The article’s main objective is to fill this lacuna by describing the major developments affecting East-West civil aviation diplomacy from the end of the Second World War up to the early 1960s, when the Soviet bloc airline companies launched their first inter-continental operations. This article seeks both to explore the rationale for Eastern bloc aviation inroads into Western Europe and the developing countries of Asia and Africa, and to explain why reactions to the ‘Eastern air offensive’ were different in Washington and other NATO capitals. From a methodological viewpoint, the article shifts from a predominantly Western-oriented narrative of existing studies to a more transnational approach that draws on evidence from both Western and Eastern archives.


civil aviation East-West relations Cold War transnational history 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Historisches KollegMunichGermany

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