Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 418–431 | Cite as

‘Rentrée dans le rang?’ France, NATO and the EU, from the Védrine report to the 2013 French White Paper on national security and defence

  • Guillaume LasconjariasEmail author


In his report to the president of the French Republic in November 2012 assessing France’s return into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) military command structure, Hubert Védrine, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that France had no interest in leaving it again. His recommendations called for renewed action within the Alliance and the emergence of a European pillar. The timing should have been perfect, with France’s draft White Paper on defence and security about to be published. However, at a time when budget cuts prevail, are these recommendations applicable and do they amount to more than just paying lip-service? This article focuses on a one-year period, from November 2012 to the latest debates around the Military Programming Law, reminiscent of Pierre Mendès-France’s famous quote that governing is all about making choices.


France NATO European defence Hubert Védrine White Paper 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research DivisionNATO Defense CollegeRomaItaly

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