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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 206–222 | Cite as

Salience and approval in transatlantic perspective

  • Henrike ViehrigEmail author
Article

Abstract

This paper focuses on issue salience and the approval of specific foreign policies and asks whether shifts in public attention are linked to specific political attitudes concerning the use of military force. It examines the role of salience of foreign affairs in the USA and Germany and links the cognitive dimension (what is important) with the attitudinal dimension (what is your opinion on a specific issue). Although the two countries differ in foreign policy style and military involvement, their publics tend to disapprove of military interventions when they perceive them as the country’s most important problem. In times of high overall salience, however, public judgement tends to be less negative because event-induced peaks in salience work according to a different logic than problem-induced salience.

Keywords

public opinion foreign policy issue salience military intervention Germany USA 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of English, American, and Celtic StudiesUniversity of BonnBonnGermany

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