Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 119–139 | Cite as

Problems, progress and prognosis in trade and investment negotiations: the transatlantic free trade and investment partnership

  • Leif Johan EliassonEmail author


A comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would increase economic output, create jobs, establish regulatory standards with global reach and set a new ‘gold standard’ for other trade agreements. However, institutionalised differences in key policy areas, divergent preferences for what constitutes an acceptable agreement, and sceptical populations constitute insurmountable hurdles. Using empirical and theoretical arguments, this paper is both a prediction for the TTIP and a contribution to our understanding of when and why trade negotiations fail, while also highlighting the positive side effects of negotiations. Assessing the extent to which the factors presented in this paper are present in other negotiations improves our understanding of the outcome of complex bilateral negotiations.


Transatlantic Economic Council transatlantic trade investments bilateral agreements non-tariff barriers domestic opposition positive side effects 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceEast Stroudsburg UniversityEast StroudsburgUSA

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