Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 109–116 | Cite as

The origins and future of liberal democracy or the need for strong states

  • Jasper M. TrautschEmail author
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  1. 1.
    Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’. National Interest 16 (1989): 4Google Scholar
  2. 1a.
    Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).Google Scholar
  3. 2.
    Francis Fukuyama, State-Building. Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)Google Scholar
  4. 2a.
    Francis Fukuyama (ed.), Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).Google Scholar
  5. 3.
    Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).Google Scholar
  6. 3a.
    See also, Francis Fukuyama, ‘After Neo-conservatism’, New York Times, February 19, 2006.Google Scholar
  7. 4.
    For the different approaches of political science and history see Jack S. Levy, ‘Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations’, International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 22–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 4a.
    Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, ‘Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries’, International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 5–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 4b.
    Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, ‘Introduction: Negotiating International History and Politics’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds), Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 1–36.Google Scholar
  10. 5.
    It needs to be pointed out that there is no homogeneous, clear-cut and easily identifiable neo-conservative group with a uniform political agenda but that various groups with competing programmes are being labelled neo-conservative. An important strand of neoconservative thought, which David Brooks has called ‘national greatness conservatism’ and which has been given much attention during the administration of George W. Bush with regard to the intervention in Iraq, emphasises the need of the USA to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to build up America’s military, to act unilaterally and to promote democracy around the world. While generally supportive of free trade and critical of social programmes leading to unintended harmful consequences, Brooks’s brand is not hostile to a powerful government but rather considers it necessary for America to perform its global leadership function. See, David Brooks, ‘A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed’, The Weekly Standard, March 3, 1997Google Scholar
  11. 5a.
    John McGowan, ‘Neoconservatism’, in John McGowan, American Liberalism: An Interpretation for Our Time (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 124–33Google Scholar
  12. 5b.
    Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, The Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003. A competing group, which is also sometimes called neoconservative and which since 2009 has become increasingly congruent with what is known as the Tea Party movement but which is closely associated, too, with state rights neo-liberalism, and libertarianism, aspires to stop what it views as wasteful government spending, to reduce taxes, to deregulate the economy and to downsize the federal government. SeeGoogle Scholar
  13. 5c.
    Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). What sets both these groups apart from traditional conservatives, who tend to emphasise the need for order, stability and the rule of law, is their aversion to the status quo and their determination to bring change to America and indeed to the entire world. Fukuyama himself noted that neo-conservatives were actually not conservative at all: ‘The neoconservatives have no interest whatever in defending the order of things as they are, founded on hierarchy, tradition, and a pessimistic view of human nature’.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 5d.
    Francis Fukuyama, ‘Beyond Our Shores’, Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2002.Google Scholar
  15. 6.
    Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For the argument that the rule of law developed before democracy in Western Europe also see the work of another one of Huntington’s studentsGoogle Scholar
  16. 6a.
    Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2003).Google Scholar
  17. 7.
    Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?’ Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 53–61.Google Scholar
  18. 8.
    On this see, Adrian Wooldridge, ‘The Visible Hand’, Economist, January 21, 2012.Google Scholar
  19. 8a.
    Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Fukuyama’s “Future of History”: Is Liberal Democracy Doomed?’ Time, February 8, 2012.Google Scholar
  20. 8b.
    William J. Dobson, ‘Comeback der Autokraten’ Cicero 7 (2012): 17–23. SlavojŽižek, ‘Die Diktatur der Clowns’ Cicero 7 (2012): 24–7.Google Scholar
  21. 9.
    On this point also see Francis Fukuyama, ‘Is China Next?’ Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2011.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Jasper M. Trautsch 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.John F. Kennedy Institute for North American StudiesFreie UniversitätBerlinGermany

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