Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 374–387 | Cite as

The intersection of climate protection policies and energy security

  • Frank UmbachEmail author


Since the end of the 1990s, international energy experts have stressed the increasing strategic importance of energy supply security as part and within the ‘energy triangle’ with its three major objectives: economic competitiveness, environmental/climate sustainability and energy supply security. In the view of many energy security experts, the biggest challenge is seen in maintaining the balance between the three objectives instead of favouring one at the expense of the other two. The following analysis addresses this ‘puzzle’ of the energy triangle and compares the interrelated energy security-climate change mitigation nexus between the USA and the EU: how both sides manage the contradictions and, more specifically, how do the two transatlantic partners attempt to achieve the needed balance within the energy triangle and its three objectives?


climate change energy security economic competitiveness US energy policies common EU energy concept 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS)King’s CollegeLondonUK
  2. 2.Programme for International Energy SecurityCentre for European Security Strategies (CESS GmbH)MunichGermany
  3. 3.Atlantic Council of the United StatesWashington, DCUSA

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