Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 305–325 | Cite as

The public images of Britain, Germany, and France in the United States

  • Kai OppermannEmail author


The article traces the images of America’s three foremost European allies in US public opinion over the course of the Presidency of George W. Bush. Public country images are seen to consist of a valence and a salience dimension. Employing a mix of opinion polls and media content data, the article locates the country images under study within this two-dimensional space. It finds that US relations with Britain, Germany and France rest on rather different foundations in the American public: the British image displays both the most positive valence and the highest salience; the valence of the German image is the second most positive but its image is the least salient; the French image has the least positive valence, and its salience takes on a middle position.


country images US public opinion salience Britain Germany France 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Political Science and European AffairsUniversity of CologneCologneGermany

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