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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp 244–256 | Cite as

The Union of the Left in France, 1971–1981: a threat to NATO? The view from Washington

  • Frédéric Heurtebize
Article

Abstract

Both the Ford and the Carter administrations regarded the rise of the Union of the Left in the 1970s with suspicion, albeit to a different extent. Ideology and events exacerbated the Ford administration’s perception of danger and hostility towards an electoral alliance that was about to bring the Communists into the government of a NATO country. Comparatively, the Carter administration seemed less worried. Although it had no sympathy for the Communist Party, the Carter team viewed the rise of a French social democracy favourably

Keywords

United States France NATO François Mitterrand Union of the Left Ford administration Carter administration Eurocommunism Henry Kissinger 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frédéric Heurtebize
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Angers and Sorbonne NouvelleParis 3France

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