Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 193–201 | Cite as


‘What President for Transatlantica?’
  • David G. HaglundEmail author


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  1. 1.
    Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Alvin Stephen Felzenberg, The Leaders We Deserved (and a Few We Didn’t): Rethinking the Presidential Rating Game (New York: Basic Books, 2008). In fact, Felzenberg’s ten top presidents are actually a ‘top eleven’ as he puts five in a tie for seventh place. In descending order, the top of the list includes Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and tied for seventh, Zachary Taylor, Ulysses S. Grant, William McKinley, Harry S Truman, and John F Kennedy. At the other extreme, Felzenberg nominates as the three worst presidents of all time, in ascending order, James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, and Franklin Pierce.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    For more on this reassessment, see Charles R. Kesler, ‘Bearish on Teddy’, National Interest, no. 52 (1998): 105–9Google Scholar
  4. 3a.
    William N. Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), ix–xiGoogle Scholar
  5. 3b.
    and Serge Ricard, Theodore Roosevelt: Principes et pratique d’une politiqueétrangère (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 1991), 12–24.Google Scholar
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    Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).Google Scholar
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    For a sharp denunciation of postwar France, written by a former Supreme Court justice of the state of Washington, see Frederick Bausman, Let France Explain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922). There was in both the US and the UK at the time a tendency for liberals especially to castigate a France they said was too preoccupied with its own security; see for a critique of this perspectiveGoogle Scholar
  8. 5a.
    Michael E. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978).Google Scholar
  9. 6.
    Alexander L. George, ‘The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The “Operational Code” Belief System’, in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 95–124.Google Scholar
  10. 6a.
    Also see Yaacov Y I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).Google Scholar
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    Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).Google Scholar
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    See Frederic Bozo, Deux strategies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’alliance atlantique (Paris: Plon, 1996)Google Scholar
  13. 8a.
    Maurice Ferro De Gaulle et l’Amérique: Une amitié tumultueuse (Paris: Plon, 1973)Google Scholar
  14. 8b.
    Edward L. Morse, Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973)Google Scholar
  15. 8c.
    and John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: Viking, 1970).Google Scholar
  16. 9.
    Now known, ever since the treaty of Lisbon came into effect late in 2009, as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).Google Scholar
  17. 10.
    See Arnaud Leparmentier and Corine Lesnes, ‘Les Européens ébranlés par l’indifférence d’Obama’, Le Monde, 4 February 2010, 1, 6.Google Scholar
  18. 11.
    See Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Queen’s UniversityCanada

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