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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp 83–104 | Cite as

Parsley Island and the intervention of the United States

  • Peter GoldEmail author
Article

Abstract

On 11 July 2002 a dozen Moroccan armed police occupied Parsley Island, a rocky outcrop off the north Moroccan coast. Five days later Spanish armed forces intervened to ‘liberate’ the island and repatriated the Moroccans. On 20 July, following the intervention of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the State Department drew up an agreement acceptable to both sides and Spain withdrew. This article examines why Morocco occupied the island, why Spain used force in reply and why the US became involved. As with many territorial disputes, the occupation and the responses to it were symptomatic of more deep-seated grievances between the disputants, while the involvement of the Bush administration was inspired by its own self-interest in the aftermath of 9/11.

Keywords

Spain Morocco United States Parsley Island 9/11 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Languages, Linguistics and Area StudiesUniversity of the West of EnglandBristolUK

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