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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 56–68 | Cite as

The CSCE and the Atlantic alliance: Forging a new consensus in Madrid

  • Sarah B. SnyderEmail author
Article

Abstract

This article analyzes how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) delegations coalesced behind a common stance at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Madrid Review Meeting held from 1980 to 1983. It demonstrates that United States Ambassador to the Madrid Meeting Max M. Kampelman and international events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish imposition of martial law, and the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 fostered allied unity at the talks. Eventual agreement among the NATO allies about their strategy for the meeting gave the West a firmer and more effective negotiating position at Madrid, which it used to push proposals on human contacts, Helsinki monitors, the flow of information, terrorism, and religious freedom, among other issues. The reestablishment of consensus on CSCE issues within the Atlantic alliance at Madrid proved important because the ability of the NATO states to remain united despite internal disagreement over negotiating tactics and objectives was significant to the long-term influence of the Helsinki process.

Keywords

CSCE NATO human rights diplomacy Helsinki process 

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Earlier accounts that explored NATO diplomacy during the Madrid Meeting largely chronicled the negotiations without the benefit of international, multi-archival research. See, for example, Alexis Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993)Google Scholar
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    The French acceded to Soviet demands that the negotiations conclude with a summit before other NATO diplomats were prepared to agree to such terms. Sarah B. Snyder, ‘The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of the Cold War’ (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2006), 68.Google Scholar
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    Proposals in Ottawa would deal with gender equality, access to health care, the right to participate in religious education and freedom from torture, whereas those at Bern would address such issues as family visits, postal communication, access to a passport, exit visa fees and facilitating tourism. Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 23; CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 27 May 1981, Helsinki/Madrid, Box 112, Fenwick Papers; CSCE/RM.16, 12 December 1980, Book 38, OSCE Archives; CSCE/RM.48, 9 November 1982, ibid; CSE/RM.49, 9 November 1982, ibid.; Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 260.Google Scholar
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© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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