Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 44–55 | Cite as

Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The crisis that didn’t happen — and what it suggests about the one that did

  • N. Piers LudlowEmail author


Many believed that the latter half of the 1960s would be a difficult time for NATO. Europe’s recovery, détente, and Washington’s preoccupation with other regions of the world, could all have endangered the alliance. Recent archival releases confirm that several of the trends that were to cause transatlantic tension during the Nixon era were already apparent during the previous administration. Yet recent historiography has emphasised the lack of a transatlantic crisis during the Johnson years. This article will seek to explain why a breakdown was averted —and in the process suggest a number of factors which help explain the difficulties of the 1969–74 period.


NATO European integration De Gaulle Johnson nuclear deterrence 


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Copyright information

© Board of Transatlantic Studies 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.London School of EconomicsUK

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