Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 263–278 | Cite as

The quiet man: Dean Rusk and Western Europe

  • Christian Nuenlist


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Copyright information

© Taylor & Francis 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Nuenlist
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ZurichSwitzerland

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