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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 43–61 | Cite as

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation: What Role for Public Opinion?

  • Alexander Hoese
  • Kai Oppermann
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Notes

  1. 1.
    This article is based on a paper presented at the 5th Annual Transatlantic Studies Conference, University of Dundee, 12th -15th June 2006. We would like to thank the participants of the conference for their most useful comments and suggestions.Google Scholar
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    Thomas W. Graham, ‘Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making’, in: David A. Deese (ed.), The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York, NY, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 195–97.Google Scholar
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    The following line of reasoning applies not only to the United States, but can also be extended to Canada as an actor in transatlantic relations, of course.Google Scholar
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    as well as Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann (eds.), The Permanent Campaign and its Future, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 2000.Google Scholar
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    Richard Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy, Chaillot Paper 28, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 6–7. For a discussion of the general problematique of measuring ‘true’ public opinion through opinion polling, seeGoogle Scholar
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    Barbara A. Bardes, Public Opinion. Measuring the American Mind, Belmont, CA, Thomson/Wadsworth, 2002, pp. 5–8.Google Scholar
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    Alexander Ochs and Markus Schaper, ‘Konflikt statt Kooperation? Die transatlantischen Umweltbeziehungen’, in: Thomas Jäger/Alexander Hose/Kai Oppermann (eds.), Transatlantische Beziehungen. Sicherheit - Wirtschaft - Öffentlichkeit, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 235–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    See the so-called Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 25 July 1997 (105th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 98).Google Scholar
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    See the data in the following publications: Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on the Global Warming Treaty, 4 February 2000Google Scholar
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    Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on Climate Change, 25 June 2004Google Scholar
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    Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans on Climate Change, 5 July 2005Google Scholar
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    Harris Interactive, Large Majority Of Public Now Believes In Global Warming And Supports International Agreements To Limit Greenhouse Gases, The Harris Poll #45, 12 September 2001Google Scholar
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    Harris Interactive, Majorities Continue to Believe in Global Warming and Support Kyoto Treaty, The Harris Poll #56, 23 October 2002Google Scholar
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    The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Worldviews 2002. U.S. General Population Topline Report, 2002Google Scholar
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    The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Global Views 2004. American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 2004.Google Scholar
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    The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen As Unilateralist, 15 August 2001.Google Scholar
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    See the articles and data, particularly those on the “Most Important Problem”, provided by the Gallup Poll News Service from 1998 to June 2006.Google Scholar
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    2003 data are for EU-15, subsequent data are for EU-25. See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometers 59-65, 2003–2006.Google Scholar
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    Ipsos MORI, MORI Political Monitor: Long term Trends. The Most Important Issues facing Britain Today, June 2006.Google Scholar
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    The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, No Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China. America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas, 13 June 2006, p. 5.Google Scholar
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    The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views 2006: The United States and the Rise of China and India. Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion, p. 31Google Scholar
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    The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Partisanship Drives Opinion. Little Consensus on Global Warming, 12 July 2006, p. 4.Google Scholar
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    CNN, Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/epolls/ (accessed 7 July 2005).
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    See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometers 59-65, 2003–2006.Google Scholar
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    The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends. Topline Data 2005, p. 68.Google Scholar
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    The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends. Topline Report 2006, pp. 20–37.Google Scholar
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    The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Pew Global Attitudes Project: Nine Nation Survey, Final Topline, March 2004, p. 32.Google Scholar
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    The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Worldviews 2002. Comparative Report: American and European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
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    The German Marshall Fund of the Unmited States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends. Topline Data 2004, p. 75. The ten countries include the United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Slovakia. Only in Turkey are approval numbers on that statement higher than they are in the U.S.Google Scholar
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    The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends. Topline Data 2004, p. 75.Google Scholar
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    The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Worldviews 2002. Comparing American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy. Transatlantic Key Findings Topline Data, p. 46.Google Scholar
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    The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends. Topline Data 2004, p. 52.Google Scholar
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    See the compilation of polling data in: American Enterprise Institute, Public Opinion on the War with Iraq, 13 October 2006, pp. 49–62.Google Scholar
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    American Enterprise Institute, Public Opinion on the War with Iraq, 13 October 2006, pp. 63–77.Google Scholar
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    See David L. Aaron et al., The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism, Policy Paper, Atlantic Council of the United States, December 2004.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Hoese
    • 1
  • Kai Oppermann
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CologneGermany

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