Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 25–42 | Cite as

Strategic Drift in the Expeditionary Era: Nato in the New World

  • Carl Cavanagh Hodge


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  1. 1.
    Strategic drift is here understood to refer to growing differences over the threat or use ofmilitary force for the ends established by policy.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl Cavanagh Hodge
    • 1
  1. 1.University of British Columbia-OkanaganCanada

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