Advertisement

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 81–110 | Cite as

Post-Cold War Nato and International Relations Theory: The Case for Neo-Classical Realism

  • Luca Ratti
Article

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Realism is best defined not as a single theory but as a family of theories, a ‘paradigm’.’ school’, or ‘approach’. What makes it possible and useful to refer to realism as a unified research paradigm is the existence of a series of shared core assumptions, such as the anarchie nature of the international system, the rationality of the actors, the nature of state preferences, and the primacy of material capabilities. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, International Security, Vol. 24, no. 2, (Fall 1999), p 9.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Since July 2005 NATO has been providing assistance to the African Union for Darfur, ensuring the co-ordination of strategic airlift of African peacekeeping troops into the region. Following the earthquake which on 8 October 2005 hit the northern regions of Pakistan, India and eastern Afghanistan, the alliance established, on request of the Pakistani government, an air bridge from Europe to Pakistan to carry vital supplies for the earthquake victims.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    The traditional realist literature on alliances has focused, however, on alliance origins, while discarding the issue of alliance persistence after an initial catalysing threat had disappeared. Robert B. McCalla, ‘NATO’s persistence after the Cold War’, International Organization, Vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 1996, p.446.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, p. 5.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Global Communication and National Power: Life on the Pareto frontier’, World Politics, Vol. 43, no. 3 (April 1991), pp.336–366.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    While its fathers have claimed that neo-reaiism is a theory of international politics and hence not a theory of foreign policy, strong counter-arguments have been made that nothing prevents neo-realists from formulating a theory of foreign policy of their own. See Kenneth Waltz, ‘International Politics is not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, Vol. 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 54–57; Colin Elman ‘Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz’, Security Studies, Vol. 6, no.1 (Autumn 1996), pp.58–61.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, no. 1, Summer 2000. p. 39.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Summer 1990), pp.5–56.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 109.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p. 18.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Robert B. McCalla, ‘NATO’s persistence after the Cold War’, International Organization, Vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 1996, p. 451.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, ‘Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the future of NATO’, Security Studies, Vol. 3. no. 3, 1993, p. 19.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Kenneth Waltz, ‘The emerging structure of international politics’. International Security, Vol.18, no.2, (Fall 1993), p. 76.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Summer 1990), pp.5–56.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Neo-realist and offensive realist theorists have questioned the rationale behind the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003, suggesting that a policy of vigilant containment and deterrence would have been a much more adequate strategy to deal with Saddam Hussein’s regime. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy, Jan./February 2003, pp.51–59.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Judy Dempsey. ‘If Bush does not make clear that NATO can be involved in critical issues, the alliance will atrophy’, The Financial Times, 20 Nov. 2002Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    For an introductory reading on the debate about the enlargement of NATO see David G. Haglund, Stephen N. MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky (eds), NATO’s Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994)Google Scholar
  19. 18a.
    James. M. Goldgeier, Not whether but when (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999)Google Scholar
  20. 18b.
    Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Doors (New York: Columbia University Press. 2002)Google Scholar
  21. 18c.
    Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).Google Scholar
  22. 19.
    Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Preserving the New Peace: the Case against NATO expansion’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, no. 3, (May-June 1995), pp.9–13.Google Scholar
  23. 20.
    Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p. 23.Google Scholar
  24. 21.
    Dan Reiter, ‘Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy’. International Security, Vol. 25, no.4 (Spring 2001), p.55.Google Scholar
  25. 22.
    Kenneth Waltz, ‘The emerging structure of International Polities’, pp.23-24.Google Scholar
  26. 23.
    While NATO’s peacekeeping tasks in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were taken up by the European Union in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the alliance maintains a conspicuous stabilisation force in Kosovo (KFOR). KFOR troops come from than 35 nations - NATO and Non-NATO nations - and currently consist of more than 16,000 soldiers. The handing over of peacekeeping responsibilities in the Balkans to the EU has allowed the United States to concentrate its military resources in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.Google Scholar
  27. 24.
    In 1999 Italy and France argued in favour of an early conclusion to the bombing campaign, while Greece, which has often found in Belgrade an ally against Albanian and Macedonian ambitions, openly opposed the use of force against the FRY.Google Scholar
  28. 25.
    In April 2004, foUowing the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, Spain’s newly elected socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero withdrew the last 260 Spanish troops from Iraq, fulfilling one of his campaign pledges but causing disappointment and resentment in Washington.Google Scholar
  29. 26.
    While differences persist between Washington and Berlin with regard to Iraq and some U.S. tactics employed in pursuit of terror suspects, including the Guantánamo detainee camp and the abduction and detention network of suspected terrorists in Europe, the new German Chancellor Angela Merkel demonstrated a willingness to improve transatlantic ties and start the relationship anew.Google Scholar
  30. 27.
    Hanns W. Maull, ‘The future of NATO’, Contribution to the Conference “New Europe, Old Europe and the New Transatlantic agenda”, held on 6 September 2003 in Warsaw.Google Scholar
  31. 28.
    Drawing on a series of historical examples. Waltz emphasises that the democratic peace thesis, at least in the form in which it proponents cast it, is irrefutable, as a liberal democracy at war with another country is unlikely to call it a liberal democracy. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, pp. 5–41.Google Scholar
  32. 29.
    R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Co-operation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security, Vol. 24. No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 54.Google Scholar
  33. 30.
    Unlike realists, liberal-institutionahsts ascribe an important role to norms and values in international politics: while realists see norms and values as lacking causal force, liberalinstitutionalists argue that they play an influential role in certain issue-areas. However, even for liberal-institutionalists norms and values are a superstructure built on a material base: they have a regulative function, helping actors with given interests maximise utility. In the liberal perspective, as in the realist paradigm, it is agents who construct values, norms and institutions and not the other way around. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, no.2, January 1998, p.327.Google Scholar
  34. 31.
    Robert Keohane, ‘Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge’, in Baldwin, David Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York, Columbia University Press: 1993), p.285Google Scholar
  35. 31a.
    see also Fergus Carr, Europe: The Cold Divide, (London, Macmillan: 1998), p. 281.Google Scholar
  36. 32.
    James Sperling and and Emil Kirchner, ‘Economic security and the problem of co-operation in post Cold-War Europe’, Review of International Studies, 1998, pp. 223.Google Scholar
  37. 33.
    Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Co-operation: Understanding the Debate’, p.51.Google Scholar
  38. 34.
    R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kluger, and F.L. Larrabee, ‘Building a New NATO’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 4, (Sept./Oct. 1993). p.23.Google Scholar
  39. 35.
    Lars S. Skålnes, ‘From the inside out: NATO expansion and international relations theory’. Security Studies, Vol. 7, no. 4, (Summer 1998), pp.44–87.Google Scholar
  40. 36.
    Robert W. Rauchhaus (2001), pp. 3–19. Some liberal-institutionalist scholars, such as Wallander, have suggested, however, that expansion should not undermine the institution’s efficiency and decision-making procedures. In order for NATO to remain efficient, this process should be complemented therefore by a comprehensive internal reform of the alliance, whose objective would be to establish procedures for dealing with members that violate the alliance’s rules, while increasing their incentive to perform and live up to political standards. Celeste A. Wallander, ‘NATO’s Price: Shape up or Ship Out’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, no. 6, (Nov./Dec. 2002), pp. 2–8.Google Scholar
  41. 37.
    The deadlock was broken only when the alliance’s then secretary general, Lord Robertson, proposed to bring the issue before the Defence Planning Committee, in which France is not represented. The decision sheet agreed on 16 Feb. 2003 by the Defence Planning Committee can be consulted at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030216e.htmdocu/pr/2003/p030216e.htm.
  42. 38.
    France and Germany have also opposed, for different reasons, the merging of 1SAF, the international stabilization force deployed by NATO in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. led operation that focuses on Al-Qaeda and the leadership of the Taliban.Google Scholar
  43. 39.
    These requirements, such as adherence to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and respect for human rights, were made explicit by the ‘Study on NATO enlargement’ that was published by the alliance in September 1995. The ‘Study on NATO enlargement’ is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm.
  44. 40.
    See Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, International Affairs, Vol. 20, no. 4. p. 694; see also Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’ Security Studies, Vol. 8, no.2. Winter 1999, p.217.Google Scholar
  45. 41.
    This argument also applies to Georgia and Ukraine, following the hard-fought elections and peaceful revolutions in 2003 and 2004 respectively, which have strengthened their interest in earning NATO membership.Google Scholar
  46. 42.
    Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thorns Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, (London, Sage: 2002), pp. 100–101Google Scholar
  47. 43.
    Waller Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign policy’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). Handbook of International Relations, p.342.Google Scholar
  48. 44.
    Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign policy’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). Handbook of International Relations, p.341.Google Scholar
  49. 45.
    Rob B.J. Walker, ‘Realism, Change, and International Political Theory’, International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 76–77.Google Scholar
  50. 46.
    Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1999).Google Scholar
  51. 47.
    For a debate about the simplification of the rationalist-constructivist divide in terms of’ material’ versus ‘ideational’ see James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Sceptical View’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). Handbook of International Relations, pp.58–60.Google Scholar
  52. 48.
    Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’, p.211.Google Scholar
  53. 49.
    Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’, p.217. See also Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).Google Scholar
  54. 50.
    Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, The culture of national security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996: pp.357–399).Google Scholar
  55. 51.
    The text of the Washington treaty is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htmdocu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
  56. 52.
    Quoted in Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, p. 689.Google Scholar
  57. 53.
    Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’, pp.198-200.Google Scholar
  58. 54.
    See the ‘Study on NATO enlargement’; see also J.M. Goldgeier, Not whether but when: the US decision to enlarge NATO, p.56.Google Scholar
  59. 55.
    Rachel A. Epstein, ‘NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations’, Security Studies, Vol. 14, no.1, Autumn 2004/2005, pp. 63–105.Google Scholar
  60. 56.
    Although experiencing difficulties along the way and having few concrete results to advertise, the NATO-Russia Council has also made progress on a number of diplomatic, military, and educational fronts. Furthermore, the fact that NATO and Russia have continued to meet and talk over a range of issues, despite tensions over the war in Iraq and other crises, means the Council has fulfilled, at least to a certain extent, its primary purpose. For a positive evaluation of the work of the NATO-Russia Council see P. Fritch, ‘Building Hope on Experience’, NATO Review, Autumn 2003, (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/art3.htmldocu/review/2003/issue3/english/art3.html).
  61. 57.
    For a social-constructivist evaluation of West Germany’s adhesion to the alliance as an example of international socialisation see Mary N. Hampton, ‘NATO, Germany and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia’, Security Studies, Vol. 8, nos. 2/3, Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999, pp. 235–269.Google Scholar
  62. 58.
    F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘The Baltic states and NATO membership’, Testimony Presented to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 April 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT204/CT204.pdfpublications/CT/CT204/CT204.pdf, pp.4-6. See also Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, p.34; Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’, p.217; Rachel A. Epstein, ‘NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy. Evidence and Expectations’, pp. 63–105.
  63. 59.
    Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, p. 695.Google Scholar
  64. 60.
    The European Union has, however, struggled to maintain a common position on the Chechen issue. The lack of European unity was evident when, after an EU-Russian summit in Rome in November 2003, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who was at that time holder of the EU presidency, defended Russian conduct in Chechnya, provoking mixed reactions and embarrassment among the other EU members.Google Scholar
  65. 61.
    From a social-constructivist perspective, Schimmelfennig has argued that the process of international socialisation will stop when the surviva! of the institution is at stake. Presumably, the admission of Russia may also be seen by social-constructivist scholars as technically ‘indigestible’ for the alliance. However, in this case, the explanation for not inviting Russia, being based on a rationalist motivation, would appear to draw more on realist than social-constructivist theory. Furthermore, the prospect of NATO membership finds lukewarm support in Russia, where it is perceived that joining NATO would seal Moscow’s acceptance of the new status quo in central and eastern Europe. Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO enlargement: A constructivist explanation’, p. 213.Google Scholar
  66. 62.
    See Gideon Rose (1998), ‘Neo-classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, Vol.51, no. 1, (Oct. 1998), pp. 144–172. Raymond Aron features prominently among the precursors of neo-classical realist thought. See Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966). Other examples of neo-classical realism are the work of Randall L. Schweller,’ Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma’, Security Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3, (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121Google Scholar
  67. 62a.
    Eric J. Labs, ‘Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims’, Security Studies, Vol. 6, no. 4, (Summer 1997), pp. 1–49Google Scholar
  68. 62b.
    Fareed Zakaria ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, International Security. Vol. 17, no. 1, (Summer 1992), pp. 177–188 andGoogle Scholar
  69. 62c.
    Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).Google Scholar
  70. 63.
    While Legro and Moravcsik fault neo-classical realists for the inclusion of domestic variables, Taliaferro has pointed out that the inclusion of unit-level variables does not hinder our understanding of real-world phenomena. My argument is that neo-classical realism, establishing a hierarchic and rigorous link between systemic factors and unit-level variables, does not result in an uncontrolled and subjective extension of analytical categories and satisfies, therefore, the two conditions identified by Sartori in order to avoid ‘conceptual mishandling’. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, International Security, Vol. 25, no.3, p. 157–158; J.W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, pp. 5–9. See also Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Polities’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, no.4, pp. 1033–1053.Google Scholar
  71. 64.
    Fareed Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, p 128.Google Scholar
  72. 65.
    Gideon Rose, ‘Neo-classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, p. 161.Google Scholar
  73. 66.
    Jeffrey W.Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, p. 132.Google Scholar
  74. 67.
    Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, p. 6.Google Scholar
  75. 68.
    For a discussion of the variation in state strategies in defensive realism see Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-DefenseTheory and its Critics’, Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Summer 1995), pp. 660-91. Unlike its offensive counterpart, defensive reaiism emphasises the importance of the source, level and direction of threats, defined primarily in terms of technological factors, geographic proximity, military capabilities and perceived intentions. Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign policy’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, p.336.Google Scholar
  76. 69.
    Examples of defensive realism include: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and international Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neo-liberalism, and Co-operation’, pp.42-63Google Scholar
  77. 69a.
    Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar
  78. 69b.
    Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940’, International Organization, Vol. 51, no. 4, (Winter 1997), pp. 65–97Google Scholar
  79. 69c.
    Stephen Van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War’, International Security, Vol. 22, no. 1, (Spring 1998), pp. 5–43Google Scholar
  80. 69d.
    Charles L. Glaser, ‘Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models’. World Politics. Vol. 44, no. 4, (July 1992) pp. 497–538Google Scholar
  81. 69e.
    Charles L. Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics, Vol. 50, no. 1, (Oct. 1997), pp. 171–201.Google Scholar
  82. 70.
    Other realist scholars, such as Taliaferro, have argued that the division between offensive and defensive realism subsumes that between neo-realism and neo-classical realism. See Jeffrey W.Taliaferro ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, p. 134. Overviews of the offensive-defensive realist debate include Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, ‘Preface’ in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 9–12Google Scholar
  83. 70a.
    and Benjamin Frankel ‘Restating the realist case: an introduction’ in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. ix–xx.Google Scholar
  84. 71.
    This sentence is usually attributed to Lord Ismay who was NATO’s first secretary general between 1952 and 1957. An additional realist motivation for the preservation of the alliance was to avoid a re-nationalisation of security and defence in Europe. Robert J. Art, ‘Why Western Europe needs the United States and NATO’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. III, No. 1, Spring 1996.Google Scholar
  85. 72.
    Post-Cold War isolationist tendencies in the United States were behind Patrick Buchanan’s two attempts to win the Republican Party’s presidential nominations in 1992 and 1996. In 1992 Buchanan obtained about 3 million votes in the republican primaries, finishing second behind Bob Dole. During the 1990s isolationist tendencies were also reflected in the positions adopted on foreign policy issues by many of the Republican members of the Congress. For example, senator Richard Lugar, suggested that “NATO go out of area or go out of business”, implying that the alliance would face irrelevancy if it did not adapt to the changed geo-strategic context. In 1993 George F. Kennan, the acclaimed father of containment, had observed that: “the time for the stationing of American forces on European soil has passed”. See Douglas T. Stuart, “Symbol and (Very Little) Substance in the US Debate over NATO Enlargement”, in. David G. Haglund (ed.). Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging The Atlantic Alliance, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University Centre for International Affairs, 1996), p. 118.Google Scholar
  86. 73.
    On 140ctober 1991, as the Maastricht treaty negotiations entered their crucial phase, the then French President François Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl released a common letter which advocated reinforced Franco-German military co-operation and emphasised the need to turn the Western European Union (WEU) into the defence component of the European Union. Willem, Van Eekelen, ‘WEU’s post Maastricht agenda’, NATO Review, no. 2, April 1992, pp.13–17.Google Scholar
  87. 74.
    The strategic concept adopted by the aUiance at its Rome summit in 1991 is available at www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htmdocu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm.
  88. 75.
    Charles P. David, ‘Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, no. 1, (Apr. 2001), pp.2–7.Google Scholar
  89. 76.
    Robert W. Rauchhaus, ‘Marching NATO Eastward: Can International Relations Theory Keep Pace?’, pp. 3–19.Google Scholar
  90. 77.
    The argument that NATO’s operation in Bosnia provided some kind of legitimisation for the bombing campaign against the FRY is put forward by Beverly Crawford, ‘The Bosnian Road to NATO enlargement’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, no. 2, (Aug. 2000), pp.39–59.Google Scholar
  91. 78.
    Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake have argued that NATO expansion is a creative response to three strategic challenges: enhancing the relationship between the United States and an enlarging democratic Europe; engaging Russia in a co-operative relationship; reinforcing habits of democracy and practices of peace in central Europe. See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake, ‘For a New World, a New NATO’, New York Times. June 30, 1997.Google Scholar
  92. 79.
    Stephen Castle, ‘Can NATO reinvent itself as a powerful force in the modern world’, The Independent, 21 November 2002.Google Scholar
  93. 80.
    The NATO-Russia Founding Act identified a broad range of topics on which NATO and Russia could consult and co-operate, including preventing and settling conflicts, peacekeeping, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and exchanging information on security and defence policies and forces. The text of the NATO-Russia Founding Act is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htmdocu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm.
  94. 81.
    Before the elections President Clinton gave major speeches in Milwaukee, Cleveland and Detroit, cities with significant numbers of East European voters. See James M. Goldgeier, ‘NATO expansion: the Anatomy of a Decision’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp.94–95. See also Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, p.22.Google Scholar
  95. 82.
    Ronald Asmus has argued that NATO should assume a leading role in providing security in Iraq and be prepared to help enforce an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. See Ronald D. Asmus, ‘Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, no. 5, (Sept./Oct. 2003), pp. 20–31.Google Scholar
  96. 83.
    U.S. president Bush first signalled during a visit to Poland in June 2001 that his administration favoured a broad expansion of NATO. The transcript of the President’s address to faculty and students of the Warsaw University is available at ‘http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.htmlnews/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html’.
  97. 84.
    In August 2002 Romania was the first country to sign an agreement with the United States which, under article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, commits it not to consign U.S. nationals to the Court. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania have since signed article 98 agreements with Washington.Google Scholar
  98. 85.
    Dan Reiter, ‘Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy’, p.55.Google Scholar
  99. 86.
    According to Hanns Maull, NATO could possibly turn into a provider of co-operative security services and conflict prevention in Europe and its periphery, and a political mechanism to draw non-members closer to the West. Roberto Aliboni has suggested instead that the alliance could evolve into a collective security organisation, no less exten? sive than the OSCE. While wittingly pointing out potential paths in NATO’s evolution, these hypotheses fail, however, to acknowledge that, as assumed by the realist theoretical framework, the fortunes of the alliance will continue to depend upon the political will of its member countries. See Hanns W. Maull, ‘The future of NATO’; Roberto Aliboni, ‘Neo-Nationalism and Neo-Atlanticism in Italian Foreign Policy’, The International Spectator, no. 1, January-March 2003, p.88.Google Scholar
  100. 87.
    The United States has demonstrated to be aware of this Russian concern. For this reason, the Bush administration has limited its interference in Russia’s internal affairs and in the Chechen conflict, while taking a cautious line about Ukraine’s prospects of earning NATO membership. More specifically, although nurturing Ukraine’s ambition to strengthen ties with the West, the Bush administration has stopped short of providing a clear timetable for Ukraine’s admission into NATO.Google Scholar
  101. 88.
    In Uzbekistan, for example, Moscow openly challenged U.S. policy, supporting the decision of Uzbek President Karimov to reject NATO requests for an independent investigation into the Uzbek government crackdown against political opposition in the city of Andijon in May 2005. Two months later Russia, China, and the four central Asian states of the Shangai Co-operation Council demanded the United States to set a deadline for ending its military presence in central Asia. Alongside China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Russia is evidently worried by the U.S. attempt to promote regime change across the region.Google Scholar
  102. 89.
    This statement was made in a speech delivered by Schroeder’s Minister of Defence Peter Struck at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2005.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Taylor & Francis Group 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luca Ratti
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Rome 3Italy

Personalised recommendations