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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 179–198 | Cite as

Relating to the Anglosphere: Canada, ‘Culture’, and the Question of Military Intervention

  • David G. Haglund
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Notes

  1. 1.
    See my ‘From Empire to Umpire to Empire: Canada and the Dilemmas of Military Interoperability,’ in The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002), pp. 109–17.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Lawrence Martin, ‘A Tale of Two Models: How We Remain a European Nation,’ Globe and Mail (Toronto), 2 June 2005, p. A19; and, especiallyGoogle Scholar
  3. 2a.
    Philip Resnick, The European Roots of Canadian Identity (Toronto: Broadview, 2005).Google Scholar
  4. 3.
    ‘Chirac dit non à la guerre américaine contre l’Irak,’ Le Monde, 12 March 2003, pp. 1, 2.Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    See Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, ‘Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,’ in Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’ s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?, ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 181–99.Google Scholar
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    For the familial imagery, see John C. Blaxland, ‘The Armies of Canada and Australia: Closer Collaboration?’ Canadian Military Journal 3 (Autumn 2002): 45–54.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
    There is an abundant literature on tensions between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ leaders and de Gaulle during and after the Second World War. See, for instance, Raoul Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict, a Personal Memoir (New York: Free Press, 1988)Google Scholar
  8. 6a.
    François Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1983)Google Scholar
  9. 6b.
    John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: Viking, 1970)Google Scholar
  10. 6c.
    Mario Rossi, Roosevelt and the French (Westport: Praeger, 1993)Google Scholar
  11. 6d.
    Milton Viorst, Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965); andGoogle Scholar
  12. 6f.
    Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).Google Scholar
  13. 7.
    The term itself first appeared in print in Neal Stephenson’s science fiction novel, The Diamond Age: Or, a Young Lady’s Primer (New York: Bantam Books, 1995).Google Scholar
  14. 8.
    Quoted in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, ‘Foreword,’ in Image and Reality in World Politics, ed. Farrell and Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. v.Google Scholar
  15. 9.
    Williams, cited by William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘The Concept(s) of Culture,’ in Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 35–61. For an extensive catalogue of culture’s many, and at times contradictory, meaningsGoogle Scholar
  16. 9a.
    see A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).Google Scholar
  17. 10.
    For a discussion, see David G. Haglund, ‘What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept,’ International Journal 59 (Summer 2004): 479–502.Google Scholar
  18. 11.
    Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977).Google Scholar
  19. 12.
    Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 36–37. Also see his ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 32–64.Google Scholar
  20. 13.
    Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,’ Review of International Studies 25 (January 1999): 49–69, quote at p. 58 (emphasis in original).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 14.
    This critique is made by Paul A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside and Out.’ Security Studies 8 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999): 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 15.
    For a sharp critique of those who would steer clear of national character while embracing identity and other such vague, not to say self-contradictory, categories, see Dean Peabody, National Characteristics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).Google Scholar
  23. 16.
    Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, new and rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 169. Also see, on this themeGoogle Scholar
  24. 16a.
    Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Hispanic Challenge,’ Foreign Policy, no. 141 (March/April 2004), pp. 30–45.Google Scholar
  25. 17.
    See James C. Bennett, Anglosphere: The Future of the English-Speaking Nations in the Internet Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).Google Scholar
  26. 18.
    Though as Ignatieff uses it, lite stands as code for a variant of interventionism, which he calls ‘temporary imperialism’; my usage tends in the other direction, away from the willingness to project military force. See Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: NationBuilding in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), p. vii.Google Scholar
  27. 19.
    See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities,’ Ethics & International Affairs 10 (1996): 63–98, quote at p. 73; Idem, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); andCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 19a.
    Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Security and Integration in Mitteleuropa: Towards a New Research Agenda’ (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1997).Google Scholar
  29. 20.
    See John J. Miller and Mark Molesky, Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France (New York: Doubleday, 2004).Google Scholar
  30. 21.
    In particular, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).Google Scholar
  31. 22.
    An illuminating discussion of the extensibility of the post-modern community of states is found in Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 1996); and Idem, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).Google Scholar
  32. 23.
    On this point, Michael Doyle reminds us that ‘[i]f the liberal thesis is anything like normal social science, we will discover exceptions — interliberal wars or interliberal crises — with some of the latter resolved by (from the liberal view) luck rather than by principled respect, institutional restraint, and commercial interest.’ Doyle, ‘Reflections on the Liberal Peace and Its Critics,’ in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 361.Google Scholar
  33. 24.
    For examples, see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,’ American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624–38; andCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 24a.
    Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, ‘Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. 25.
    See Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,’ Kant’s Political Writing, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar
  36. 25a.
    Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 205–35; Idem, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,’ ibid. 12 (Fall 1983): 323–53; andGoogle Scholar
  37. 25b.
    James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 4–6.Google Scholar
  38. 26.
    Norms can be taken, in the words of two students of DPT, to be ‘rules of conduct that provide standards by which behavior is approved or disapproved.’ Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, ‘Polities and Peace,’ in Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 239–62. Also see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).Google Scholar
  39. 27.
    Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 31 (emphasis in original).Google Scholar
  40. 28.
    Douglas Stuart, ‘NATO’s Anglosphere Option: Closing the Distance Between Mars and Venus,’ International Journal 60 (Winter 2005): 171–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. 29.
    On that identity, see Thomas Risse, ‘Transatlantic Identity and the Future of Canada-UK Relations,’ in Transatlantic Identity? Canada, the United Kingdom and International Order, ed. Robert Wolfe (Kingston, ONT: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, 1997), pp. 27–29.Google Scholar
  42. 30.
    Some even hold this Anglosphere to be primarily an economic entity, in which ‘the Anglosphere balances the world’s macro-economy,’ through its members serving as ‘spenders of last resort.’ See Martin Wolf, ‘Big Spenders Keep the Economy Moving,’ Financial Times, 27 April 2004, online edition. And though he does not use the term per se, it is obvious that Niall Ferguson also makes the link between Anglosphere culture and economics, by labelling ‘Anglobalization’ the process by which the British empire fostered global economic interdependence. SeeGoogle Scholar
  43. 30a.
    Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. xxvi.Google Scholar
  44. 31.
    James C. Bennett, ‘The Emerging Anglosphere,’ Orbis 46 (Winter 2002): 111–26, quote at p. 122. Also see this same author’s ‘Networking Nation-States: The Coming InfoNational Order,’ National Interest, no. 74 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 17–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. 32.
    The term is sometimes said to be Charles Krauthammer’s; for a critique of its practical applicability, see Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Neoconservative Moment,’ National Interest, no. 76 (Summer 2004), pp. 57–68. Krauthammer himself insists his vision is a more limited one, and goes under the name ‘democratic realism.’ SeeGoogle Scholar
  46. 32a.
    Charles Krauthammer, ‘In Defense of Democratic Realism,’ ibid., no. 77 (Fall 2004), pp. 15–25.Google Scholar
  47. 33.
    Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage Books, 2004).Google Scholar
  48. 34.
    Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,’ Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 4862, quote at p. 50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. 35.
    On the role of the latter, see John Edwards, Language, Society and Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).Google Scholar
  50. 36.
    Advocacies made, inter alios, by Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); Idem, ‘Toward an English-Speaking Union,’ National Interest, no. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 64–70; andGoogle Scholar
  51. 36a.
    Conrad Black, ‘Britain’s Atlantic Option, and America’s Stake,’ National Interest, no. 55 (Spring 1999), pp. 15–24.Google Scholar
  52. 3.
    Owen Harries, ‘The Anglosphere Illusion,’ National Interest, no. 63 (Spring 2001), pp. 130–36, quote at p. 130.Google Scholar
  53. 38.
    This epistemic community originated with the group of young, mainly Oxford-bred, enthusiasts working on postwar reconstruction for Lord Alfred Milner, British high commissioner in South Africa, in the immediate aftermath of the Boer war. See Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Community (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000).Google Scholar
  54. 39.
    H. Perry Robinson, The Twentieth Century American: Being a Comparative Study of the Peoples of the Two Great Anglo-Saxon Nations (Chautauqua, NY: Chautauqua Press, 1911), p. 19.Google Scholar
  55. 40.
    See, for this period, Ido Oren, ‘The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany,’ in Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 263–300; Price Collier, Germany and the Germans: From an American Point of View (London: Duckworth, 1913); andGoogle Scholar
  56. 40.
    Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 21–23.Google Scholar
  57. 41.
    See Richard T. Vann, ‘The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (April 1958): 259–72; andCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. 41a.
    Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 10–24.Google Scholar
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    Homer Lea, The Day of the Saxon (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1912).Google Scholar
  60. 43.
    Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, or the Racial Basis of European History (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1919), pp. 91–100.Google Scholar
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    For an indictment of those who sought to impart a ‘scientific’ basis to racial categorizing, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).Google Scholar
  62. 45.
    Nor was it only Anglo-Saxons who espied America’s slipping from the fold; a leading French sociologist of the early twentieth century was just as convinced that America was fully and irreversibly shedding its Anglo-Saxon identity, with implications impossible to predict. See André Siegfried, Les États-Unis d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Armand Colin, 1927). This theme has recently reappeared inGoogle Scholar
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    Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).Google Scholar
  64. 46.
    E. V. Lucas, A Wanderer in Holland (London: Methuen, 1905), p. 5.Google Scholar
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    Balanced discussions of the issue are provided in David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); andCrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Dirk Verheyen, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). For a less balanced account that stresses national character, seeGoogle Scholar
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    A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946).Google Scholar
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    Alexander De Conde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), pp. 184–86.Google Scholar
  69. 49.
    Ralph Waldo Emerson was the first to popularize the ‘smelting pot’ metaphor, but over time it ceded place to the related, though somewhat different, image of the ‘melting pot.’ Technically, the former is used to separate a metal from its mineral, while the latter is used to blend metals into alloys. For the metaphor and its evolution, see Denis Lacome, La Crise de l’identité américaine: Du melting-pot au multiculturalisme (Paris: Fayard, 1997), pp. 198–203.Google Scholar
  70. 50.
    David Hackett Fischer, Albion’ s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).Google Scholar
  71. 51.
    The region comprises three zones, running from east to west: the Blue Ridge Belt, the Greater Appalachian Valley, and the Cumberland Belt; it covers portions of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky, as well as all of West Virginia. See John C. Campbell, The Southern Highlander and His Homeland (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1921).Google Scholar
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    Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), pp. 231–50.Google Scholar
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    Or so I have argued in ‘Whose Divergence? Canada-US Relations in a Period of Jacksonian Ascendancy,’ Policy Options 25 (October 2004): 34–40.Google Scholar
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    Joel J. Sokolsky, ‘Northern Exposure? American Homeland Security and Canada,’ International Journal 60 (Winter 2004-5): 35–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  75. 55.
    See, on this strain, Jean-Sebastien Rioux, ‘Two Solitudes: Quebecers’ Attitudes Regarding Canadian Security and Defence Policy,’ a paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute’s Research Paper Series, February 2005.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • David G. Haglund
    • 1
  1. 1.Queen’s UniversityKingstonCanada

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