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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 123–138 | Cite as

Bowling by the Same Rules? Eu-United Nations Relations and the Transatlantic Partnership

  • Peter Schmidt
Part III: Strategic Issues and Alliance Cohesion

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Notes

  1. 1.
    ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, White House, Washington, September 2002.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    For the strategic partnership approach between the EU and NATO see ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, NATO Press Release 142, December 16, 2002.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    ‘The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA’, in ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Brussels, December 12, 2003, p. 13.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See Colin L. Powell, ‘A Strategy of Partnerships’, Foreign Affairs, 83(1), (2004).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Certain elements of the constitutional treaty have already come into force by political declarations like the preparation of a European diplomatic service and a solidarity obligation in case of a catastrophic event in member countries.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Even France cannot be excluded from the list of risk states. See Andreas Maurer and Andrea Stengel, ‘Ein Referendum für Europas Verfassung?’, SWP Diskussionspapier, May 2004.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Released at December 12, 2003, http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3087.
  8. 8.
    See Peter Schmidt and Gary Geipel, ‘Forward Again in US-European Relations’, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, May 2004, pp. 30–33.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    The first draft of the document contained the notion of ‘preemptive engagement’, which was then replaced during the discussions by ‘preventive engagement’. In sum, the revised version leans, more than the first, to preventive engagement and the use of the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy instruments. By this it puts more emphasis on the traditional EU approaches to security.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    See Carsten Stahn, ‘International Law at a Crossroad? The Impact of September 11’, Zeitschriftfiir ausländisches öffentliches Recht & Völkerrecht, 4 (2002), pp. 232–33Google Scholar
  11. 10a.
    and Christoph Schaller, ‘Das Friedenssicherungsrecht im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus. Gewaltverbot, Kollektive Sicherheit, Selbstverteidigung und Präemption’, SWP-Studie, S3, Berlin, February 2004.Google Scholar
  12. 11.
    Later on, however, the UK and the U.S. legitimized the operation not by the notion of necessary ‘preemption’, but by the violation of U.N. resolutions by Iraq. See Schaller, ‘Das Friedenssicherungsrecht’, p. 20.Google Scholar
  13. 12.
    See Reinhardt Rummel, ‘Soft-Power: Interventionspolitik mit zivilen Mitteln’, in Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Burkhardt Schmitt (eds.), Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen, Aktivitäten, Fähigkeiten, Baden-Baden, 2004, pp. 259–279.Google Scholar
  14. 13.
    ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and, when necessary, robust intervention’, ‘European Security Strategy’, p. 11. The quote does not explicitly speak of military means, but the context of the sentence refers implicitly to the use of armed forces.Google Scholar
  15. 14.
    See ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999’, para 25.Google Scholar
  16. 15.
    Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.Google Scholar
  17. 16.
    See Loi de Programmation Militaire 2003–2008, p. 23.Google Scholar
  18. 17.
    See Assembly of the WEU, ‘Explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr Rivolta, Rapporteur’, Document A/1825, pp. 4–26.Google Scholar
  19. 18.
    See Art. 1–40, para 6 of the draft for a constitutional treaty of the European Union.Google Scholar
  20. 19.
    See Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, pp. 27–42.Google Scholar
  21. 20.
    See Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘“Preemptive Strikes”. Eine neue sicherheitspolitische Realität’, Internationale Politik, June 2004, p. 46.Google Scholar
  22. 21.
    John Peterson reports the Statement of a high-ranking U.S. National Security Council official after the war against Saddam: ‘…we may never have intelligence that’s good enough to make preemption a viable strategy. Even a 2 per cent failure rate is politically unacceptable’, John Peterson, ‘American as a European power: the End of Empire by Integration?’, International Affairs, 80, (2004), p. 626. The interview was carried out on December 1,2003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 22.
    See New York Times, March 11, 2004, p. A1.Google Scholar
  24. 23.
    Not by chance, J. Habermas and J. Derrida start from the assumption that a common European identity can and should be forged out of opposition to the United States. See Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy. Beginning in the Core of Europe’, Constellations, 10 (2003), pp. 291–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 24.
    For this interpretation, see Holger Hestermeyer, ‘Die völkerrechtliche Beurteilung des Irakkriegs im Lichte transatlantischer Rechtskulturunterschiede’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 64 (2004), pp. 315–341.Google Scholar
  26. 25.
    Quite interestingly, the former German President, Roman Herzog, argues along Anglo-Saxon lines in insisting that the Coalition attack on Iraq 2003 was neither legal nor illegal. See Roman Herzog, ‘Das Völkerrecht nach dem Irak-Konflikt’, Zur débatte: Themen der Katholischen Akademie in Bayern, 6 (2003), p. 12.Google Scholar
  27. 26.
    E.g. the Ottawa Convention banning land mines, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol. See Joachim Krause, ‘Multilateralism: Behind European Views’, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2004, p. 53.Google Scholar
  28. 27.
    For the debate, see Peter Rudolf, ‘Menschenrechte und Souveränität: Zur normativen Problematik “Humanitärer Intervention‘”, SWP-Studie, S40, Berlin, December 2001.Google Scholar
  29. 28.
    There are quite a number of international law specialists in Europe, who reject the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a justification for military intervention. See, e.g., R. Wolfrum, ‘Irak - eine Krise auch für das System der kollektiven Sicherheit’, February 24, 2003, www.mpil.de/de/Wolfrum/irak.pdf.Google Scholar
  30. 29.
    The main legal argument for the war was the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’, but it was obvious that the NATO framework was an important additional legitimizing factor in the political process.Google Scholar
  31. 30.
    See ‘Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations Operations‘.Google Scholar
  32. 31.
    See ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, Background Note, June 1, 2004.Google Scholar
  33. 32.
    ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, New York, September 24, 2003.Google Scholar
  34. 33.
    See Council of the European Union, ‘EU-U.N. Co-Operation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-U.N. Joint Declaration’, Adopted June 17–18, 2004.Google Scholar
  35. 34.
    According to current plans, Battlegroups should be available by 2007. These units will represent high readiness joint packages which are able to start an operation on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch an operation. See Council of the European Union, ‘ESD Presidency Report’, 10547/04, COSDP 373, PESC 524, CIVCOM 128, Brussels, June 15, 2004, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar
  36. 35.
    In these cases, the EU might exert only the function of a clearing house for coordinating nation states’ efforts. See Council of the European Union, ‘EU-UN Co-Operation’, p. 3.Google Scholar
  37. 36.
    See François Grignon, ‘The Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations. An Agenda of Priorities’, Paper presented at International Conference, October 23 and 24, 2003, Tivoli Tejo Hotel, Lisbon.Google Scholar
  38. 37.
    Grignon, ‘The Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations’, p. 3.Google Scholar
  39. 38.
    The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe goes a little bit further (article III–206) in saying: ‘Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the European Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. When the EU has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the EU’s position’.Google Scholar
  40. 39.
    For the current German debate on this matter, see Karl Kaiser, ‘A Security Council Seat for Germany’, Internationale Politik (transatlantic edition), 5(3), (2004), pp. 61–69.Google Scholar
  41. 40.
    The coalition agreement between the social democratic and green party uttered the aim of a European permanent seat. A national seat was only regarded acceptable, if the European seat had become an unrealistic goal.Google Scholar
  42. 41.
    See BBC News (world edition), ‘Four Nations Launch UN Seat Bid’, September 22, 2004.Google Scholar
  43. 42.
    The proposal by the UN’s High-level Panel (see The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, General Assembly, A / 59/565, 2 December 2004, clause 252–253) proposes two models for the reform of the Security Council. The first model knows six additional permanent members of the Security Council (without power of veto), the second eight additional members on a rotating basis.Google Scholar
  44. 43.
    See the approach of the ESS to form’ strategic partnerships’ with quite a number of countries and regions close to the U.S. A recent example is the EU summit with states of Latin America and the Caribbean in Gudadalajara, Mexico. An important point of discussion was ‘multilateralism’.Google Scholar
  45. 44.
    See Van Oudenaren, ‘Transatlantic Bipolarity’.Google Scholar
  46. 45.
    See Randall L. Schweller, ‘Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources’, in: Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.Google Scholar
  47. 46.
    See David Haglund, ‘Western Europe and the Challenge of the “Unipolar Moment”: Is Multipolarity the Answer?’, unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
  48. 47.
    Haglund, ‘Western Europe’.Google Scholar
  49. 48.
    Michel Rocard, ‘Du bon usage d’une Europe sans âme’, Le Monde, November 28, 2003, pp. 1, 17.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Schmidt
    • 1
  1. 1.Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)BerlinGermany

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