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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 71–87 | Cite as

A European Competitive Advantage? Civilian Instruments for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

  • Antonio Marquina
  • Xira Ruiz
Part II: The Other Option: An Autonomous Europe

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Originated in the 1992 Petersberg meeting of WEU ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and were later included in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Petersberg tasks comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking operations. These tasks have been expanded in the European Constitutional Treaty, Article III-210, section I, and include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. For these tasks, the EU may use civilian and military means.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    European Commission, Civilian instruments for EU crisis management, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, April 2003, p. 5.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Jussi Koskela, ‘Instruments of Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Available to the European Union’, STOA (Scientific and Technological Options Assessment), European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, March 2001.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    ‘Definitions and Categorizations used by the European Commission’, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition. htm.
  5. 5.
    That is clearly established in Conflict Prevention: Report by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, 14088/00, Brussels, November 30, 2000, which was endorsed by the Council in Nice.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    For further information see Presidency Report to the European Council at Feira on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, Appendix III, Study on concrete targets on civilian aspects of crisis management; Appendix IV, Concrete Targets for Police, June 19–20, 2000.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Göteborg European Council, June 15–16, 2001.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    The PSC is made up of ambassadors for every EU member country and provides early warning, offers advice, policy options and civil-military coordination and co-operation. And it maintains the political control and strategic direction of the operations.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    The committee includes one representative for every EU member and oversees training and recruitment, makes recommendations and offers advice. It also develops strategies for international police deployment, strengthening the rule of law and civil administration.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    This unit offers advice and facilitates contacts with EU Member States.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    The PPEWU has a staff of 30 people. It monitors and provides early warning, produces policy option papers and plans the responses.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    The centre supports the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and assists the Political and Security Committee making a contribution to early warning, monitoring the situation, providing intelligence and making assessments.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    See Malin Trappert, ‘Developing Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities’, European Security Review, 20 (2003).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    The Commission emphasized its experience in support for crisis management and post-conflict operations such as observation missions, civil protection and support to the UN, OSCE and other partner operations in the field of rule of law, civilian administration and police, and the potential support of the 129 EU delegations, representatives and offices in the world. Ibid.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
  16. 16.
    In all crisis management operations the EU normally designs a special envoy responsible for political coordination on the ground.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Tatjana Reiber, ‘The civilian component of the European Security and Defence Policy’, Address at the Conference European Security and Defence Policy and the New Strategic Environment, Athens, November 29, 2002.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
  19. 19.
    Financing of Civilian Crisis Management Operations. COM/2001/0467, 28 November 2001.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Reinhardt Rummel, ‘The EU’s Involvement in Conflict Prevention—Strategy and Practice,’ pp. 67–92 in Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wouters (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention, The Hague. T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, 2004.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    The Rapid Reaction Mechanism only supports actions for up to six months.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    The EUPM was launched on January 1, 2003 addressing a wide range of activities related to the rule of law, institution building programmes and police activities.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Operation PROXIMA was launched on December 15, 2003 aiming to monitor, mentor and advise the country’s police in fighting organized crime, as well as promoting European police standards.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Peter Viggo Jacobsen, The emerging EU civilian crisis management capacity — A “real added value” for the UN? Background Paper for the Copenhagen Seminar on Civilian Crisis Management, June 8–9, 2004.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    ‘NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations,’ http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20-%20EU-NATO%20Consultation,%20%Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf
  26. 26.
    Catriona Gourlay, ‘Feasibility Study on the European Civil Peace Corps’, International Security Information Service, Brussels, 2004, p 10. Gourlay mentions the conclusions of a preparatory study for the deployment of professional volunteers financed by the EU Commission and a paper on the potential contributions of NGOs and non-state experts on the EU concept of the rule of law operations introduced by the Greek presidency in late 2003. The figures provided by this study ‘illustrate that in the sectors of rule of law, public administration and reconstruction there is relatively more capacity available in the private and non-governmental sectors than that pledged by member states’. The paper acknowledges the potential of non-state experts in the preparation and conduct of missions. The problem is the Commission reluctance to fund second pillar activities where it does not have control and the EU Member States’ reluctance to finance non-state experts for these kinds of tasks.Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Peter Viggo Jacobsen, op. cit., in note 24.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Catriona Gourlay, op. cit., in note 26.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    For more information about this initiative see Training civilian experts for international peace missions. EC project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management. Office for official publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2003.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Action Plan For Civilian Aspects of ESDP. Adopted by the European Council, Brussels, 17–18 June 2004.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    However, in the EU it will not be easy to resort to this instrument given the difficulties in reaching an agreement among the EU members when there are thorny political issues at stake in the country at risk. See Niño Pérez J., ‘EU instruments for Conflict Prevention’, in Kronenberg V. and Wouters J. (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention, The Hague. T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, 2004.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Draft Presidency report to the European Council on EU activities in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 10327/04. Brussels, 8 June 2004.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    D. Rothchild, ‘Third-Party incentives and the phases of conflict prevention’, in C. Leckha & K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice. Strengthening U.N. capacities for the prevention of violent conflict, Lynne Rienner Publishers. London, 2003, p. 41.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Renata Dwan and Zdzislaw Lanchowski, “The Military and Security Dimensions of the European Union’, Security and Conflicts, 2002.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    D. Rothchild, op. cit in note 34, p. 61.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Without a doubt, the rivalry will appear again in the discussion of the Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, COM(2004) 630 final, Brussels, September 29, 2004.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Poul Nielson, Building Credibility: The Role of European Development Policy in Preventing Conflicts, Speech at the Foreign Policy Centre, London, February 8, 2001.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Non-military crisis response instruments available in EU Member States, 12323/99, Brussels, 24 November 1999. This document of the Council is a revised inventory of non-military crisis response instruments available which includes the following items: civil police, humanitarian assistance, emergency and rescue services, mine clearance, reconstruction and post-conflict rehabilitation, support for human rights, democracy, institution building, media, fact finding, mediation.! arbitration, confidence building.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antonio Marquina
    • 1
  • Xira Ruiz
    • 1
  1. 1.Complutense UniversityMadridSpain

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