Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 5–21 | Cite as

A New Military Ethos? Nato’s Response Force

  • Sten Rynning
Part I: Changing NATO


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  1. 1.
    NATO Briefing, NATO Response Force, May 2004, p. 1.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    This and the citation above are from the Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4a.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    These are contained in MC 477. The homepage of the ARRC, one of NATO’s rapid reaction corps, enumerates the missions,
  4. 4.
    The headquarters in Lisbon is strictly speaking not a ‘joint force’ headquarters but merely a ‘joint’ headquarters because it is host principally to a sea-based headquarters, the command ship USS Mount Whitney.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, Survival, 44(3), (2002), p. 123.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p. 123.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p. 127.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Joint Vision 2020 was published in June 2000,
  9. 9.
    Hans Binnedijk and Richard L. Kugler, ‘Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts’, Defense Horizons, November 2001, pages 3 and 5.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    In June 2004.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Rumsfeld’s argument to the press at a press conference following the informal NATO defense ministers’ meeting September 24, 2002,
  12. 12.
    The Washington Post, ‘NATO Looking Ahead to a Mission Makeover’, November 5 2002.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003; see alsoGoogle Scholar
  14. 13a.
    David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 14.
    Jolyon Howorth, ‘Why the ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance’, in Howorth and Keeler (eds.), Defending Europe, New York, Palgrave, 2003, p. 233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 15.
    Sten Rynning, ‘The Transatlantic Link and European Security. Defense Capabilities in Old or New Bottles?’, NATO Research Fellowship Report, October 2002Google Scholar
  17. 15a.
    John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
  18. 16.
    Germany was for long one of the surest supporters of conscription but reforms introduced in 2003 now place the emphasis on the upper two of three tiers in a new force structure: a 35,000 rapid deployment force and a 70,000 stabilization force - both projectable - which are followed by the residual force component, a 137,500 support force. Conscription is now most prominent in such nations as Greece and Turkey.Google Scholar
  19. 17.
    Cited in The Independent on Sunday, ‘Regiments face the axe in defence overhaul’, June 27, 2004.Google Scholar
  20. 18.
    Interviewed in June 2004.Google Scholar
  21. 19.
    Conducted by author at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE in June 2004.Google Scholar
  22. 20.
    Interviewed by author at NATO headquarters in Brussels in June 2004.Google Scholar
  23. 21.
    For Scheffer, see notably his June 2004 charge against the current disjointed force planning and force generation process: ‘NATO’s Istanbul Summit: new mission, new means’, speech at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 18 June, 2004, See also the Istanbul Summit Communique, NATO Press Release (2004)096, and Statement on Afghanistan by the NATO Secretary General, NATO Press Release (2004)106.
  24. 22.
    Interviewed June 2004.Google Scholar
  25. 23.
    Interviewed at NATO headquarters, June 2004.Google Scholar
  26. 24.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Afghanistan, ‘NATO Mission Bears Signs Of Continuing U.S.-French Tensions’, Monday, 26 July, 2004.Google Scholar
  27. 25.
    Interviewed in Brussels, June 2004.Google Scholar
  28. 26.
    People at both SHAPE and IS told the author that the personal factor - i.e., particular individuals - played a major part in this.Google Scholar
  29. 27.
    The impact of this skepticism on the EU’s bottom-up approach to force planning (since 1999) is analyzed in Rynning, ‘Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26/1 (March 2003), pp. 53–72.Google Scholar
  30. 28.
    Information conveyed in background interviews, NATO headquarters and SHAPE, June 2004.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sten Rynning
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Southern DenmarkDenmark

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