A New Military Ethos? Nato’s Response Force
Part I: Changing NATO
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- 1.NATO Briefing, NATO Response Force, May 2004, p. 1.Google Scholar
- 2.This and the citation above are from the Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4a.Google Scholar
- 3.These are contained in MC 477. The homepage of the ARRC, one of NATO’s rapid reaction corps, enumerates the missions, www.arrc.nato.int/brochure/q_a.htm.
- 4.The headquarters in Lisbon is strictly speaking not a ‘joint force’ headquarters but merely a ‘joint’ headquarters because it is host principally to a sea-based headquarters, the command ship USS Mount Whitney.Google Scholar
- 5.Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, Survival, 44(3), (2002), p. 123.Google Scholar
- 6.Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p. 123.Google Scholar
- 7.Binnendijk and Kugler, ‘Transforming European Forces’, p. 127.Google Scholar
- 8.Joint Vision 2020 was published in June 2000, www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm.
- 9.Hans Binnedijk and Richard L. Kugler, ‘Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts’, Defense Horizons, November 2001, pages 3 and 5.Google Scholar
- 10.In June 2004.Google Scholar
- 11.Rumsfeld’s argument to the press at a press conference following the informal NATO defense ministers’ meeting September 24, 2002, www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/Sept2402RumsfeldNATOProposal.html.
- 12.The Washington Post, ‘NATO Looking Ahead to a Mission Makeover’, November 5 2002.Google Scholar
- 13.Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003; see alsoGoogle Scholar
- 15.Sten Rynning, ‘The Transatlantic Link and European Security. Defense Capabilities in Old or New Bottles?’, NATO Research Fellowship Report, October 2002Google Scholar
- 15a.John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
- 16.Germany was for long one of the surest supporters of conscription but reforms introduced in 2003 now place the emphasis on the upper two of three tiers in a new force structure: a 35,000 rapid deployment force and a 70,000 stabilization force - both projectable - which are followed by the residual force component, a 137,500 support force. Conscription is now most prominent in such nations as Greece and Turkey.Google Scholar
- 17.Cited in The Independent on Sunday, ‘Regiments face the axe in defence overhaul’, June 27, 2004.Google Scholar
- 18.Interviewed in June 2004.Google Scholar
- 19.Conducted by author at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE in June 2004.Google Scholar
- 20.Interviewed by author at NATO headquarters in Brussels in June 2004.Google Scholar
- 21.For Scheffer, see notably his June 2004 charge against the current disjointed force planning and force generation process: ‘NATO’s Istanbul Summit: new mission, new means’, speech at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 18 June, 2004, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040618a.htm. See also the Istanbul Summit Communique, NATO Press Release (2004)096, and Statement on Afghanistan by the NATO Secretary General, NATO Press Release (2004)106.
- 22.Interviewed June 2004.Google Scholar
- 23.Interviewed at NATO headquarters, June 2004.Google Scholar
- 24.Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Afghanistan, ‘NATO Mission Bears Signs Of Continuing U.S.-French Tensions’, Monday, 26 July, 2004.Google Scholar
- 25.Interviewed in Brussels, June 2004.Google Scholar
- 26.People at both SHAPE and IS told the author that the personal factor - i.e., particular individuals - played a major part in this.Google Scholar
- 27.The impact of this skepticism on the EU’s bottom-up approach to force planning (since 1999) is analyzed in Rynning, ‘Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26/1 (March 2003), pp. 53–72.Google Scholar
- 28.Information conveyed in background interviews, NATO headquarters and SHAPE, June 2004.Google Scholar
© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005