Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 3, Supplement 1, pp 63–83 | Cite as

Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship

  • Jérôme B. Élie


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Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jérôme B. Élie
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate Institute of International StudiesGenevaSwitzerland

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