Journal of Transatlantic Studies

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 87–107 | Cite as

The New Transatlantic Agenda: Transatlantic Security Relations Between Post-Hegemonic Cooperation and Interdependence

  • Carla Monteleone


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    See Attinà, E, State Aggregation in Defence Pacts: Systemic Explanations, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Journalistic sources remind us that the Twin Towers and the Empire State Building had already been object of attacks on 3 August 1977 by the Puerto Rican Faln and on 26 February 1993 by Islamic fundamentalists. As for the means used, plans involving them were found against Paris, Hong Kong, the Philippines and New York. See and (27/04/02).
  3. 3.
    See Congressional Report Service, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support’, 17 October 2001; U.S. European Command Public Affairs, ‘Coalition Building. War on Terrorism’, 12 March 2002.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See (21/04/02).
  5. 5.
    Attinà, F., Il sistema politico globale, Bari, Laterza, 1999.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Just think about cases such as the intervention in Albania, the imposition of the no-flight zone in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish minority, or the intervention in Kosovo.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Attinà, F., Il sistema politico globale., p. 146.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    The clearest case is the Great Lakes Region, in Africa, and in particular the conflict in Rwanda, that produced refugees flows towards Tanzania, Zaire and Burundi so massive that created not only humanitarian crises, but also the expansion of the conflict. A typical example of extension of the instability and conflict area due to the incursions of irregular armies is provided by Liberia and Sierra Leone. But the phenomenon is not limited to the African region: during the Kosovo crisis, the refugee flows and the incursions of irregular armies threatened the expansion of the conflict to Macedonia.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    In Bosnia, for instance, the conflict continued for several years before a result was achieved. In Somatia the forces intervened for a nation-building operation had to withdraw.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report, Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997, (21/04/02).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Bajpai, K., ‘Human Security: Concept and Measurement’, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Occasional Paper #19:OP:1, Columbia International Affairs Network, 2000,, (21/04/02).
  13. 13.
    Buzan, B., People, States and Fear, Great Britain, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1983Google Scholar
  14. 13a.
    and Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J., Security. A New Framework for Analysis, London, Boulder, 1998.Google Scholar
  15. 14.
    On the evolution of the concept of security, see Monteleone, C. (2000), ‘Sicurezza: una nuova agenda per un concetto in evoluzione’, in Teoria politica, 16 (2000), pp. 161–176Google Scholar
  16. 14a.
    and Monteleone, C., ‘Sfide e prospettive del concetto di sicurezza multidimensionale nel sistema politico globale’, paper presented at the Conference ‘Evoluzione della sicurezza nel sistema mondiale’, Catania, 2–3 May 2002.Google Scholar
  17. 15.
    See, amongst others, Walt’s comment in Columbia International Affairs Network, ‘Commentary on the Terrorist Attacks against the United States’, September 2001, (21/04/02)Google Scholar
  18. 15a.
    and Walt, S., ‘Beyond Bin Laden’, International Security, 26 (2001), p. 56–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 16.
    See Chipman, J., ‘The Future of Strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy’, Survival, 34 (1992).Google Scholar
  20. 17.
    Solana, J. quoted in ‘Spain sheperds move to strengthen EU-US links’, International Herald Tribune, 2–3 December 1995. Solana was at the time the Foreign Ministry of Spain, country holding the EU Presidency.Google Scholar
  21. 18.
    Ambassador Eizenstat, Wireless File, 9 February 1996Google Scholar
  22. 18a.
    quoted in Frellesen, T., ‘Processes and Procedures in EU-US Foreign Policy Cooperation: From the Transatlantic Declaration to the New Transatlantic Agenda’, in Philippart, E. and Winand, P. (eds.), Ever Closer Partnership, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Brusseis, 2001, p. 333, note 20.Google Scholar
  23. 19.
    Phitippart, E., ‘Assessing, Evaluating and Explaining the Output of US-EU Relations’, in Philippart, E and Winand, P., Ever Closer Partnership,.p. 57–79.Google Scholar
  24. 20.
    Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., Power and Interdependence, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977, p. 19.Google Scholar
  25. 21.
    Featherstone, K. and Ginsberg, R.H., The United States and the European Union in the 1990s, London, Macmillan, 1996.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 22.
    Philippart, ‘Assessing, Evaluating and Explaining…’, p. 75.Google Scholar
  27. 23.
    Gilpin, R., Guerra e mutamento nella politica internazionale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 47Google Scholar
  28. 23a.
    original edition: Gilpin, R., War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. 23b.
    Keohane, R.O., After Hegemony, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 136.Google Scholar
  30. 24.
    Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 365.Google Scholar
  31. 25.
    See Cox’s definition of hegemony: «a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities. In a hegemonic order these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as the natural order. Such structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state’s dominance is not in itself sufficient to create hegemony», Cox, R., ‘Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, in Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E.O. (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 140.Google Scholar
  32. 26.
    Thanks to Professor Fulvio Attinà for his suggestion on this point.Google Scholar
  33. 27.
    Modelski, G., Long Cycles in World Polities, London, Macmillan, 1987.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 27a.
    For a more recent and revised version, see Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics’, in Bornschier, V. and Chase-Dunn, C., The Future of Global Conflict, London, SAGE, 1999.Google Scholar
  35. 28.
    Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization’, p. 13.Google Scholar
  36. 29.
    Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization’, p. 16.Google Scholar
  37. 30.
    Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization’, p. 17.Google Scholar
  38. 31.
    Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization’, p. 18.Google Scholar
  39. 32.
    For an analysis of the regular connection between the level of state aggregation in defence pacts and the phase of leadership, see Attinà F., ‘State aggregation in defense pacts: systemic explanations’, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  40. 33.
    Modelski, G., ‘From Leadership to Organization’, p. 14.Google Scholar
  41. 34.
    Attinà, F., It sistema politico globule, p. 176.Google Scholar
  42. 35.
    Modelski, G. and Thompson, W. R., ‘The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach’, Mershon International Studies Review, 1 (1999), pp. 109–140.Google Scholar
  43. 36.
    Annual consultations since 2001, as both the US (at the EU-US ministerial on 6 March 2001) and the EU (Communication from the Commission to the Council COM(2001)154 final, 20 March 2001), considering that there was too little time for an efficient preparation of the Summits, agreed on the need to reduce the number of Summits. Another proposal concerns the reduction of ministerial preparatory meetings that has become a common practice since 1998.Google Scholar
  44. 37.
    The framework has been obtained combining information from interviews to officials of the Department of States, to DG1A, to the EU mission to the United States, to the US mission to the European Union, from Frellesen, T., ‘Processes and Procedures in EU-US Foreign Policy Cooperation’; and from and (07/07/2001).Google Scholar
  45. 38.
    Lebow, R.N., Between Peace and War, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 7.Google Scholar
  46. 38a.
    However, for a review of the literat/are on crisis see Brecher, M., Crises in Worm Politics, Oxford, Permanent Press, 1993, p. 8–25.Google Scholar
  47. 39.
    Interview with an official of the Department of State, December 1998.Google Scholar
  48. 40.
    Trying to overcome the traditional difference over the death penalty issue, the US and the EU are currently negotiating an agreement on extradition and mutual assistance. Other examples of cooperation are provided by the establishment of new channels of communication, and in particular by the opening of a Europol liaison office in Washington and by the recent participation of the American Attorney General to a meeting of the Council of Ministers dealing with internal security issues.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Board of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carla Monteleone
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Studies on Politics, Society and LawUniversity of PalermoItaly

Personalised recommendations