Security Journal

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 385–400 | Cite as

Prevention of white-collar crime through licensing: The case of the licensing of employees in the Swedish securities industry

Original Article

Abstract

Licensing programmes for employees in the securities industry have been introduced in an increasing number of countries and have become a significant element of control of the associated markets, which are important for public finances. This article documents the licensing programme in the Swedish securities industry, and analyses its potential to foster rule compliance and prevent white-collar crime. The programme’s knowledge requirements, sanctions system, reporting obligation and organisational structure are central components that are analysed, particularly regarding their ability to create predictability, confidence and interdependent relationships that can counteract risk factors for white-collar crime, namely, social disorganisation, responsibility diffusion, institutional market imbalances and isolated subcultures.

Keywords

white-collar crime financial crime securities markets licence crime prevention 

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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of GothenburgGothenburgSweden

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