Many view BRI as advancing China’s geopolitical, even hegemonic, ambitions in Eurasia and Africa, perhaps in line with its historical “tributary state system.” U.S. formulation of a new Indo-Pacific strategy, the creation of a countervailing bloc known as the “Quad” (consisting of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia), and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor championed by India and Japan, represent examples of powerful, proactive resistance and opposition to these states’ perception of BRI as the instrument of a geopolitical agenda (Singh, 2019). India, in particular, is adamantly opposed to the current iteration of BRI, which it regards as an “encirclement strategy” constituting unwarranted intrusion into the South Asian region. Recently, the U.S., as part of intensifying hostilities and rivalry with China, has strongly criticized BRI and urged countries to disengage from BRI projects. In such circumstances, there is a need for a strategic re-think of BRI, which can alleviate concerns and blunt the criticism of BRI through greater inclusiveness and pro-active international cooperation.
It is clear that, from China’s perspective, BRI is intended to serve, perhaps predominantly, its international political and security interests. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is designed to secure unimpeded strategic access through the Straits of Malacca to the Indian Ocean and through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. Port and zone construction, under BRI auspices, in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Djibouti (China’s first overseas naval base), and Egypt all serve China’s security interests. This BRI emphasis on geopolitical security is further reinforced by China’s network of “strategic partnerships” with BRI partners – China’s equivalent of alliances (Lewis & Moise, 2018), to the near exclusion of Western MNEs and local businesses as evidenced below.
It has been estimated that approximately 80% of BRI infrastructure projects funded by Chinese state banks have been awarded only to Chinese companies with European companies, in particular, acting merely as niche players (Devonshire-Ellis, 2018; European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2020). According to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as of 2018, 89% of contractors in Chinese-funded transportation projects, many of them BRI projects, are Chinese companies (Hillman, 2018). More than half of European companies in China that have bid on BRI-related projects list “insufficient information available” as a major challenge, while nearly 40% have struggled with “non-transparent public procurement systems” (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2020). Clearly, there is an exigent need for greater inclusiveness of foreign business in BRI projects and for enhanced openness and transparency in the bidding and tendering process for such projects.
Nonetheless, certain foreign multinational corporations have been able to successfully position themselves to participate in BRI projects and related activities. Such MNE cooperation has taken the form of services provision and EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) support arrangements often structured as joint ventures with Chinese companies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018).
General Electric (GE) in the U.S. and Siemens AG, based in Germany, have both benefitted significantly from their participation in BRI projects. These MNEs have set up joint ventures with Chinese companies in BRI countries, providing technological support, equipment supply, and financial and operating solutions.
Notably, GE has entered into a MoU with the China National Machinery Industry Corporation to collaborate on clean energy projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. GE is also partnering with over 30 Chinese engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractors in more than 70 markets in BRI countries, including collaborating on more than ten Pakistani power projects. For its part, Siemens is partnering with over 100 Chinese EPC contractors in more than 60 overseas markets (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018).
BRI partnerships with MNEs are also prevalent in regions where the Chinese presence is relatively recent and established MNEs have a comparative advantage. For example, Orange (formerly France Telecom) has teamed up with Chinese Internet giant Baidu to develop the mobile internet for Francophone Africa. Similarly, a consortium of French and Chinese firms, including French Bolloré and China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) have jointly won a bid to fund, build, and operate the Kribi Container Terminal in Cameroon (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). Bolloré has also teamed up with CHEC and the Government of Timor-Leste in a PPP for the construction of the new Tibar Bay Container Port - intended to serve as an important BRI maritime trade hub between China and Oceania (Bolloré Ports, 2018).
Many BRI infrastructure projects are implemented through joint ventures and PPPs between Chinese firms and local private enterprises or government entities. Local partners are often indispensable to operate infrastructure and gain access to local markets as they possess the requisite connections with local authorities (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). As is indicated in Table 2, BRI Projects (below), local private companies, in addition to local government entities, may perform a range of important functions as BRI project contractors, implementers, and operators. It should be noted that BRI projects with AIIB financial backing typically entail higher levels of local and foreign participation than projects without such multilateral support.
Local business participation in BRI projects may also take the form of state-owned enterprises, rather than private business. For example, in Indonesia, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail project includes only Indonesian state-owned companies as lead contractors, and KCIC is the state-owned rail operator for the project. This is the Chinese preference. For BRI projects in Indonesia, Chinese loans are subject to certain conditions – the money must filter down to Indonesia’s state-owned companies to provide a better fit with Chinese-participating SOEs (Devonshire-Ellis, 2018).
Nowhere perhaps is the challenge of aligning BRI strategies with SDG benchmarks more evident than in the CPEC, considered by China to be “the flagship project” for the entire BRI enterprise. Unlike the other economic corridors, which necessitate complex multilateral agreements, CPEC is an entirely bilateral arrangement built upon the foundation of over six decades of an “all-weather” strategic partnership between the two countries. Chinese investment in CPEC since 2014, estimated to ultimately reach $45–60 billion, has targeted energy, communication, and transportation infrastructure, such as the Karot and Suki Kinari hydropower dams, the Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi railway, the port of Gwadar, a fiber optic project, and solar, wind, and coal-fired power plants (Fulton, 2018). Although there is potential for significant advances in all of the 17 SDGs, with China continuing to fund fossil fuel energy projects, even with stepped-up investment in renewable energy, the “green” SDGs11-15 will probably remain elusive for some time to come.
As noted above, India remains skeptical of BRI as an intrusion on its regional prerogatives. If China is to refute these challenges and demonstrate the synergistic potentiality of BRI with the SDG framework, CPEC could be an important test case. In this regional context, BRI could serve as a vehicle both for addressing China’s concerns over energy supplies and security, while also alleviating Pakistan’s daunting economic and environmental problems, such as recurrent drought and desertification in Central and Southern Pakistan (Ferguson, 2018). Only time will tell, but particularly if CPEC can make headway in encouraging the rule of law, reducing violence (SDG 16), and enhancing stable cross-border partnerships (SDG 17), it will have made significant contributions toward creating a more stable and thus more sustainable sociopolitical environment. In a region that remains fraught with the potential for conflict, even to the point of a nuclear exchange, such stability is sorely needed.
In spite of the bilateral character of the CPEC, its high-speed rail, highway, pipeline, and port facilities now planned or under construction hold the potential for integrating a vast region, from the landlocked Central Asian nations to the north, to the Indian Ocean littoral as far as East and Southern Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. The port of Gwadar conceivably could play a role akin to that of Hong Kong or Singapore, as a dynamic entrepot of regional commerce, linked to but not dominated by trade and investment from China. Should this occur, then fears of an overwhelmingly Sinocentric orientation of BRI may turn out to be misplaced, especially if Indo-Pakistani strategic competition and other simmering South Asian conflicts can be defused and turned in less militarized directions. Thus, while much of the infrastructural investment and construction in CPEC may be undertaken mainly by Chinese or joint Sino-Pakistani firms, the resultant infrastructure can serve much broader constituencies than its original funders and founders, just as the Suez Canal, the Inter-American Highway, or Japanese infrastructure projects (some undertaken many decades ago) in Southeast Asia do today.
Japan’s ASEAN Formula
Japan’s early experiences with FDI in the ASEAN countries could serve as a useful point of reference as China pursues a similar, albeit more extensive, outbound investment path via BRI today. In the 1980s, Japan, facing mounting trade frictions with the United States, began investing heavily in the Southeast Asian countries as external export platforms which were also attractive on account of their significantly lower production costs (Guisinger, 1991; Urata, 1993). Offshoring of Japanese manufacturing to ASEAN countries, especially in electronics, machinery, consumer goods, and later automobiles, made Japan’s exports more competitive in Western developed countries and more affordable in newly emergent intra-ASEAN and wider East Asia markets. Japanese production arrangements typically involved electronics components being produced by a parent company in Japan or by Japanese subsidiaries in other developed countries or in the “Newly Industrialized Economies” (i.e., South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) (Urata, 1993). These electronic components were then shipped to other Japanese subsidiaries in the ASEAN countries or back to the home country where final products such as TVs and refrigerators were assembled. Such cross-border business operations involved what is known today as the New International Division of Labor (NIDL). The ASEAN economies attracted Japanese FDI in manufacturing as they could provide the skilled labor necessary for industrial manufacturing processes.
The above was made possible by substantial infrastructure investment from the ADB, led and preponderantly financed by Japan, in the construction of roads, bridges, hydropower dams, and power plants and grids. Such ADB-financed infrastructure supported FDI by Japanese and non-Japanese MNEs in ASEAN, which, in turn, was a major factor underlying the development of Southeast Asia.
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Recently, several BRI countries have cancelled or re-negotiated mega-projects or have balked at deepening their BRI relations with China, including Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. It is noteworthy that the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar) Corridor, officially one of BRI’s key components, was not referenced in the most recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in April 2019. It has been effectively replaced by the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as a result of China’s political, economic, and even military conflicts with its neighboring countries.
Many other criticisms have been leveled at BRI. U.S. Vice-President Pence and others have decried BRI as a vehicle for “debt-trap diplomacy” to ensnare unsuspecting BRI developing countries. From this perspective, Chinese financing of BRI infrastructure projects is viewed as a “deliberate strategy of entangling other developing countries in a web of debt, and then using this to extract unfair or strategic concessions” (Brautigam, 2019). Frequent reference has been made to the Hambantota port project in which the debt-encumbered Sri Lanka government ceded control over this new Indian Ocean port to a Chinese-dominated joint venture in return for $1.1 billion investment. Similar concerns over the assumption of excessive debt recently led Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia to cancel and then re-negotiate BRI port and railway projects with China. Debt sustainability in developing BRI countries, especially in Africa, is no doubt a realistic concern. The IMF’s Managing Director at the time, Christine Lagarde, warned that BRI poses risks of potentially failed projects and misuse of funds, which could lead to balance-of-payments problems in developing countries and necessitate IMF bailouts (Brautigam, 2019). Recently, there has been a further assessment of China’s BRI lending practices, which questions the underlying validity of elements of the Western “debt-trap” narrative (Brautigam, 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic has effectively stalled BRI, as countries have sought to contain virus spread through travel bans and other transport and immigration restrictions disrupting, inter alia, trade, logistics, and the ability of skilled Chinese workers to return to BRI host countries. BRI developing countries are faced with severe debt-servicing difficulties and prospects of defaults on BRI-related loans. As a result, BRI projects have been put on hold and, in some cases, cancelled (The Economist, 2020). In order to re-galvanize BRI in the eventual post-COVID world, Beijing may have to provide developing countries with debt relief. Apparently, China has already begun this process, including through implementation of the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (BRIX, 2020).