The impact of NOCs in Chinese foreign policy: the cases of Angola and Sudan

Abstract

Chinese companies have invested substantially in countries abroad in recent years, including countries in Africa. This article investigates the activities of Chinese energy companies in Africa, looking at the cases of Angola and Sudan. It develops a theoretical framework that can examine the role of non-state actors in foreign policy. The article presents evidence that non-state actors play a role for Chinese foreign policy and sometimes go against the policy line from Beijing. Theoretically, it illuminates the increasing role played by national oil companies (NOCs) in foreign policy and contributes with explicitation of the role played by NOCs for the foreign policy of the state. The article also contributes with insights regarding the importance of concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) to Chinese foreign policy and how this motive relates to the Chinese NOC activities in a number of countries.

Introduction

China’s overall power has grown rapidly over the last decade. In all areas of power, not least economically and militarily, the capabilities of the country have grown, both in absolute and relative terms. In the debate on the ‘rise’ of China, it is argued that as China’s capabilities grow relative to other powers, China is indeed rising. In contrast to many power transitions in the past, China’s current economic growth has occurred largely while accepting the norms of the international system (Fravel 2008). Still, the question of how China will make use of the military power that its increasing wealth is rendering possible remains unsettled. While these tensions are yet to be resolved, given the country’s economic growth, China will clearly come to require increasing imports of resources in the future (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2012; BP 2014).

Chinese companies have invested substantially in countries abroad in recent years. To ensure sufficient supplies of energy resources to fuel the growing economy, the Chinese government launched its ‘going out’ policy (走出去/zouchuqu) in 2001. Consequently, during the subsequent decade, Chinese energy companies have become engaged in regions as diverse as Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. In 2009, Chinese companies spent $18.2 billion¹ on merger and acquisition deals, which equates to 13 percent of the total global oil and gas acquisitions in this period (61 percent of all acquisitions have been made by national oil companies). In 2010, Chinese companies spent $29.39 billion on merger and acquisition deals, and Chinese oil companies are now operating in 31 countries, with oil and gas production in 30 of them (Jiang and Sinton 2011).

Following the increase in activities abroad, evidence has emerged that in the decade subsequent to the launch of the ‘going out’/走出去 policy the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have become stronger and more profitable.

The Chinese SOEs have been listed on international stock exchanges and are among the world’s largest companies in terms of revenue. Moreover, a tendency has been observed according to which SOEs have acquired an increasing influence on economic decision-making in China.

In Europe and the USA, Chinese companies have invested a record of $23 billion in 2015 and $15 billion, respectively. Recently, opposition has been voiced to the investments made by Chinese SOEs. Germany is currently lobbying for European Union rules that will allow member states to block acquisitions by SOEs in strategic sectors. In the USA, the US Congress is preparing legislation to hinder SOEs from investing in the country. Opposition to investments by Chinese SOEs hinges on the idea that they are backed with state finance, and that there is a lack of reciprocity for European and US companies doing business in China (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2019). Fundamental to the concern raised is the role of SOEs and the degree to which they are independent or controlled by the Chinese state.

The objective of this article is to examine and explain the role played by non-state actors in foreign policy. Specifically, it examines one important type of non-state actors: national oil companies (NOCs). It provides a test of the role of non-state actors for foreign policy, and for this purpose presents a theoretical framework that can help examine the role of non-state actors in foreign policy.

This article examines the question whether state interests, economic interests, or concerns with domestic stability dominate the activities of Chinese energy companies. Here, the proposition is that the empirical variation found in the relationship between the government policies and the activities of the NOCs—a subgroup of the SOEs—provides a window for understanding China’s energy policy in recent years.

For the most part, the measures are drawn from a 10-year period (2002–12) covering most of the outward activities of the Chinese energy companies following the going out (走出去) policy.

This article continues by setting out the theoretical framework used to discuss the role of NOCs in foreign policy as well as the research methodology and case selection. The following sections relate the framework to the cases of Angola and Sudan. The last section presents concluding remarks.

Theoretical framework: the role of NOCs in foreign policy

The explanation here of China’s behavior is rooted in three theories that explain the activities of the Chinese energy companies. Specifically, this article offers a theoretical framework that explains the relationship between state interests and strong interest groups.

First, the paper presents a theory that stresses structural factors. The argument is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been characterized by (near) unipolarity. In the last decade, China’s power relative to the USA has grown. In a (nearly) unipolar world, according to structural realists, candidate poles such as China are expected to try to balance against the USA (Layne 1993; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1997). In this rivalry for influence, sufficient, stable energy supplies are necessary for economic growth. Along the lines of this argument, the companies are seen as an extension of the state.

Second, building on insights from the Chinese politics literature,² a hypothesis is established according to which the political and administrative systems have been fragmented, which in turn has led to the pluralization of the policy process and reduced state capacity. In turn, the pluralization of the policy process can explain how SOEs can influence economic decision-making. Along the lines of this perspective, companies are seen as rational, profit-maximizing entities acting according to a means-end calculus. Moreover, they are seen as independent interest groups.

Third, building on insights from the Chinese politics literature,³ I present a theory emphasizing how the foreign policy of an (authoritarian) state is related to concerns with domestic legitimacy. The hypothesis is that concerns with maintaining domestic stability (维稳/weiwen) dominate and that activities of the companies in the recipient country are related to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s concern with maintaining power. The logic behind this hypothesis is that the more the leadership is concerned with domestic legitimacy, the more it needs economic growth. As economic growth requires sufficient energy supplies, the role of the Chinese companies in this regard has become important. Thus, the activities of the companies abroad can be seen as a reflection of the need for the CCP to sustain regime and domestic stability. In other words, this hypothesis can be understood as a proxy for the state’s concern with legitimacy.

Building on these theories, three hypotheses are presented: one speaks to the dominance of state interests, one speaks to the dominance of SOE interests, and one speaks to the dominance of concern with domestic stability.

H1

State interests dominate.

H2

SOE interests dominate.

H3

Concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) dominate.

Theoretical model

To test the validity of the three hypotheses presented above, I set up a framework according to which, depending on different values for the independent variable, that is, their level of oil and level of strategic importance, the SOEs in some countries will have an impact on foreign policy while the SOEs in other countries do not.

Conceptualizing the variations in government–company coordination in the manner presented here provides a view of the role of security and (geo-) political factors in the country’s energy policy and the capacity of the Chinese state in directing the engagement in the countries.

My general theory is that relations between the government and companies in particular countries are explained by the amount of oil in the country and their level of strategic importance to China. This can be thought of as the overarching hypothesis that I am testing. An alternative to my theory is that the amount of oil alone is sufficient to explain the variation in government–company relationships. However, that is not deemed to be convincing.

Based on the logic above, there are four possible outcomes of government–business relations as related to the amount of oil available and the level of strategic importance of the country in question (Fig. 1):⁴

Fig. 1

Possible outcomes

Here, the ‘level of oil’ refers to the figures for production and total reserves in the country.⁵Strategic importance signifies the strategic value of the country to the Chinese leadership. Its measurement entails a large analysis of all countries with five indicators (with weighted component parts) reflecting that which makes a country strategically important to China. It consists of the following political factors (level of political relations and role for CCP regime stability), geographic factors (salience of territory), military/security factors (role to be played by the other great power) and economic factors (bilateral trade)).

The five components of the indicator for the level of strategic importance vary from low to medium to high (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2

Indicators of Strategic Importance

In the matrix above (Fig. 1), ‘domestic stability’ refers to the ‘concern with domestic stability’. State interests and concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) are placed together, as they have the same driver. For example, much of the concern with worker safety directly bears on national security and therefore has direct security implications. Still, concerns with domestic stability (weiwen), is a variable considered apart from state interests.

One could argue that the three hypotheses are not separate and that they should be combined in different ways. One might reason that the first and second hypotheses cannot be separated as, at times, the state will have economic motives.⁶ One might say there are important indications that the companies are integrated into the state.⁷ Lastly, that the third hypothesis is not independent of the first and the second hypotheses as the behavior of the companies might be similar when concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) matter.

While I am aware that this might be a problem, here, I maintain the separation of the three hypotheses and test them across the cases. In the conclusion, I will then evaluate whether or not the distinction was useful and whether, on this basis, they should be modified in future studies. Thus, for matters of simplicity, I operate here with the simpler terms of state interests, economic interests and concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) as clearly separate terms.

One could point to alternative explanations altogether. An alternative approach to analyzing the role of SOEs in Chinese foreign policy is Norris who examines the extent of government control over the companies by use of the principal–agent framework (Norris 2016). However, as the phenomenon of ‘control’ is difficult to measure, instead I look for another proxy for capturing this underlying concept of consistency between the government policy and company activities.

Yet another perspective is to focus on the logic of appropriateness in SOE’s decision-making as Gong does (Gong 2021). Gong analyses the performance of Chinese financing as an effect of (poor) decision-making based on the logics of appropriateness (Gong 2021). Notably, Gong’s focus is limited to domestic actors within Chinese institutions. In contrast, this article aims to investigate whether SOEs, in their overseas activities, operate independently of the Chinese state.

In addition, Sino-African scholarship offers further contributions related to the activities of Chinese energy companies in Africa more generally (Downs 2006; Kong 2010). While this literature is rich on the workings of Chinese energy companies more generally, this literature does not look in depth at the role of NOCs in foreign policy. Other authors, including Brautigam, examine the role of Chinese aid to Africa (Brautigam 2010)—but less so in the context of Chinese oil companies.

Thus, to analyze the role of NOCs in Chinese foreign policy this article will apply the framework of the three hypotheses above pertaining to state interests, economic interests and concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) and then examine the extent to which China operates according to liberal or nationalist economic theory or according to concerns with domestic stability. While these hypotheses might be simplistic, at the same time, it is argued here that they will help shed light on the motives behind the activities of the Chinese energy companies.

Research methodology

The dependent variable assesses the Chinese discourse on the activities of the companies. It is defined as the degree to which state interests, economic interests, or concerns with domestic stability (维稳/weiwen) dominate and is defined as the ratio of these three.

For the quantitative analysis, the object of analysis will be texts—that is, words—that reflect underlying motives rather than more ‘objective’ measurements of, for example, physical activities or the level of government control, as it enables a stronger analysis.

For the qualitative analysis, we will consider the following indicators. Indicators for the hypothesis concerning state interests include official statements made by the Chinese leadership, visits made by senior leaders, aid flows, as well as other statements, including statements from political leaders. Indicators for the hypothesis concerning economic interests include evidence that a certain acquisition was profitable,⁸ in the sense of acquiring a certain technology or access to important reserves or assets. In terms of the indicators for the hypothesis regarding the concern with domestic stability (weiwen), I consider evidence that Chinese nationals are killed in the recipient country and evidence of the attention such incidents receive domestically, i.e., on social media, such as weibo (微博), that the Chinese leadership takes action to mediate in the situation, as well as statements from the state leaders reflecting this.

The indicators for the three hypotheses will be observed in the analysis of the cases that make up the study. Importantly, the same indicators are used in the analysis across the cases of the study in order to maintain consistency.

Moreover, it is worth noting that when considering which hypothesis provides explanatory power, I am assessing the relative explanatory power of the independent variables.

Case selection

Based on the collection of data for the above components of the independent variable (level of oil and level of strategic importance), a case selection is made in order to ensure maximum variation on the dependent variable. Based on the compilation of data on the countries and the case selection, four African countries are selected; Nigeria (high strategic importance/high oil), Angola (low strategic importance/high oil), Sudan (high strategic importance/low oil), and Tunisia (low strategic importance/low oil) (Table 1).

Table 1 Levels of oil and strategic importance

This article focuses on the cases of Angola and Sudan to test the argument because they demonstrate the full variation of the independent variable. It allows us to shed light on the causalities and dynamics found here. It presents the case of Angola, in which one would expect the SOEs to have an impact on foreign policy and the case of Sudan, where state interests are expected to dominate.⁹ Comparing the two countries with most variation is expected to give a rich analysis and allow us to shed light on the causalities and dynamics found here. For that reason, we will focus exclusively on the case of Angola and Sudan.

The article combines qualitative and quantitative analyses for empirical leverage in order to test the portability of the explanations. The quantitative part utilizes quantitative content analysis, and the qualitative component contributes with case studies and interviews.¹⁰ For the quantitative content analysis, materials written in Chinese are sampled from the CNKI database (中国知网). This is the largest Chinese language database and can be seen as representing the discourse in the Chinese state media. The qualitative part entails the thick qualitative analysis of the selected countries in the shape of structured, focused comparisons. Interviews are an important part of the analysis here.¹¹

Utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods, each case study evaluates which of the hypotheses has the preponderance of evidence, that is, whether the first, second, or third hypothesis is correct. The quantitative part of the study will enable a first cut at whether the hypothesis presented is supported. The qualitative part then enriches and provides further investigation for the reasons and validity of this.

The article focuses on the cases of Angola and Sudan, providing results within one region: the African continent. Looking at each case, three key decisions are included. For each key decision, evidence of state interests, economic interests, and concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) is examined. Finally, the results are presented and restated and discussed in relation to their implications for theory.

Resarch findings: Angola and Sudan

This section relates the analytical framework to the cases of Angola and Sudan. Each case first presents the empirical expectation for the country based on its level of strategic importance and level of oil. This is then followed by both a quantitative analysis and a qualitative analysis.

Angola

There are three predominant perspectives in the literature on the activities of Chinese energy companies in Angola. First, through a political economy lens, Chinese corporate activities in Angola offer a case of the Chinese navigating the Angolan bureaucracy and winning over the Angolan elite to ensure resource acquisitions (Alves 2010; Soares de Oliveira 2007; Corkin 2013). From a foreign policy perspective, the Chinese companies are used as tools by the Chinese state to obtain the important oil resources and are part of an expansionist strategy of the Chinese state (Rotberg 2008). Third is a globalist perspective, according to which the activities of the Chinese companies in Angola have positive developmental effects (Cheru and Obi 2011).

The contributions in the literature have several limitations. First, they are limited to materials written in English. Second, the existing literature either studies the activities of the Chinese companies as an expression of state control or not. Moreover, because I am able to access materials written in Chinese, the analysis here includes the perspectives of Chinese academics and decision-makers as reflected in the Chinese state media, together with my own interviews with Chinese business and state representatives. Thus, the study here is more thorough.

Empirical expectation

Angola is only of limited strategic importance to China; no extremist groups have become established in the country and in terms of strategic location and its ‘role for other great power’, the country is of limited importance. Even if there is high bilateral trade, and the two countries have established a strategic partnership, overall, Angola is of limited strategic importance to China (Table 2).¹²

Table 2 Level of strategic importance–Angola

Angola has very rich gas and oil reserves, together with high production. In terms of oil, as of 2014, Angola has proven reserves of 10.47 billion barrels of crude oil (18th in the world) (EIA 2016). In 2013, Angola’s oil production accounted for 1.83 million bpd (barrels per day), ranking the country as the world’s 16th largest oil producer (EIA 2016). In terms of gas; Angola’s natural gas reserves are estimated at 366.14 billion m³ in 2014 and ranked 35th in the world (EIA 2016). Its production of natural gas in 2012 was 752.10 million m³ (67th in the world) (EIA 2016). Thus, relatively speaking, Angola can be said to possess very rich gas and oil reserves together with high production.

As Angola is a country of limited strategic importance and has abundant reserves of oil, the empirical expectation is that economic interests are the dominant motivating force for Chinese interests in Angola. The empirical expectation is that:

Chinese companies have an incentive to be involved in Angola due to its large quantity of oil in order to maximize profits. But as the Chinese government attributes limited strategic importance to the country, the state will not seek to pursue its state interests there. The companies will be in the driver’s seat and there will be evidence of economic interests.

Quantitative content analysis

As noted above, the hypothesis for Angola is that economic interests dominate. The quantitative analysis of the Chinese state media shows that 80 percent of the media articles have a preponderance of economic interests over the 10-year period under investigation. Thus, the activities are driven by commercial interests and the above hypothesis is supported. Still, looking at how the discourse develops over the course of the period under examination, we see many fluctuations: economic interests dominate relative to state interests and concerns with domestic stability, except for the years 2006 (ratio of 0.8:1) and 2009 (ratio of 0.97:1). Still, in most years, the quantitative evidence supports the hypothesis (Fig. 3).¹³¹⁴

Fig. 3

Ratio of economic interests to state interests/domestic stability

The results above generally confirm the hypothesis presented here that economic interests are expected to dominate in most years. The remainder of this section explores the extent to which the results from the quantitative analysis are corroborated by the results from the qualitative analysis.

Qualitative analysis

We consider three key decisions that illuminate important aspects of the activities of Chinese companies in Angola. They have been selected to allow for analysis over time. I focus on the Eximbank loan to Angola in 2004, an agreement in 2006–07 on the construction of a refinery in Angola, and Sinopec’s and CNOOC’s failed attempt to acquire an asset in 2009–10. An alternative key decision could be Sinopec’s purchase of the stakes of SSI in block 18 in Angola in 2010. But since this is an internal company transaction, this is not included here. The three key decisions above are argued to be particularly significant and representative in terms of the activities of Chinese companies in Angola in the period under investigation.

The Eximbank loan to Angola

On 21 March 21 2004, Eximbank and the Angolan government entered into the first of three major financial deals, namely a $2 billion financing package for public investment projects. The second, agreed to in July 2007, was a $500 million agreement for ‘complementary actions’ to projects tied to the first phase of the financial deal. The third was an additional $2 billion loan in September 2007 (Corkin 2013). The combined loan of $4.5 billion was to be partly repaid in oil with provision of 10,000 bpd in the first two years, to increase to 40,000 bpd in 2009 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2005). According to one Eximbank representative, ‘Chinese banks ask such a strong guarantee as oil to do business in Angola because there is high risk’ (Interview Beijing 2014). The particular loans given to Angola have given rise to an ‘Angolan model,’ characterized by financial assistance secured by Chinese access to natural resources which, in turn, comes tied to the use of Chinese contractors. Importantly, the second tranche of the oil-backed Eximbank loan was agreed upon during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Angola in 2006.

Simultaneously, another thing happened. In mid-2003, Shell put its 50 percent stake in BP-operated ‘Block 18’ in Angola up for sale. This block contains deep-water oil assets with the highest reserves and production volume among similar projects (Moran 2012). In February 2005, Sonangol transferred the stake to Sinopec (SSI) (Alves 2010).

For Sinopec, the acquisition was its first stake in the Angolan oil industry, giving the company access to most of the Sinopec/SSI-produced oil in that bloc. Finally, as the stake would be managed in partnership with BP, a company with advanced technology, the acquisition would help Sinopec gain access to new oil technology. Says Sinopec: ‘the aim for its activities in Angola was access to technology through the joint venture between Sinopec and BP as BP has very good offshore technology’ (Interview, Beijing, 2012). As ‘Chinese technology is lagging behind, (比较落后/bijiao luohou) the JV [between BP and Sinopec] is good as a platform for sharing technology’ (Interview, Beijing, 2012). Finally, in Block 18, BP had carried much of the investment, for which reason the acquisition did not require extensive investments from Sinopec (Interview, Beijing, 2012).

There is a puzzling simultaneity of events: an important business deal on an important, promising stake in the Angolan oil industry, ‘Block 18’ in Angola, was settled immediately after the donation of the Eximbank loan. Moreover, statements from political leaders and important political visits take place to back up the acquisition. In this sense, the political agreements are bait to ‘catch’ oil deals. There is therefore evidence that—rather than the bid for the oil stake in Block 18 and the loan being unrelated—these two events are closely linked, intended to aid the Chinese companies to enter the competitive Angolan oil industry. In the words of a Chinese academic, there is ‘fierce competition … and huge amounts of money and certain political conditions related to investments in Angolan infrastructure are needed’ (Kang [[亢升] 2010]. Chinese concessional loans might therefore be seen as a way to ensure important state objectives, and thus as a foreign policy tool. This key decision to extend the Eximbank loan thus reflects state interests.

Still, there is also evidence of economic interests. The deep-water oil block, ‘Block 18’ that Sinopec acquired, had the highest reserves and production volume among projects of similar type and could thus be regarded as promising. Finally, the acquisition of the ‘Block 18’ stake helped Sinopec acquire important technology and ‘catch up’ with Western companies. As there is also evidence of economic interests in addition to state interests, state and economic interests coincide in this key decision. The activities of the Chinese oil companies in Angola are not found to have any consequences for domestic stability in the period under scrutiny.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? The results from the quantitative analysis show that economic interests dominate relative to state interests/domestic stability in 2004 (ratio of 3.0:1) and in 2005 (ratio of 2.2:1). Overall, the results from the quantitative analysis are not consistent with the qualitative analysis here, as they indicate that state and economic interests coincide. While there will always be some inconsistencies between different types of evidence, the question is whether or not they are in overall agreement. Still, based on the above, the evidence that state and economic interests coincide is more credible.

Lobito refinery 2006–07

We now turn to the key decision concerning the construction and subsequent failure of an oil refinery in Angola in 2006–07 and the significance of this for Chinese foreign policy.

On 16 March 2006, following up on deals signed during a visit by Chinese Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan to Angola in 2005, Sinopec (SSI) and Sonangol jointly agreed to develop the new Sonaref refinery. This was part of a larger agreement reached in conjunction with Sinopec being awarded stakes in the 2006 licensing round. According to the agreement, Sinopec was to provide the full funding for the project of $3.5 billion (Katsouris 2006).¹⁵ Sonangol would hold 70 percent of the shares in this project and Sinopec the remaining 30 percent.

In January 2007, however, the refinery negotiations stalled between Sonangol and Sinopec and in March, Sinopec announced its decision to withdraw from the project, citing concerns about the current market for refined products (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). On 14 March 2007, Sonangol declared that it would manage the project on its own. What were the reasons for this?

From the Chinese side, some sources indicate that Sinopec was not genuinely interested in the refinery project from the outset (Interview Luanda Angola 2014, Interview Beijing 2014); the company had only become involved with the refinery project given that the Angolan government had linked the refinery project to the concession Blocks 15/06, 17/06 and 18/06 in the 2006 licensing round. According to Chang Hexi, the Chinese economic counselor in Luanda, Chinese negotiators deliberately obstructed the negotiations (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007). For Sinopec, it is more commercially viable to export crude oil from Angola rather than exporting more expensive refined products, particularly as sufficient refining capacity is available in China. Moreover, a refinery was being built in South Africa that would compete with the Sonaref refinery. Furthermore, as petrol prices are controlled and highly subsidized in Angola, the prospects for turning a profit were very low (Centre for Chinese Studies 2010). Finally, the financial viability of the project and the risk to which it exposes the investor was questioned (Alves 2010; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010, Interviews Luanda Angola 2014). In the words of one Chinese scholar: ‘There was high risk involved in building the refinery’, and—adding to the risk—'to build a refinery is not an easy thing for Sinopec given that it lacks experience and knowledge’ (Interview, Beijing, 2014). Thus, we see that Sinopec was not interested in the project, as it was not seen as financially viable and carried high risk.

Were there also evidence of state interests? As reflected in interviews with various company representatives in Angola, the Chinese leadership was very interested in the Lobito refinery (Interviews, Luanda Angola, 2014). It offered a way to guarantee oil imports to China, thus contributing to oil security. 80 percent of the oil refined at the Lobito refinery was to be exported to the Chinese market, which would be in favor of China at the expense of the local Angolan market (Interviews, Luanda Angola, 2014). Moreover, shortly after the May 2006 bidding round, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Angola in June 2006, at which time he offered a $9 billion loan for infrastructure improvements in return for petroleum (BBC 2006). While Premier Wen made no explicit statements concerning the refinery during the visit to Angola (China Economic Herald [中国经济导报] 2006), for the Premier to visit Angola, while negotiations for the Sonaref refinery are ongoing can be seen as an indication that the Chinese government supports the construction of the refinery. This makes the ultimate failure of the refinery deal all the more surprising.

Thus, based on the evidence above, it is reasonable to conclude that economic interests dominated this case. The question, then, is why economic interests dominate and whether this is more consistent with NOC or state interests? Sinopec withdrew from the deal as the refinery was considered high risk and it was unlikely that Sinopec would be able to profit from this venture. This action did not favor the state, however, as Chinese companies subsequently lost important bids for promising stakes, as seen below in Key Decision 3. Moreover, it can be seen as damaging Chinese security interests, as it might allow for less oil to be imported to China. Moreover, it was a blow to otherwise stable bilateral relations. In this sense, this is a case where the company acted independently, pursuing its own commercial interests, which later proved to have consequences for foreign policy. This would be consistent with a greater role for NOCs in Chinese foreign policy.

Thus, the key decision considered here—the withdrawal from the Sonaref refinery in 2007—reflects economic interests.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? Whereas economic interests clearly dominate the activities of Chinese energy companies up through 2005, state interests became more important in 2006–2007. In fact, in 2006, state interests and the concern with domestic stability came to dominate relative to economic interests (ratio of 0.8:1). In the year 2006, state interests peaked relative to concerns with domestic stability (ratio of 33.0:1). Thus, the decrease in economic interests is caused by stronger state interests.

With the finalization of the important deal for the oil refinery in Angola in 2006 supported by Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit, the quantitative analysis thus reflects this increase in the importance of state interests. In 2007, however, when the refinery deal collapsed, economic interests become more important (ratio of 3.7:1). This reflects the withdrawal of Sinopec from the project because of commercial concerns. Lastly, it is worth noting that the quantitative analysis produces no evidence of the activities of the Chinese companies in Angola having any significant impact on domestic stability in China. In this key decision, the quantitative results and qualitative analysis are thus consistent, as both reflect a dominance of state interests in 2006 and both show evidence of economic interests in 2007.

Sinopec and CNOOC’s failure in 2009–2010

Subsequent to the failed refinery deal, Sinopec and CNOOC attempted to acquire an asset in Angola in 2009 that also ultimately failed.

On 17 July 2009, Sinopec and CNOOC placed a joint bid for a 20 percent stake in ‘Block 32’ owned by US-based integrated oil company, Marathon Oil. Even if only a minority stake, as this investment was blocked subsequent to the failed refinery deal in 2006–2007 and therefore had importance for Sino–Angola relations, it is worth considering more thoroughly. Block 32 is estimated to have 1.5 billion barrels of oil reserves and is considered ‘highly prospective’. The consideration for the 20 percent stake was $1.3 billion. On 11 December 2009, however, the CNOOC–Sinopec bid was blocked when Sonangol exercised its right of first refusal on the interest. Instead, Sonangol acquired the stake for $1.3 billion in a deal that closed on 9 February 2010 (Oil & Gas Journal 2009, Brenner 2010).

The unsuccessful attempt of CNOOC and Sinopec to acquire the stake provides evidence of economic interest, as Sinopec’s and CNOOC’s transaction would have given the companies access to important reserves and technology (deep-water assets) and allow them to learn management techniques from Western companies. It was an offshore field (ultra-deep water), which had been a strategic priority for Sinopec in recent years in order to gain more deep-water technology (China Metal Bulletin [中国金属通报] 2008). It would thus be considered profitable.

This is also a case of how, in the period leading up to China Sonangol’s obtaining the stake, leadership visits intensified. A strategic partnership was formed during Xi Jinping’s visit in 2010 and additional loans from CDB and Eximbank were extended. During the visit, Xi referred to ‘Angola cooperation’, where ‘energy, credit and engineering are bundled together’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Angola [中华人民共和国驻安哥拉共和国大使馆] 2010).

Thus, there are intricate links between the different parts of the activities, such as the deals, visits and loans. The frequency of the visits made by senior leaders—not only from Angola to China but also from China to Angola—increased in the period after 2007, and Xi Jinping’s visit in 2010 was particularly remarkable. All in all, the key decision examined here provides evidence of state interests. The activities of the Chinese oil companies in Angola are not found to have any consequences for domestic stability in the year under scrutiny.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? Whereas economic interests dominated prior to 2009, state interests and concerns with domestic stability became more important in 2009. In fact, in 2009, state interests dominate relative to economic interests (ratio of 0.97:1). Thus, in 2009, the results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses are consistent. Thus, in this key decision, the quantitative results and qualitative analysis are consistent (for 2009).

In conclusion, in the case of Angola, we expect to find evidence of economic interests. The qualitative analysis does not entirely confirm this empirical expectation. It reveals that state and economic interests coincide in the case of the Eximbank loan; in the case of the refinery deal, economic interests dominate; and in the case of Sinopec and CNOOC’s failed acquisition in 2009, state interests dominate. The quantitative analysis corroborates the results, with the exception of the Eximbank loan in 2004. I argue that the evidence that state and economic interests coincide in the 2004 instance is more credible, as there is also evidence of strong state interests in addition to economic interests. This means that the qualitative and quantitative analyses are in overall agreement.

The empirical expectation presented is therefore only partially supported, as the results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses produce evidence of both economic and state interests.

Sudan

This section first presents the empirical expectation for Sudan based on its level of strategic importance and level of oil. It then presents the quantitative analysis followed by the qualitative analysis.

In the literature that addresses the activities of Chinese energy companies in Sudan, three perspectives can be distinguished: a liberal/political economy perspective, a realist/foreign policy perspective and a globalist perspective. The general take is that Chinese companies are only after the oil and that the activities of Chinese companies are merely part of an expansionist strategy of the Chinese state (Rotberg 2008). In contrast, there is a small body of literature that scrutinizes the functioning of the oil companies in Sudan and the consequences for IOCs and world markets (Beswick 2004). This literature focuses on Beijing’s relations with the ruling NCP and different elites within the Sudanese state (Large 2009). Part of the literature has a globalist perspective, examining the consequences of the activities of Chinese NOCs in Sudan for development (Soares de Oliveira 2008; Taylor 2010).

There are several limitations to the above literature. First, these contributions are limited to English language materials. Second, whereas most of the above literature assumes that the Chinese state and/or companies are engaged in Sudan for state interests, the analysis here investigates the extent to which this is actually the case. Thus, I proceed in a different manner.

Empirical expectation¹⁶

Sudan holds great strategic importance for China: this observation stems from the high number of visits of the Chinese leadership to Sudan that have taken place, the (previous) existence of an extremist group linked to Al-Qaeda in the country (until 1996), and the fatalities among Chinese nationals in the country. The country has a strategic location with respect to transport to Asia compared to the West African coast as the shipping time is shorter and has important Chinese-built infrastructure, including the two main crude oil pipelines transporting oil to the main export terminal in Bashair (the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline and the Petrodar oil pipeline). Finally, even if bilateral trade is relatively limited, the fact that Sudan has been subjected to UN sanctions renders the country strategically important to China (Table 3).¹⁷

Table 3 Level of strategic importance–Sudan

As of 1 January 2014, Sudan and South Sudan combined had proven oil reserves of 5.0 billion barrels (25th in the world) (EIA 2014). Since South Sudan resumed its oil production in 2012/13, their combined oil production has increased. In terms of gas, Sudan and South Sudan combined are rich in natural gas with reserves, estimated at 84.95 billion m³ (56th in the world) (EIA 2014). However, neither Sudan nor South Sudan have any gas production, and gas exploration has been limited. Thus, relatively speaking, Sudan has neither particularly rich oil and gas reserves nor high production.

As it appears from the data above, Sudan is a country that is attributed high strategic importance by the Chinese leadership and only has little oil. Thus, state interests are expected to be the dominant driver in Sudan. The empirical expectation is that:

companies have little incentive to be involved due to the limited availability of oil. As the government attributes high strategic importance to the country it pursues its state interests. Thus, state interests/domestic stability/(weiwen) will dominate.

Quantitative analysis

As noted above, the hypothesis for the case of Sudan is that state interests dominate. The quantitative analysis of the Chinese state media shows that 80 percent of the news articles have a preponderance of economic interests over the 10-year period under investigation. Thus, the activities are driven by commercial interests and the above hypothesis is not supported. Looking over this period, the quantitative analysis shows that the level of economic interests fluctuates: overall, over the course of the period, economic interests dominate relative to state interests and concerns with domestic stability, except in the years 2008 (ratio of 0.7:1) and 2009 (ratio of 0.9:1) (Fig. 4).¹⁸

Fig. 4

Ratio of economic interests to state interests/domestic stability

The above results are surprising and disprove the hypothesis that state interests are expected to dominate. Instead, we find evidence of the dominance of economic interests, except for the years 2008 and 2009. The remainder of this article examines why this is the case and discusses its significance.

Qualitative analysis

We now scrutinize three key decisions because they illuminate important aspects of the activities of Chinese companies in Sudan. The three key decisions are deemed to be the most significant and representative in terms of the activities of Chinese companies in Sudan over the last decade, and thus allow for an analysis across time. First, we consider how President Hu Jintao put pressure on Sudanese President Bashir in 2006–2007. Second, we discuss the response from the Chinese leadership to the killing of Chinese workers in Sudan in 2008. Third, we focus on how the Chinese leadership responded to the oil production shutdown by South Sudan in January 2012 following the separation of Sudan into two countries in 2011. Another possibility would have been to focus on a particular acquisition by CNPC. Still, it is held that the three key decisions outlined above offer a ‘richer’ analysis. The analysis of these key decisions will help us understand if Chinese foreign policy toward Sudan is dominated by state interests, economic interests or concerns with domestic stability (weiwen).

Change in foreign policy in 2006–2007

The first key decision is a key shift in policy that took place by the Chinese government in 2006–2007. Following the criticism facing Beijing, mainly from the US about the conflict in Darfur in the period leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing changed its foreign policy stance. This represented a change from China’s traditional non-interference stance to a more interventionist stance. We focus on this policy change and the motivations behind it.

On 2–3 February 2007, President Hu Jintao visited Khartoum. Prior to this trip, the Chinese leadership had made an effort to defend its economic relations with Sudan. Zhou Wenzhong, China’s deputy foreign minister, articulated the traditional position when asked about China’s relations with Sudan in the context of the Darfur crisis: ‘Business is business. We try to separate business from politics’ (French 2004). During the visit, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun voiced the Chinese government’s opposition to sanctions on Sudan.

Still, according to other sources, including Zhang Dong, the Chinese ambassador in Khartoum, Presidents Bashir and Hu held a meeting behind closed doors during the visit to discuss the issue. It was leaked to the media that, in the course of this meeting, Hu urged Bashir to accept the use of a hybrid UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in Darfur (De Montesquiou 2007). This news received extensive coverage in Chinese media reports and was offered as evidence that China had adopted new policy toward Sudan (Interview, Beijing, 2014). In other words, in this instance, there is evidence of the dominance of state interests.

The pressure must have grown too strong for President Bashir. On 12 June 2007, in a joint statement with the AU and UN, Sudan declared that it had explicitly accepted the third phase of the Annan proposal, that is, the deployment of the AU–UN force to enter Darfur.

The criticism that China faced had an economic ‘image,’ however, in the sense that several investment groups made changes to their investment portfolios following the mounting criticism of China resulting from its involvement in Sudan. In May 2007, Fidelity Investments, the world’s largest mutual fund firm, sold 90.6 percent of its American depositary receipt holdings in PetroChina amid pressure that US activist groups placed on institutional investors to divest their PetroChina shares due to CNPC’s involvement in Sudan.

Thus, the decision to adopt a new stance toward Sudan shows how the threat of a 2008 Olympics boycott and repercussions from loss to China’s ‘international face’ was considered more important than the risk of economic losses and loss of a political ally such as Bashir and the risk to national security of losing a chunk (approximately 6 percent) of the country’s oil imports. This response by China was connected to and influenced by Chinese history and the century of humiliation.¹⁹

Thus, in the case of the foreign policy shift in 2006, international opinion and foreign pressure played a key role in Beijing taking a ‘responsible’ position on Darfur. The pressure placed by Hu Jintao on President Bashir reflected how the concern with international image overshadowed economic interests. It demonstrated that the Chinese leadership was willing to sacrifice its economic interests to ensure its security interests. Thus, this key decision provides evidence of state interests.

The 2006 policy shift had ramifications for Chinese companies operating in Sudan. Prior to the Darfur crisis, the companies had been left on their own and, in fact, according to CNPC, the company’s operations in Sudan had been its most profitable overseas activities (Interview, Beijing, 2014). But when the Chinese President interfered in domestic politics, thus transgressing what had previously been an unwritten agreement, the Chinese companies operating in Sudan suffered: ‘It was because politics got in the way’ (Interview, Beijing, 2012). The events in Darfur in 2006–2008 came to have consequences for the Chinese companies operating in Sudan, as a change becomes evident around Darfur. Prior to the incident, the Chinese companies had been more independent, whereas they clearly fell under greater pressure from Beijing afterward (Interview, Beijing, 2012).

Moreover, this key decision provides evidence of how the independent activities of the NOCs and profitable commercial activities in Sudan came to have negative ramifications for Chinese foreign policy given the possible repercussions for the Chinese ‘image’ that would be caused by a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games. This key decision thus shows that NOCs do play a role in China’s foreign policy.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? The results from the quantitative analysis show that whereas economic interests dominate relative to state interests and concerns with domestic stability up through 2005, during the 2006–2007 interlude state interests and concerns with domestic stability become more important (ratios of 1.5–2.3:1), and in fact, in 2008, state interests/domestic stability dominate economic interests (ratio of 0.7:1). Thus, in the years 2006–2008, when the Sudan/Darfur issue was most relevant for the PRC, the data reflect this increase in the importance of state interests. Thus, the results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses are corroborated (for 2008).

Kidnapping of Chinese workers in 2008

The second key decision concerns the weight attributed in Chinese foreign policy to the kidnapping of Chinese workers in Sudan in 2008.

In the years following the recent introduction of China’s ‘going out’ strategy, a growing number of Chinese workers have been stationed abroad. As of February 2012, some 850,000 Chinese were working abroad. In Sudan, there are currently up to 10,000 Chinese workers (CIA 2019). In Sudan, in recent years, several Chinese workers have been abducted (see Table 4):

Table 4 Abductions of Chinese workers (2004–2013)

The key decision considered here is the response from the Chinese leadership to the most serious abduction of Chinese workers in Sudan in 2008.

On 18 October 2008, nine CNPC employees, including three engineers and six other workers, were kidnapped at a worksite in southern Kordofan near the Abeyi region while doing contract work for the GNPOC. The abduction, which led to the deaths of four Chinese workers, the five others being rescued, was undertaken by rebels affiliated with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

How did the Chinese government respond? While there had been previous abductions, the severity and the publicity that this incident subsequently received in China rendered this case different. Several things happened: Chinese Ambassador to Sudan Li Chengwen and CNPC Deputy General Manager Wang Dongjin paid visits to the rescued workers (Xinhua News Agency 2008c). Liu Guijin, the Chinese government’s special representative on the Darfur issue, was sent to Khartoum to mediate. The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yesui, condemned the murder of Chinese workers in Sudan at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Darfur (Xinhua News Agency 2008a). Finally, on 30 October 2008, 12 days later, while several workers were still missing, the Chinese government sent a delegation headed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to Sudan to pay a visit to Khartoum (Xinhua News Agency 2008b).

Maintaining the safety of Chinese workers when they are abroad and serving the interests of the nation—that is, protecting oil imports and, thus, the energy supply—is very important for the Chinese public. In the words of a Chinese scholar, ‘In Sudan, when workers are killed, this puts pressure on Chinese leaders’ (Interview, Beijing, 2012). The fact that the Chinese government sent a delegation to Sudan shows that the case of Chinese workers was considered vital for domestic stability and was related to concerns with nationalism and public opinion. The killing of Chinese workers abroad leads to domestic discontent visible in social media, which, in turn, puts pressure on the regime.

Even if the killing of Chinese workers in Sudan is not targeted at China, it has domestic consequences for China, as protecting the lives of its workers is important for maintaining the country’s social stability. Thus, the issue touches on concerns with regime legitimacy, which is ultimately linked to the survival of CCP rule. In this way, the deaths of the Chinese workers in Sudan in 2008 touch on the ability of the state to ensure domestic stability.

The incidents examined here caused a considerable stir domestically in China through social media. A study of People’s Daily news coverage also shows how the concern with domestic stability increased overwhelmingly around 2008–2009. Thus, this decision provides evidence of the concerns with domestic stability.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? In 2008, state interests and concerns with domestic stability are more dominant relative to economic interests (ratio of 0.7:1). However, looking singularly at the ratio of state interests to concerns with domestic stability in 2008, state interests dominate (ratio of 11.8:1). Thus, whereas the killing of Chinese workers in Sudan in 2008 is important and causes concerns regarding domestic stability, the Chinese leadership is more driven by state interests in this year, because of the Olympics and the crisis in Darfur. Thus, the results here provide evidence of state interests.

The 2012 oil production shutdown

We now consider the response of the Chinese government to an almost year-long South Sudan oil production shutdown in 2012 that cost CNPC $3 billion. As China imports approximately 6 percent of its oil from Sudan, the separation of Sudan into two countries in July 2011 constituted a threat to Chinese national security. What was the response to these events of the Chinese companies operating in Sudan and of the Chinese government?

On 22 January 2012, in response to the detainment of oil tankers by Sudan, South Sudan incrementally shut down its entire oil production of 350,000 bpd, even though this jeopardized its own economic survival. The shutdown was completed on February 8. Subsequently, the situation escalated. In April 2012, Sudan dropped bombs on South Sudan, including the city of Bentiu. In return, South Sudan seized the contested Heglig oil field (Blocks 1/2/4) on 10 April, resulting in the heaviest fighting between Sudan and South Sudan since 2005. On 20 April 2013, after some 10 days, South Sudanese forces left Heglig. The Heglig oil facility, CNPC’s key installation in Sudan, sustained roughly $3 billion of damages as a result of the fighting (Platts Oilgram News 2013, Interview Beijing 2014).

The 2012 oil shutdown had major significance for the Chinese leadership: it led to sizable financial losses for the Chinese companies. As a result, it would be in the interest of the Chinese government to negotiate a solution to the conflict. Immediately after the CNPC installations were damaged in April 2012, the Chinese government initiated efforts to broker the conflict, dispatching envoy Zhong Jianhua to the region. The idea was that Beijing could ensure stability in Sudan through its role as a trusting broker given its commercial interests and credibility on both sides. At the same time, while an envoy and the MFA indeed went to Khartoum and Juba, there were no senior visits to Sudan or South Sudan after 2011 to apply pressure to avoid a crisis, including the oil shutdown. The Chinese President did not travel to the region nor were any official statements issued by the Politburo. Moreover, aid was limited. In other words, the Chinese response was relatively subdued. Thus, despite the oil shutdown, the Chinese decision was to simply remain on the sidelines and non-interference once again came to characterize Chinese foreign policy toward the two Sudans. This instance illustrates how economic interests again came to dominate the activities of the companies abroad in the sense that economic interests were not serious enough for the Chinese state to interfere.

How does the analysis here compare to the quantitative analysis? In 2012, economic interests again strongly dominate relative to state interests/domestic stability (ratio of 3.5:1). Thus, the results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses are corroborated.

In the case of Sudan, the empirical expectation is that state interests/concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) will dominate. The qualitative analysis produced evidence of both state interests, concerns with domestic stability, and economic interests, but this evidence varied over time. The analysis shows that in the case of the 2006–2008 foreign policy change, state interests dominated. In the case of the killed Chinese nationals in 2008, concerns with domestic stability dominated. Finally, in the case of the oil shutdown in 2012, economic interests dominated. Interestingly, I find particular evidence of the concern with domestic stability in 2008, which is a novel finding. The quantitative analysis corroborates these results, except in the case of the killed oil workers in 2008. Still, I argue that, in fact, the evidence of concerns with domestic stability is more credible in this instance. Thus, the two methods are generally corroborated.

In conclusion, the quantitative and qualitative analyses only partly support the empirical expectation, as the results show evidence of both economic interests and state interests/domestic stability (weiwen).

Conclusion

This article investigates the activities of Chinese energy companies in Africa. It looks at the cases of Angola and Sudan in order to illustrate the argument, because these two cases can illustrate the full variation of the independent variable.

The article presents evidence that non-state actors play a role for foreign policy and sometimes go against the policy line from Beijing. In the case of Angola, there is evidence that economic interests dominate. Despite the Chinese leadership being interested in the Lobito refinery, we saw how Sinopec withdrew from the refinery as it was not considered commercially viable. The withdrawal from the Sonaref refinery did not favor the state, as Chinese companies subsequently lost important bids for promising stakes. In this sense, this is a case where the company acted independently, pursuing its own commercial interests, which later proves to have consequences for foreign policy; and thus an affirmation of liberal theories.

In contrast, in the Sudan case there is evidence that state interests dominate. The Chinese leadership was willing to sacrifice its economic interests to ensure its security interests in the case of Sudan at a time leading up to the Olympics. Then in subsequent years (after 2008), economic interests again came to dominate as the main motive guiding the Chinese NOCs in Sudan.

Thus, the African cases reveal variation in the activities found and confirm the general idea that government–business relations are related to the amount of oil available and the level of strategic importance.

In countries of strategic importance to China, such as Sudan, the state is involved for state interests; that is, to ensure its security. Conversely, in countries of little strategic importance, such as Angola, the companies are freer to pursue their interests and go about their business irrespective of state interference.

But the evidence also shows variation in the autonomy of the companies across time as the companies prior to 2006 were freer to pursue their own interests and then, at the time of the Beijing Olympics, came under pressure from Beijing. In subsequent years (after 2008), economic interests again came to dominate as the main motive guiding the Chinese NOCs in Sudan and companies were freer to pursue their interests.

Overall, this article finds that commercial actors have an impact on Chinese foreign policy. We find that Chinese NOCs play an important role in influencing the direction of China’s foreign policy in countries of little strategic importance, but in countries that are strategically important, their actions often are subordinate to Beijing, even when substantial economic losses are incurred.

Theoretically, this article illuminates the increasing role played by NOCs in foreign policy and contributes with explicitation of the role played by NOCs for the foreign policy of the state. This research contributes to the debate about whether structural factors, characteristics of the Chinese authoritarian state, or concerns with legitimacy can explain the change we see in key actors in foreign policy during the period under question (2002–2012). This study suggests that a second level variable can add great insight to an analysis.

This article examines the period from 2002 to 2012. Even if looking at this period has lost some relevance since the Presidency of Xi Jinping given the stronger centralization that arguably has taken place since 2013; it is still relevant as first, the ‘going out’ policy (走出去/zouchuqu) of the Chinese government was launched in 2001 and this article thus allows us to understand the dynamics between the Chinese NOCs and the Chinese government in this period immediately following its launch. Moreover, even if things have changed since, understanding the dynamics between the Chinese NOCs and the Chinese government of that period offers a window to understand dynamics more generally between Chinese NOCs and the Chinese government. Furthermore, recently the Chinese leadership announced that leaders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be evaluated based on the performance of their publicly listed subsidiaries, thus showcasing the importance of “economic interest” with regards to the Chinese SOEs. Notably, given that the period under study is from 2002 to 2012 the conclusions of this article do not necessarily apply today (after 2013).

The article also contributes with insights regarding the importance of concerns with domestic stability (weiwen) to Chinese foreign policy and how this motive relates to the NOC activities in a number of countries. The case of Sudan shows evidence of the domestic impact of the deaths of Chinese workers abroad. Specifically, we saw how the killed oil workers in Sudan in 2008 led to domestic discontent which in turn put pressure on the regime.

Importantly, the findings here have implications for the foreign policy of the authoritarian state. This article suggests and confirms the notion that non-state actors can have a role in foreign policy. A hypothesis can be established about the characteristics of the foreign policy of the authoritarian state in which the rise of SOEs is a significant characteristic. The logic is that as a result of the reform processes, the political and administrative systems of China have been fragmented, which has led to a pluralised policy process and weakened leadership. This has, in turn, enabled SOEs to obtain greater influence over economic decision-making. The argument here is that the role of NOCs in foreign policy is a particular characteristic of the foreign policy of the authoritarian state (China), and that particularly in the authoritarian state, NOCs have a role in foreign policy.

These conclusions have implications for international relations theory. The article’s central claim is that the SOEs play a growing role in foreign policy. This is a contribution, as in much of the secondary literature, Chinese NOCs are not expected to be driven by commercial interests but rather by security imperatives. The activities of the Chinese NOCs are deemed to be part of an expansionist strategy on the part of the Chinese regime to lock up oil and as constituting a threat to other states in the international system. The findings here speak to the China-rise literature, as it illuminates how, contrary to the standard take in much of the secondary literature, the rise of China will be peaceful.

Moreover, the conclusions here suggest that concerns in both Europe and the US about investments by Chinese SOEs are unfounded: this article provides evidence that the SOEs, overall, are motivated by economic interests in the period under study. Moreover, this analysis sheds light on episodes in which the activities of the companies conflict with the strategic interests of the Chinese leadership.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

The quantitative analysis includes articles from journals from China Academic Network. It draws on 300 articles from specialist magazines/journals (农业工程技术 [‘Agriculture and Engineering Technology’]) to more general journals (亚非纵横 [‘Asia-Africa Relations’]).