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Defence industrial power: understanding the UK’s post-Brexit role

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Abstract

The British government has argued that the UK’s first-class, knowledge-driven economy supports the country’s claim to be a global power. However, in the area of defence science and technology, this proposition is not entirely persuasive. While the UK has a significant defence industry and is a major defence exporter, it has long underinvested in defence research and development compared to its European peers. Further, a significant dependence on imports raises questions about the UK’s ability to maintain freedom of action in its foreign and defence policy. This speaks to a broader, persistent tension in UK foreign policy post-Brexit: the gap between aspirations towards global influence and the resources available to pursue that ambition. Based on an interrogation of four propositions, this article argues that the UK retains considerable potential post-Brexit, but that it faces several obstacles in developing its defence industrial power.

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Fig. 1

Source: US Department of State (2021b)

Fig. 2

Source: US Department of State (2021b)

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Notes

  1. This applies to complex, high-technology defence procurement. It is less true when procuring low-tech items from overseas, such as uniforms, boots and stationary. We explore the type of defence imports below.

  2. Of note, the UK Government figures as reported by Harding and Dempsey (2021) place the UK in a slightly better light. Their figures indicate that ‘on a 10-year rolling basis’ (that is, between 2011 and 2020) ‘the UK [was] the world’s second largest defence exporter, behind the USA’. As discussed above, there are many ways to measure defence imports and exports. We have chosen to use the WMEAT data as a standard baseline for this paper to ensure consistency, albeit noting where other databases provide a slightly different accounting. Still, both datasets confirm the same trend of the UK as a significant exporter.

  3. The WMEAT figures lists $1.9B out of a total of $3.9B in exports. SIPRI data from 2009 to 2021 list 50.4 per cent of UK arms exports going to Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE; Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 38 per cent of UK exports across that period, including 20 per cent of sales in 2021. The UK’s own figures as reported by Harding and Dempsey (2021) indicate the share might be even higher, with as much as 60 per cent of UK arms exports going to the Middle East between 2011 and 2020.

  4. SIPRI data from 2009 to 2021 list 50.4 per cent of exports going to Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

  5. Of note, however, it is not possible to ascertain from publicly available sources whether that technology is as capable as that supplied to America’s own forces.

  6. ITAR is the US regulatory regime controlling how defence industrial products made by in or collaboration with the USA can be used, altered or sold.

  7. The National Security and Investment Act came into force in January 2022 and covers seventeen sectors (UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2022).

  8. The figures do not go further than 2019, as the government changed the methodology for classified defence R&D spending that year. The relevant guidance explicitly states that ‘MOD R&D data prior to 2018/19 should not be used in comparison with later years’. This makes it impossible to compare spending in 2020 and 2021 with previous years; however, as the same source notes this methodology did result in a drop in gross R&D expenditure of over £600 million (UK Ministry of Defence 2022b).

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Correspondence to Rebecca Lucas.

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Lucas, R., Wilkinson, B. Defence industrial power: understanding the UK’s post-Brexit role. Int Polit (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00516-x

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