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‘Remember Iraq!’ Learning theory and the 2013 non-decision on air strikes against Syria

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Abstract

Statesmen sometimes seek to legitimize contemporary foreign policy decisions by referring to a ‘historical lesson’, derived from an allegedly analogous situation in the past. According to foreign policy learning theory, such lessons may also be decisive for the actual decisions. Learning theory is here being tested against four national decision processes in August–September 2013 regarding air strikes against Syria. The four countries participated militarily in the March 2003 Iraq intervention. The latter being defined as reasonably ‘similar’ to the Syria project and also as a failure, learning theory expects the 10-year-old memory to decisively restrain their 2013 decisions. Was this really the case, or were the countries driven more by, for example, contemporary 2013 concerns focusing at the situation in and around Syria? The theoretical expectation turns out to be fulfilled in the USA, the UK, and Poland, but is disappointed regarding Denmark, where a rivalling lesson, i.a., proved stronger.

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Notes

  1. Moreover, it seems that neoconservative leaders like Vice-President Dick Cheney had ‘adapted’ intelligence conclusions to fit the political agenda.

  2. Cf., among several others, Khong (1992), Reiter (1996), Brunk (2008), or Siniver and Collins (2015).

  3. Epistemological realism is argued by Karl Popper in his ‘Two faces of common sense: an argument for common-sense realism and against the commonsense theory of knowledge’, pp. 32–106 in Popper (1972). The work of Reiter (1996), for example, implicitly respects this distinction. Cf. also p. 407 in Mouritzen and Runge Olesen (2010).

  4. Both Snyder (1990) and Larson (1991) warn that lessons are often more rhetorical than cognitive, i.e. they serve to legitimize behaviour taken for other reasons. A lesson may of course be both rhetorical and cognitive.

  5. Both ‘most likely’ and ‘least likely’ case studies are subtypes of so-called crucial case studies (‘crucial’ because they provide a maximum of feedback from case to theory).

  6. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/08/26/read-the-full-transcript-kerrys-speech-on-syria-chemical-weapons-and-the-need-to-respond/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.38a5faa01c1c.

  7. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/world/middleeast/erdogan-syria-rebels-leading-ally-hesitates-31-months-in.html.

  8. For references, see the in-depth analyses of these decisions in the subsequent sections.

  9. Cf. pp. 1045–1046 in Bentley (2014).

  10. Obama’s own account to Goldberg (2016), p. 15.

  11. Denmark became the leader of a multinational maritime transport operation, cf. Brems Knudsen (2014).

  12. Wednesday 28 August. Cf. http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/145573,Poland-will-not-join-strikes-on-Syria.

  13. Possibly, this should be Libya instead of Lebanon, referring to the 2011 NATO intervention in this country.

  14. Daily News, 29 August, no. 168/2013. These governmental statements were not accompanied by any debate in the Sejm, the Polish parliament.

  15. Daily News, 16 August, no. 159/2013.

  16. Cf. Milczanowski at https://pulaski.pl/en/new-strategy-in-the-fight-against-isis-what-role-for-poland/ (2016). Poland had also sent troops to Afghanistan, but abstained from participating in the Libya campaign.

  17. Ibid.

  18. Cf. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html?_r=0.

  19. Cf. Milczanowski, op. cit.

  20. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_divided_poland_faces_foreign_policy_crossroads4047 (22 September 2015).

  21. Ritzau 26 August 2013.

  22. Berlingske (Danish daily), 23 August 2013.

  23. According to Gallup, 64% of the voters disagreed or partly disagreed in Danish participation without a UN mandate (Berlingske 27. August 2013). 23% agreed.

  24. Thorning-Schmidt, Politiken.dk.

  25. Søvndal, Jydske Vestkysten (Danish daily).

  26. Ritzau 29 August 2013.

  27. The public opposed a limited military attack by two to one (50% vs. 25% regarding British missiles fired from ships off the coast of Syria). In the words of Peter Kellner, ‘The shadow of Vietnam constrained United States foreign policy for decades…Iraq is now casting a similar shadow over British foreign policy’. Cf. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2013/08/28/syria-and-shadow-iraq. On the US Vietnam lesson, cf. Snyder (1990), pp. 299–304.

  28. http://www.usatoday.com, ’Britain will not join USA in strike on Syria’.

  29. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.

  30. Politiken.dk, 30 August 2013.

  31. TV2 News, 30 August 2013.

  32. Information.dk, 30 August 2013.

  33. https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/zG551/Stoltenberg-etter-middagen-Obama-er-utalmodig.

  34. Politiken (Danish daily), 28. August 2013 (‘Danskerne skal lige vænne sig til tanken om at gå uden om FN’).

  35. ‘A red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized’. Quoted from p. 10 in Chollet (2016).

  36. ‘Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Air Strikes’, Pew, 3 September 2013.

  37. Associated Press: ‘House of Representatives tentative about Syria attack’, 7 September 2013.

  38. ‘Full transcript: Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey testify at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria’, Washington Post staff, 3 September.

  39. Cf. also, for instance, senator Tom Udall (dem.), going all the way back to the Kuwait war of 1991: ‘The Iraq war began as an international effort to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait…this limited military action eventually led to what is one of the biggest blunders in US foreign policy…’ Cf. ‘Full transcript: Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey…’, op.cit.

  40. Cf. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/114/text.

  41. Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, a former senator like Kerry, also witnessed in these hearings.

  42. Cf. ‘Full transcript: Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey…’, op.cit.

  43. ‘Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Air Strikes’, Pew, 3 September 2013.

  44. So he could hide essential installations, possibly move some into Russian base facilities.

  45. His formulation when welcoming lawmakers to the White House on Tuesday 3 September. Cf. ’Senate committee approves resolution authorizing US strike on Syria’ (AP 4 September).

  46. P. xi in Chollet (2016). Obama’s extensive speech on 31 August, explaining his motives, had no ‘lesson from Iraq’ (https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria).

  47. Resolution 1483 (2003), adopted by the UN Security Council on 22 May.

  48. Jv.dk (Jydske Vestkysten, Danish daily), 27 August 2013.

  49. Politiken, 3 September 2013.

  50. Compare this version of Danish foreign policy identity with its Polish counterpart: Poland perceives itself as a victim of others’ historic misdeeds (Poland’s partitions, e.g.; cf. also p. 174 in Zwolski 2017); they are therefore indebted to Poland. Thus, when Poland offers military contributions outside its own salient environment, it demands specific ‘payments’ in return. Denmark does not, since Denmark is basically still paying back on perceived old debts (the Fogh Rasmussen lesson).

  51. http://stm.dk/publikationer/Et_Danmark_der_staar_sammen_11/Regeringsgrundlag_okt_2011.pdf.

  52. ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was decided by the UN 2005 World Summit (cf. §§ 138 and 139; http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/folkeretten-a/responsibility-to-protect/). The prescribed collective military action should be taken though the Security Council according to § 139.

  53. Mariager and Wivel (2019a). The report has been summarized in English in Mariager and Wivel (2019b).

  54. On such combination, cf. Mouritzen 2017.

  55. Cf. also, among others, p. 218 in Siniver and Collins (2015) or Miller (2016).

  56. Cf. Karl Popper, ‘The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge’, pp. 341–361 in Popper (1972).

  57. That is, those self-reinforcing mechanisms eliminate any sound criticism of a prevailing view. Cf. Janis (1989).

  58. Cf., among others, Stevenson (2014).

  59. It cannot be excluded, of course, that a minor part of the stockpiles remained in Syria.

  60. Critics in the Washington foreign policy establishment and among US allies. Cf., for instance, the survey (and countercriticism) by Chollet (2016) pp. 19–26. Many regional actors felt betrayed. Some critics have even claimed that Obama’s non-decision emboldened Putin’s actions in Ukraine the following year (referred in Phillips (2016) p. 182).

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    Hans Mouritzen

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Mouritzen, H. ‘Remember Iraq!’ Learning theory and the 2013 non-decision on air strikes against Syria. Int Polit 57, 954–972 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00207-x

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