Advertisement

International Politics

, Volume 55, Issue 5, pp 655–677 | Cite as

Parties’ foreign policy approach and the outcome of coalition allocation negotiations: the case of Israel

  • Matt EvansEmail author
Original Article
  • 63 Downloads

Abstract

Foreign policy research has explored the impacts of different aspects of domestic politics on actors’ international behavior. This work looks in the other direction, examining how political parties’ foreign policy approach affects the share of payoffs they successfully negotiate in parliamentary government coalitions. This study integrates political psychology research, correlating IR paradigms and negotiating behavior, with studies of coalition formation. The article also expands on previous coalition allocation research through analysis of ministers, deputy ministers, and committee chairs in eight coalition governments in Israel from 1992 to 2015. The results indicate that political parties characterized by a realist approach obtain a higher share of coalition payoffs, quantitative and qualitative, than parties with a constructivist or liberal approach. Realists’ advantage is revealed to be significantly greater among non-formateur parties. This work contributes to research on coalition allocation, political behavior, political parties, and foreign policy analysis.

Keywords

Realism Liberalism Constructivism IR theory Political psychology Coalition allocation Israel 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Reuven Hazan, Professor Orit Kedar, and Dr. Matan Sharkansky of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for their valuable suggestions.

References

  1. Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976–1998. American Journal of Political Science 50(3): 513–529.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Adams, James, and Samuel Merrill. 2009. Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model. British Journal of Political Science 39(3): 539–558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Adler, Emanuel. 1997. Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 319–363.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision. New York: Longman.Google Scholar
  5. Arian, Asher. 2005. Politics in Israel: The Second Republic. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.Google Scholar
  6. Arian, Asher, and Michal Shamir. 2008. A Decade Later, The World Had Changed, The Cleavage Structure Remained: Israel 1996–2006. Party Politics 14(6): 685–705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Axelrod, Robert. 1976. The Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Patrick Dumont. 2011. Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies. European Journal of Political Research 50(4): 441–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Barnett, Michael. 1999. Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo. European Journal of International Relations 5(1): 5–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Baron, David, and John Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Ben-Porat, Guy, and Shlomo Mizrahi. 2005. Political Culture, Alternative Politics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel. Policy Sciences 38(2/3): 177–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Browne, Eric C., and Karen Ann Feste. 1975. Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs Evidence From European Party Governments, 1945-1970. American Behavioral Scientist 18(4): 530–556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Browne, Eric, and Mark Franklin. 1973. Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review 67(2): 453–469.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50(2): 324–348.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Clark, Terry D., Jennifer M. Larson, John N. Mordeson, and Mark J. Wierman. 2008. Extension of the Portfolio Allocation Model To Surplus Majority Governments: A Fuzzy Approach. Public Choice 134: 179–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Dahl, Robert. 1983. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Diermeier, Daniel, Roderick I. Swaab, Victoria Husted Medvec, and Mary C. Kern. 2008. The Micro-Dynamics of Coalition Formation. Political Research Quarterly 61(3): 484–501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Druckman, Daniel, and Christopher Mitchell. 1995. Flexibility in Negotiation and Mediation. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 542(1): 10–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Ecker, Alejandro, Thomas M. Meyer, and Wolfgang C. Müller. 2015. The Distribution Of Individual Cabinet Positions In Coalition Governments: A Sequential Approach. European Journal of Political Research 54(4): 802–818. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Evans, Matt. 2007. An Institutional Framework for Policymaking. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield Inc.Google Scholar
  21. Evans, Matt. 2016. Framing Policy Paradigms: Population Dispersal & the Gaza Withdrawal. Israel Affairs 22(2): 379–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Fearon, James D. 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science 1: 289–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Franklin, Mark, and Thomas Mackie. 1984. Reassessing the Importance of Size and Ideology for the Formation of Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 29(4): 671–692.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Gamson, William A. 1961. A Theory of Coalition Formation. American Sociological Review 26(3): 373–382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. George, Alexander L. 1979. The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs And Decision-Making Behavior: The Operational Code. In Psychological Models in International Relations, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  26. Gerring, John. 2004. What is a Case Study and What is it Good For? American Political Science Review 98(2): 341–354.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Giannetti, Daniela, and Michael Laver. 2005. Policy Positions and Jobs in the Government. European Journal of Political Research 44(1): 91–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Hall, Peter. 2004. Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research. In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Heller, William B. 2001. Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments. American Journal of Political Science 45(4): 780–798.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Hermann, Margaret G. 1995. Leaders, Leadership, and Flexibility: Influences on Heads of Government as Negotiators and Mediators. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 542(1): 148–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Hermann, Tamar, Ella Heller, Chanan Cohen, and Dana Bublil. 2015. The Israeli Democracy Index. Jerusalem: The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research.Google Scholar
  32. Herzog, Hanna. 1987. Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective. Comparative Politics 19(3): 317–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Holsti, Ole R. 1962. The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study. Case Studies in Conflict 6(3): 244–252.Google Scholar
  34. Hopmann, P.Terrence. 1995. Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 542(1): 24–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis 1: 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Hudson, Valerie M., and Christopher S. Vore. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. Mershon International Studies Review 39(2): 209–238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model. The American Political Science Review 81(4): 1099–1120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Inbar, Efraim. 1996. Contours of Israel’s New Strategic Thinking. Political Science Quarterly 111(1): 41–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Kaarbo, Juliet. 2015. A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory. International Studies Review 17(2): 189–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.). 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  41. Keohane, Robert O. 1993. Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics, ed. David A. Baldwin, 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Kim, Dong-Hun, and Gerhard Loewenberg. 2005. The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag. Comparative Political Studies 38(9): 1104–1129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Laver, Michael, and Ben Hunt. 1992. Party and Policy Competition. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  44. Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. The American Political Science Review 84(3): 873–890.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  47. Lipsmeyer, Christine S., and Heather Nicole Pierce. 2011. The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments. The Journal of Politics 73(4): 1152–1164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–86. American Political Science Review 87(3): 624–638.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Maoz, Zeev, and Anat Shayer. 1987. The Cognitive Structure of Peace and War Argumentation: Israeli Prime Ministers versus the Knesset. Political Psychology 8(4): 575–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Martin, Lanny, and Randolph Stevenson. 2001. Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 33–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Martin, Lanny W. 2004. The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 445–461.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2004. Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny. American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 13–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Mershon, Carol. 1996. The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments. The American Political Science Review 9(3): 534–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1993. Why Don’t Democracies Fight Each Other?: An Experimental Study. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(3): 484–503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Modigliani, Andre. 1972. Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy. The American Political Science Review 66(3): 960–978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Mowle, Thomas S. 2003. Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict. Political Psychology 24(3): 561–592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger. 2004. An Alternative Approach for Defining the Boundaries of ‘Party Families’: Examples from the Israeli Extreme Right-Wing Party Scene. Australian Journal of Political Science 39(2): 285–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Peres, Shimon. 1995. A Better World. Journal of International Law And Politics 27(2): 281–288.Google Scholar
  59. Pundak, Ron. 2001. From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? Survival 43(3): 31–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42(3): 427–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Rabin, Yitzhak. 1992. Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin Presenting his Government. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook9/pages/1%20%20address%20to%20the%20knesset%20by%20prime%20minister%20rabin.aspx.
  62. Ripley, Brian. 1993. Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory. Political Psychology 14(3): 403–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Rose, Gideon. 1998. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51(1): 144–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Rynhold, Jonathan. 2003. Making Sense of Tragedy: Barak, the Israeli Left and the Oslo Peace Process. Israel Studies Forum 19(1): 9–33.Google Scholar
  65. Rynhold, Jonathan. 2007. Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change Israel and the Making of the Oslo Accords. Cooperation and Conflict 42(2): 419–440.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Shamir, Michal, and Asher Arian. 1994. Competing Values and Policy Choices: Israeli Public Opinion on Foreign and Security Affairs. British Journal of Political Science 24(2): 249–271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Shlaim, Avi. 2005. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process. In International Relations of the Middle East, ed. Louise Fawcett, 241–261. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  68. Siniver, Asaf. 2012. Israeli Identities and the Politics of Threat: A Constructivist Interpretation. Ethnopolitics 11(1): 24–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2000. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. International Studies Quarterly 44(1): 97–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Strøm, Kaare, and Jørn Y. Leipart. 1993. Policy, Institutions, and Coalition Avoidance: Norwegian Governments, 1945–1990. The American Political Science Review 87(4): 870–887.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  71. Telhami, Shibley. 1996. Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal Type or a Breed of Its Own. In Israel in Comparative Perspective, ed. Michael Barnett, 29–52. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  72. Thies, Michael F. 2001. Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments. American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 580–598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. Urbatsch, R. 2010. Isolationism and Domestic Politics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(3): 471–492.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  74. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. 1990. The world in their minds: Information processing, cognition, and perception in foreign policy decision-making. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  75. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1996. International Politics is Not Foreign Policy. Security Studies 6(1): 54–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  76. Warwick, Paul V., and James N. Druckman. 2001. Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments. British Journal of Political Science 31(4): 627–649.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  77. Warwick, Paul V., and James N. Druckman. 2006. The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation Into The Nature Of A Very Strong But Puzzling Relationship. European Journal of Political Research 45(4): 635–665.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  78. Waxman, Dov. 2003. Between Isolation and Integration: The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy. Israel Studies Forum 19(1): 34–56.Google Scholar
  79. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46(2): 391–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  80. Wohlforth, William C. 2008. Realism. In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal, 131–149. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  81. Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge. 2000. Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  82. Yaar, Ephraim, and Tamar Hermann. 2005. Peace Index: July 2005—The Disengagement as a Done Deal. Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies and the Evens Program for Conflict Resolution Research of Tel Aviv University.Google Scholar
  83. Young, Michael D. 1996. Cognitive Mapping Meets Semantic Networks. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(3): 395–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  84. Zerubavel, Yael. 1995. Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Pennsylvania State UniversityAltoonaUSA

Personalised recommendations