The aim of this article is to analyze the main characteristic features of the security culture of the Russian Federation (RF) during Medvedev’s presidency in the context of the Russian foreign and security policy in the period 2008–2012. The second aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the continuity of the main features of the Russian security culture represents a possible starting point for understanding the reasons for the current Russian military intervention in Crimea. The main features of the Russian security culture will be searched for on three levels: firstly, the level of key foreign and security strategic documents of the RF; secondly, that of the Russian position toward military interventions; and finally, that of Russia’s relations with the West.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
According to Daniel Treisman, there are several interpretations or motives that led Putin to occupy and annex the Crimea. Firstly ‘the Crimean operation was a response to the threat of NATO’s further expansion along Russia’s western border.’ Secondly, ‘the annexation of Crimea was part of a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of the Soviet Union.’ Finally thirdly, ‘the annexation of Crimea was a hastily response to the unforeseen fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’ (Treisman 2016, p. 47).
Although Medvedev stated already on August 12, 2008, that he had ordered the armed forces to end their military operations in Georgia, the Russian troops actually finally left Georgia at the turn of August and September 2008.
At the same time, Russia views the Muslim-populated Caucasus and Central Asia regions as a key national security challenge. Of the 50 million Muslims who lived in the USSR, some 20 million remained in Russia; the rest became citizens of the six Muslim nations situated along Russia’s border (Magen 2013, p. 24).
Allison, R. 2013a. Russia, the West, & Military Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Allison, R. 2013b. Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis. International Affairs 89(4): 795–823.
Baev, P. K. 2008. Medvedev´s Foreign Policy Takes Indefinite Shape. Eurasia Daily Monitor, advance online publication 21 July, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33816&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=166&no_cache=1.
Berger, T. 1996. Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and in Japan. In The Culture of National security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. P.J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
Buzan, B., O. Waever, and J. de Wilde. 1998. Security. A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lyne Rienner Publishers.
Charap, S. 2013. Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention. Survival 55(1): 35–41.
Cyganok, A. 2008. Uroki pjatidnevnoj vojny v Zakavkaze. Nezavisimoje vojennoje obozrenije, 29 August.
de Haas, E. 2010. Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century. Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. London and New York: Routledge.
de Haas, M. 2011. Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000–10). In Russian Military Politics and Russia´s 2010 Defence Doctrine, ed. S.J. Blank, 1–62. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute.
Eichler, J. 2011. Bezpečnostní a strategická kultura USA, EU a ČR. Praha: Karolinum.
Eichler, J., and L. Tichý. 2013. USA a Ruská federace. Komparace z pohledu bezpečnostní a strategické kultury. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů.
Felgernhauer, P. 2008. A Military Reform That Does Not Seem to Satisfy Anyone, Eurasia Daily Monitor 241, advance online publication 18 December, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34282.
Gvosdev, N.K., and R. Marsch. 2014. Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vectors and Sectors. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Huntington, S. 1994. The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 11th ed. Cambridge: Harvard University.
Katz, M.N. 2012. Russia and Arab Spring. George Mason University, 3 April.
Kirchner, E. and J. Sperling (eds.). 2007. Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century. London and New York: Routledge.
Klein, M. 2012. Russia and the Arab Spring. Foreign and Domestic Policy Challenges. Berlin: Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Kriendler, J. 2013. NATO–Russia Relations: Reset is not a Four-Letter Word. In Understanding NATO in the 21st Century. Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance, ed. P.G. Herd and J. Kriendler. London and New York: Routledge.
Kulhánek, J., and Fedorov, Y. 2010. Russia’s New Military Doctrine: Is the Reset Over? Europe’s World, 22 February.
Liountri, C. 2013. Understanding Russia’s Reaction to the Arab Spring. INSIGHTS, 5 February.
Lippman, W. 1946. Zahraniční politika a válečné cíle Spojených států. Praha: Družstevní práce.
Lyukanov, F. 2016. Putin´s Foreign Policy. The Quest to Restore Russia´s Rightful Place. Foreign Affairs 94(May/June): 30–37.
Makarychev, A. 2011. Russia’s “Libya Debate”. Political Meanings and Repercussions. PONARS Eurasia Memo No. 178, September.
Magen, Z. 2013. Russia and the Middle East: Policy Challenges. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies.
Mankoff, J. 2012. Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group Inc.
Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii. 2010. Programm effektivnogo ispol’zovaniya na sistemnoy osnove vneshnepoliticheskikh faktorov v tselyakh dolgosrochnogo razvitiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. May.
Nichol, J. 2011. Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy, Congressional Research Service, advance online publication 24 August, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42006.pdf.
Oldberg, I. 2011. Aims and Means in Russian Foreign Policy. In Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. K.E. Robert, 30–58. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pavlovsky, G. 2016. Russian Politics Under Putin. The System Will Outlast the Master. Foreign Affairs 94(May/June): 10–17.
Prezident Rossii. 2008 Kontseptsiya Vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii. July.
Prezident Rossii. 2009. Dogovor o Yevropeyskoy bezopasnosti. November.
Prezident Rossii. 2010. Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii. February.
Savelyev, A.G. 2011. Russian Defence Doctrine. In Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defence Doctrine, ed. S.J. Blank, 153–179. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute.
Sherr, J. 2014. Russia’s Elusive Search for Soft Power. New Eastern Europe 6(2): 48–53.
Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii. 2009. Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda. May.
Survey, Strategic. 2012. Russia and Eurasia, 171–198. London and New York: Routledge.
Treisman, D. 2016. Why Putin Took Crimea. The Gambler in the Kremlin. Foreign Affairs 94(May/June): 47–54.
Trenin, D. 2016. The Revival of the Russian Military. How Moscow Reloaded. Foreign Affairs 94(May/June): 23–29.
Tsygankov, A.P. 2013. Russia´s Foreign Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group Inc.
Tsygankov, A.P. 2014. Putin’s Crusade. New Eastern Europe 6(2): 55–61.