Abstract
This article uses the theory of Red Queen competition to predict patterns in the founding of nationally active interest groups in the USA. The theory of Red Queen competition holds that competition among groups in a population is history-dependent such that each organization’s competitiveness is a function of its historical experience. The theory predicts that: (1) a population relatively full of recently experienced incumbent organizations is extremely uninviting for newcomers; and (2) a population relatively devoid of recently experienced competitors (and thusly full of incumbents whose competitive experiences are either minimal or concentrated in the distant past) is relatively inviting for newcomers. We test these predictions against data from two group populations. Ultimately, we find strong support for the theory of Red Queen competition and its substantive predictions.
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Notes
There was one group included in the original dataset, a group called Exodus, which did not belong. The group is actually an anti-gay, “ex-gay” group. We eliminated it from the dataset before conducting our analyses.
Our approach here begs the following question: Why test the theory of Red Queen competition against data on these two populations? Unfortunately, the number of comprehensive, over time population studies of politically active organizations is vanishingly small. Thus, the primary reason we chose these two populations was practical; most of the data needed to test the theory of Red Queen competition—especially counts of foundings, death, and density—existed and was attainable from these two sources. Collecting population-level data is no small task, so practical concerns are non-trivial. All the data necessary to replicate this study are available at the author’s website at http://anownes.wixsite.com/anownes/research.
We calculated all predicted values using CLARIFY software (see Tomz et al. 2003).
Of course, one weakness of this study (and others like it) is that it does not and cannot provide direct evidence of organizational learning. This raises the possibility that our results reflect processes other than learning. The most obvious alternative explanation for our findings is that selection processes weed out weak organizations, which makes existing organizations stronger competitors. There is probably some truth in this explanation. Even though we attempt to control for selection processes, they probably account for some of the competitive effects we uncover. But we believe they do not account for all of them.
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Nownes, A.J., Bell, C. Can the Red Queen help? A new approach to explaining the formation of interest groups in the USA. Int Groups Adv 7, 61–81 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-018-0030-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-018-0030-8