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Keeping the status quo: business success in the EU collective redress initiative

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Abstract

The European Commission initiative on collective redress was a failed attempt to introduce a form of class action in the European Union. Business organizations were firmly opposing the proposal, while citizen interest groups were mobilized to support it. The outcome was rather puzzling because some previous research suggests that business organizations in the European Union most often find themselves unsuccessful in defending the status quo, especially in the field of environmental and consumer protection. Business lobbying success in this case is explained by the low media salience of the issue and diverging preferences among public officials. The article illustrates how lobbying success in the European Union can also be achieved by maintaining the status quo and contributes to our understanding of contextual factors, most notably the role of policymakers.

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Notes

  1. An interest group is defined as ‘an association of individuals or organizations, usually formally organized, that on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy’ (https://www.britannica.com/topic/interest-group). Therefore, only membership organizations, other than political parties are considered as interest groups (see also Beyers et al. 2008; Klüver 2009; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014).

  2. In the EU political system, the EC has an exclusive right to propose legislation. In most cases, before it issues a new proposal, the EC publishes a consultation document on its web portal and anyone interested can submit written opinions (responses or contributions stating policy preferences) about the policy measures outlined in that document. The vast majority of these opinions come from interest groups and are published by the EC soon after the consultation is closed.

  3. Interview with DG JUST official, 21 June 2013.

  4. The audio recordings of the hearing can be consulted at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm.

  5. https://global.factiva.com.

  6. See, for example, different versions of this document: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396.

  7. A contingency fee is a sum of money received by a lawyer on the condition that the case is won. Some, mostly business interest groups, claimed that such a funding system can lead to abuses, because lawyers would only be interested in cases with large stakes and would, more gravely, actively seek out clients to encourage them to launch a collective procedure.

  8. Intervention in the EC hearing, 5 April 2011.

  9. Interview with BEUC staff, 7 May 2013.

  10. Interview with BusinessEurope staff, 20 June 2013.

  11. Interview with BEUC staff, 7 May 2013.

  12. Interview with BusinessEurope staff, 20 June 2013.

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Acknowledgements

This research was supported by the European Research Council grant ERC-2013-CoG 616702-iBias. I would like to thank Jan Beyers and two anonymous reviewers for comments on previous versions of this article and the interviewees who gave so freely of their time.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, ACIM – Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics, Universiteit Antwerpen, Sint Jacobstraat 2, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium

    Vlad Gross

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Correspondence to Vlad Gross.

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Gross, V. Keeping the status quo: business success in the EU collective redress initiative. Int Groups Adv 6, 161–178 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-017-0019-8

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