A new dataset on the political independence of fiscal monitoring institutions

  • Daniel BellingEmail author


This note introduces the Comparative Independent Fiscal Institutions Dataset which contains information on the institutional characteristics of forty-four independent expert bodies that are mandated to monitor fiscal policy and performance. Based on coding of legislative documents, it describes the institutional design of IFIs in mainly developed countries at different points in time. It comprises indicators and indices on formal political independence, expert proficiency and powers to intervene into the budget process. I report empirical variations between different models of IFIs such as Fiscal Councils and Parliamentary Budget Offices.


Independent Fiscal Institution Fiscal monitoring Political independence Fiscal Councils Fiscal contract Fiscal policy Non-majoritarian institutions 


Supplementary material

41304_2019_217_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (75 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (PDF 74 kb)
41304_2019_217_MOESM2_ESM.xlsx (30 kb)
Supplementary material 2 (XLSX 30 kb)


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Copyright information

© European Consortium for Political Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford CollegeUniversity of KentCanterburyUK

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