Acemoglu, D. 2006. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson. 2001. A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review 91(4): 938–963.
Axelrod, R. 1981. The emergence of cooperation among egoists. American Political Science Review 75(02): 306–318.
Beissinger, M. 2011. Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly 16(1): 25–43.
Beissinger, M.R. 2013. The semblance of democratic revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. American Political Science Review 107(03): 574–592.
Borghans, L., and B.H.H. Golsteyn. 2006. Time discounting and the body mass index: Evidence from the Netherlands. Economics and Human Biology 4(1): 39–61.
Brandstatter, H., and K.D. Opp. 2014. Personality traits (Big Five) and the propensity to political protest: Alternative models. Political Psychology 35(4): 515–537.
Dalton, R.J., and H.D. Klingemann. 2007. Oxford handbook of political behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Diamond, L. 1999. Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Duan, J., S.J. Wu, and L. Sun. 2017. Do the powerful discount the future less? The effects of power on temporal discounting. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1007.
Finkel, S.E., E.N. Muller, and K.D. Opp. 1989. Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political action. American Political Science Review 83(03): 885–903.
Fournier, A. 2010. Ukraine’s orange revolution: Beyond soviet political culture? In Orange revolution and aftermath, ed. Paul, D. Anieri, 110–128. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press chapter 5.
Fowler, J.H., and C.D. Kam. 2006. Patience as a political virtue: Delayed gratification and turnout. Political Behavior 28(2): 113–128.
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’donoghue. 2002. Time discounting and time preference: A critical review. Journal of economic literature 40(2): 351–401.
Funder, D.C., J.H. Block, and J. Block. 1983. Delay of gratification: Some longitudinal personality correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44(6): 1198.
Goldstein, J. 2007. The role of digital networked technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (December 20, 2007). Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007–14. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1077686.
Hardisty, D.J., K.F. Thompson, H.H. Krantz, and E.U. Weber. 2013. How to measure time preferences: An experimental comparison of three methods. Judgment and Decision Making 8(3): 236–249.
Holbein, J.B. 2016. Making Good Citizens: Policy Approaches to Increasing Civic Participation PhD thesis Duke University.
Karoly, P. 1993. Mechanisms of self-regulation: A systems view. Annual Review of Psychology 44(1): 23–52.
Kirby, K.N., N.M. Petry, and W.K. Bickel. 1999. Heroin addicts have higher discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128(1): 78.
Klochko, M.A., and P.C. Ordeshook. 2005. Endogenous time preferences in social networks. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Kuzio, T. 2006a. Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 365–386.
Kuzio, T. 2006b. Everyday Ukrainians and the orange revolution. Revolution in orange: The origins of Ukraines democratic breakthrough. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 45–68.
Lehmann, H.A., A. Muravyev, and K.F. Zimmermann. 2012. The Ukrainian longitudinal monitoring survey: Towards a better understanding of labor markets in transition. IZA Journal of Labor and Development 1: 9.
Liberman, N., and Y. Trope. 1998. The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(1): 5.
Lynch, T. 2010. Building a revolution: Elite choice and opposition tactics in pre-orange revolution. In Orange Revolution and Aftermath, ed. Paul, D. Anieri, 47–75. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press chapter 3.
Martinez-Loredo, V., J.R. Fernffandez-Hermida, J.L. Carballo, and S. Fernffandez-Artamendi. 2017. Long-term reliability and stability of behavioral measures among adolescents: The Delay Discounting and Stroop tasks. Journal of Adolescence 58: 33–39.
Marwell, G., and P. Oliver. 1993. The critical mass in collective action. Cambridge: University Press.
Meirowitz, A., and J.A. Tucker. 2013. People power or a one-shot deal? A dynamic model of protest. American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 478–490.
Mello, Z.R., and F.C. Worrell. 2006. The relationship of time perspective to age, gender, and academic achievement among academically talented adolescents. Journal for the Education of the Gifted 29(3): 271–289.
Muller, E.N., and K.-D. Opp. 1986. Rational choice and rebellious collective action. American Political Science Review 80(02): 471–487.
Onuch, Olga. 2015. EuroMaidan protests in Ukraine: Social media versus social networks. Problems of Post-Communism 62(4): 217–235.
Opp, K.-D., and B. Kittel. 2010. The dynamics of political protest: Feedback effects and interdependence in the explanation of protest participation. European Sociological Review 26(1): 97–109.
Opp, K.-D., and W. Roehl. 1990. Repression, micromobilization, and political protest. Social Forces 69: 521–547.
Ostrom, V. 1997. The meaning of democracy and the vulnerability of democracies: A response to Tocqueville’s challenge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rabinovich, A., T. Morton, and T. Postmes. 2010. Time perspective and attitude behaviour-consistency in future-oriented behaviours. British Journal of Social Psychology 49(1): 69–89.
Schmidt, R.W., H. Lamm, and G. Trommsdorff. 1978. Social class and sex as determinants of future orientation (time perspective) in adults. European Journal of Social Psychology 8(1): 71–90.
Schussman, A., and S.A. Soule. 2005. Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation. Social Forces 84(2): 1083–1108.
Shukan, I. 2010. Orchestrating a popular protest movement to conduct a revolution. In Orange Revolution and Aftermath, ed. Paul, D. Anieri, 76–109. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press chapter 4.
Stepanenko, V. 2005. How Ukrainians view their Orange Revolution: public opinion and the national peculiarities of citizenry political activities. Demokratizatsiya-Washington 13(4): 595.
Wang, A.H.-E. 2017. Patience moderates the class cleavage in demand for redistribution. Social Science Research 70: 18–27.
Wang, M., O.R. Rieger, and T. Hens. 2009. An international survey on time discounting. Norwegian School of Economics working paper.
Way, L. 2010. National Identity and Authoritarianism: Belarus and Ukraine Compared. In Orange Revolution and Aftermath, ed. Paul, D. Anieri, 129–159. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press chapter 6.
Weingast, B.R. 1997. The political foundations of democracy and the rule of the law. American Political Science Review 91(02): 245–263.
Wilson, R.K. 2011. The contribution of behavioral economics to political science. Annual Review of Political Science 14: 201–223.
Wu, W.-H., W. Cheng, and W.B. Chiou. 2017. Episodic future thinking about the ideal self induces lower discounting, leading to a decreased tendency toward cheating. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 287.