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European Political Science

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 400–414 | Cite as

militaries’ roles in political regimes: introducing the PRM data set

  • aurel croissantEmail author
  • tanja eschenauer
  • jil kamerling
Research

Abstract

Have militaries become tired of interfering in politics? The declining number of military regimes and military coups implies a decrease in the influence of armed forces on political regimes. Yet, case and area studies underline that militaries still exert considerable influence on politics all over the world. This research note addresses this apparent misfit between quantitative data and qualitative studies by introducing a new measurement of armed forces’ roles in political regimes. Based on previous research, we develop a systematic measure to differentiate between two dimensions of military interference in political regimes: the military ruler and the military supporter indices. Our Political Roles of the Military (PRM) Data Set contains information on 120 democratic and autocratic regimes and a total of 138 regime spells for the period 1999–2012. The data set offers a whole range of indicators that will enable scholars to carry out causal-analytical studies on different forms and degrees of military influence on policy outcomes, economic performance, or the likelihood of regimes successfully facing and surviving political crises. Empirically, our data illustrate that militaries remain powerful actors in many regimes but tend to use more discreet and concealed channels to influence politics.

Keywords

civil–military relations military influence military ruler military supporter 

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Copyright information

© European Consortium for Political Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • aurel croissant
    • 1
    Email author
  • tanja eschenauer
    • 1
  • jil kamerling
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceHeidelberg UniversityHeidelbergGermany

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