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European Political Science

, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 475–488 | Cite as

quantitative approaches in coalition foreign policy: scope, content, process

  • sibel oktay
  • ryan beasleyEmail author
Symposium

Abstract

This article surveys the quantitative literature in coalition foreign policy. Tracing its development back to what we call the ‘first generation studies’ in Democratic Peace research, we illustrate that its theoretical and methodological foundations distinguish this literature from its predecessors. We then overview the existing studies along three dimensions: the nature of the dependent variables, the content of the key explanatory variables, and the processes that identify and systematise the institutional factors that influence coalition foreign policy. Our suggestions for future research highlight some of the puzzles motivated by the findings of this literature and the promise of multi-method designs.

Keywords

commitment extremity ideological cohesion log-rolling veto-players 

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Copyright information

© European Consortium for Political Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Illinois at SpringfieldSpringfieldUSA
  2. 2.School of International RelationsUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsScotland, UK

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