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Retaliatory Antidumping by China: A New Look at the Evidence

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Abstract

China is the most frequent target of antidumping (AD) filings and the sixth most frequent user of antidumping duties. In this paper, we investigate the factors that influence China’s decision to retaliate using AD filings from 1995 to 2015. We consider an AD filing by China to be retaliatory if it occurs within 1 year of an initial AD filing against them and determine the factors that explain retaliatory antidumping filings. We find that higher levels of China’s country-specific imports, lower growth rates of Chinese GDP, and China’s WTO membership increase the likelihood of retaliation. In contrast, higher import growth reduces AD retaliation.

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Notes

  1. Article 56. Where any country (region) takes discriminative antidumping measures on the products exported from the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of China may, upon the actual circumstances, take corresponding measures against the country (region). (Ministry of Commerce 2017).

  2. This is the same definition of AD retaliation as in Feinberg and Reynolds (2006).

  3. Notably, China has never initiated counter AD action against Argentina, Peru, Australia, Colombia, Taiwan, New Zealand, Israel, Ukraine, Trinidad and Tobago, Pakistan, the Philippines, Venezuela, Chile, or Uruguay within 1 year of an AD filing by these countries.

  4. Since only one case of industry-specific retaliation occurred at the HS4 level, we concentrate on HS2 level data for industry-specific retaliation.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Richard Nugent, Maurizio Zanardi, an anonymous referee, as well as seminar participants at the Eastern Economic Association meetings and the Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade conference for useful comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, 75275, USA

    Thomas Osang

  2. University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, 78705, USA

    Jaden Warren

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  1. Thomas Osang
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  2. Jaden Warren
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Correspondence to Thomas Osang.

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Osang, T., Warren, J. Retaliatory Antidumping by China: A New Look at the Evidence. Eastern Econ J 45, 161–178 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-018-0118-5

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