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Unmasking the Brexit negotiations: the behavioural psychology of two-level games

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British Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

The negotiation of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement (2017–2020) puzzled scholars by appearing to show a weaker party (the United Kingdom) adopting a harder negotiation strategy than the stronger party (the European Union). This article attempts to explain this paradox, by combining a two-level game framework with a negotiation psychology lens. It finds that the United Kingdom’s (UK) behaviour was indeed harder than the European Union’s (EU) on the domestic level of the game, but, on the international level, the EU’s behaviour was harder than the UK’s. The article further explores the behavioural and psychological incentives behind the UK’s hard behaviour, differentiating between negotiators at the political level and at the administrative level. The analysis shows that, while some aspects of the UK’s hard stance were rational within the context of a two-level game, others were harmful and due to cognitive limitations.

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Notes

  1. The literature also distinguishes between bargaining or distributive behaviour—where negotiators are only concerned with their own self-interest and adopt a win–lose attitude—and problem-solving or integrative behaviour—where negotiators take into account common interests, and try to find a win–win solution (Hopmann 1995). This dichotomy is closely connected with the hard versus soft distinction, as bargaining is often associated with hard behaviour, and problem-solving is often associated with a soft behaviour. However, it is not identical, since bargaining can also be expressed without hard language (Elgström and Jönsson 2010). This article follows Dür and Mateo (2010) in their categorisation, which focuses only on classifying behaviour on a spectrum from soft to hard, depending on the degree to which it is conflictual, irrespective of whether intentions are integrative or distributive. This classification is particularly helpful when the focus is on examining behaviour, rather than on estimating the actors’ intentions and strategies (Dür and Mateo 2010).

  2. This article also differs from previous applications of the two-level model to Brexit as it applies Putnam’s model without combining it with the concept of nested games (Tsebelis 1988). Both Schnapper (2021) and Biermann and Jagdhuber (2021) argue that Putnam’s model needs to be adapted to the specific case of the Brexit negotiations, and both combine it with the concept of nested games (Tsebelis 1988). Nested games are considered relevant because, due to high levels of politicisation in the Brexit case, the domestic and international game become intertwined, meaning the two levels had to be played simultaneously rather than separately. While in two-level games the chief negotiator can make the most of the situation by using domestic constraints to increase his bargaining power in the international game, in nested games the position of the chief negotiator is weaker, as domestic conflicts make it difficult to even present a coherent position at the international table. However, this article argues that Putnam’s original model already included those elements. Putnam does take into account the fact that domestic preferences can be heterogeneous, which he terms “heterogeneous conflict” (1988, p. 443). While this increases the complexity of the game (and its difficulty from the perspective of the chief negotiator), it does not make the model less applicable (ibid).

  3. Telephone interview with former High Level EU official, 28 August 2018.

  4. Interview with European Parliament official, Brussels, 19 July 2018.

  5. Telephone interview with former European Commission official, 23 August 2021.

  6. Telephone interview with former European Commission official, 23 August 2021.

  7. Interview with a Member of the British House of Lords, London, 18 July 2018.

  8. Telephone interview with European Commission official, 12 August 2021.

  9. Telephone interview with former High Level EU official, 28 August 2018.

  10. Telephone interview with European Commission official, 12 August 2021.

  11. Telephone interview with former European Commission official, 23 August 2021.

  12. Interview with Conservative MEP, Brussels, 18 July 2017.

  13. Telephone interview with former European Commission official, 23 August 2021.

  14. Interview with an expert on EU-UK relations, London, 24 July 2018.

  15. Interview with an anonymous source, July 2017.

  16. Interview with a member of the British House of Lords, London, 18 July 2018.

  17. Interview with a Member of the House of Lords, July 2016.

  18. Telephone interview with European Commission official, 12 August 2021.

  19. Another way in which the British side could be disaggregated is by exploring its sub-national dynamics. Due to space limitations, this is left for future research.

  20. Telephone interview with former European Commission official, 23 August 2021.

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  1. School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University College London, London, WC1H 0BW, UK

    Filipa Figueira

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  1. Filipa Figueira
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Correspondence to Filipa Figueira.

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Figueira, F. Unmasking the Brexit negotiations: the behavioural psychology of two-level games. Br Polit 18, 483–500 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-022-00219-6

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