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The political value of cultural capital: nationalism, ethnic exclusion, and elites in 19th-century congress Poland

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Abstract

Why do claims of cultural belonging promote institutional transformation by expanding community boundaries in some instances and constricting them in others? To address this question, I introduce an elite-capital conflict approach, which synthesizes Bourdieu’s concept of capital with elite-conflict theories. I argue that this approach is valuable for understanding key aspects of mass mobilization such as the conditions under which marginalized elites will attempt to mobilize non-elites through appeals of cultural similarity; the factors which shape the cultural boundaries that these appeals propose; and when non-elites are likely to answer an elites’ call to mobilize. Drawing on historical analysis of 19th-century nationalism in Congress Poland, I show that the degree of capital concentration in the hands of Polish elites and conversion rates between different types of capital determined whether, and how, Polish elites utilized appeals to shared beliefs and practices as grounds for mobilization of non-elites. Whether appeals to shared cultural practices became a successful basis of widespread mobilization, however, depended on the benefits for non-elites of the reconceptualization or re-valuation of Polish culture and its boundaries that Polish elites were proposing.

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Notes

  1. Nationalism always includes a degree of exclusion. I define a more inclusionary nationalism as a social “boundary-expanding” nationalism that privileges geographic considerations of one’s residency over social boundaries such as ethnicity, religion, etc. No existing state faithfully represents this ideal type. All nation states include some members based on ascriptive social boundaries alone (e.g., children of nationals living abroad) and exclude others who reside within their physical boundaries (e.g., some immigrants). Lastly, I consider the continuum of social boundary-expanding or boundary-constricting nationalism (breadth) as analytically distinct from how encompassing of an assimilation or transformation (depth) one is required to undertake in order to gain access to a “cultural” community.

  2. By cultural or culturally based mobilization or nationalism, I mean movements and ideologies grounded in claims of community belonging based on shared practices, symbols, roles, beliefs, etc. Such claims can vary in the depth and breadth of shared practices, norms, and beliefs believed to be necessary for community belonging.

  3. Spheres of struggle over capital (Swartz 2013, p. 57).

  4. A symbol of power, which, though specific to a field in which it struggles for supremacy, can be translated into capital within other fields according to a historically specific and socially (politically) defined field of power.

  5. The Polish-Lithuanian nobility who, by virtue of their status, also possessed Polish citizenship (during the Commonwealth), and who self-identified as Polish through the use of cultural practices, such as Polish language.

  6. I look both at the conceptions of culture that elites promote and the strategies they implemented to mobilize the masses through appeals to shared cultural practices.

  7. In the second half of the 19th century, Polish elites had mostly lost their land and social titles, and with them political, economic, and social privileges. Thus, many Polish elites became only a cultural elite, with cultural capital such as skills, namely literacy, education, and mannerisms as the only type of capital they possessed.

  8. We can see this belief in the potential benefits of an employee’s social network in the willingness of employers to fund business school attendance for their employees.

  9. Yet, once more, even in this example group size is not the only determinant of the value of social capital. When many members of a network are, for example, unable to vote (e.g., minors, not citizens), or lack any military training, the political or military capital of the network (types of social capital) may pale in comparison to smaller yet more resource-rich (e.g., eligible voters, trained soldiers) networks.

  10. Individuals may seek entrance into a social network for its positive benefits or to avoid the negative consequences of being excluded.

  11. Within the elite-capital conflict, an existing balance between elites can be transformed in three ways: an existing elite can lose a significant amount of a type of capital; the type of capital that an elite controls can be devalued; a new type of capital, and with it a new type of elite, can develop.

  12. The strategies described in this paragraph also apply to “inert” or “potential” cultural elites who possess cultural capital with an inert exchange value, i.e., whose currently insignificant social, political, or economic exchange value could increase rendering them active (relevant) elites.

  13. Bourdieu et al. (1994) refer to a similar conversion when discussing how national institutions foster a “national identity” and a “legitimate national culture” by “mold[ing] mental structures and impos[ing] common principles of vision and division” (8). The primary difference between Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage's (1994) example of "exchange" and the one I discuss here is founded upon their divergent starting points, being, respectively, state- versus non-state elites. The exchange to which they allude takes the following form: P(state elites)—S/P(state institutions/infrastructure)—C(shared mental structures)—S(national self-identification)—P(increased state power).

  14. Non-elites can also utilize the limited capital they have, including cultural capital, to position themselves as leaders of a vast social network that they either create or co-opt. However, such a scenario is unlikely, as non-elites typically lack enough resources to either organize a social network in the first place or to co-opt an existing one—i.e., to make oneself a legitimate leader of a group. This argument builds on Gramsci’s (1971) critique of the failure of socialists' mobilization in industrialized societies, which viewed members of the working class as lacking enough resources to mobilize a significant enough sector of civil society to establish a working-class hegemony.

  15. Kronenberg and Wimmer (2012) argue that groups have a tendency toward excluding others. On the one hand, they state that masses in weakly centralized states with “weak” civil societies prefer “ethnic closures” even if such a preference gives them less favorable resource distribution (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, p. 217). On the other hand, they posit the absence for a “preference” for “ethnic closures” of feudal orders as resulting from “the estate order [being] rather uninteresting in terms of resource exchanges for the masses” (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, p. 217). Hence, they explain mass preferences for ethnic closure in the first scenario as existing in spite of potential resource gains, yet they evoke lack of resource gains as the basis for the absence of this preference in the second case. Thus, it is not clear when ethno-cultural distinctions matter because of resources and when they matter in spite of them even in the terms set by the authors—those of decentralized states with weak civil societies. An equation of “robust” civil societies with cross-ethnic integration and cooperation carries with it tautological difficulties when the presence of a “weak” or “strong” civil society is presented as an explanation of ethnic closures or cross-ethnic cooperation.

  16. As such, this approach would expect mobilization through appeals to shared practices, values, or dispositions in, for instance, feudal states in the face of some external threats or internal conflicts with religious elites.

  17. I discuss a reference to such a strategy (P-S–C–S-P) by Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage (1994) in footnote 12.

  18. This is the case of top-down, state-driven cultural nationalism that assimilates unwilling populations that either lack a cultural elite or lack valuable social capital (due to a small size or, for instance, an economically impoverished social network) to muster enough resources to contest such a state project.

  19. A ruling class is marked by its self-replication, where privilege and power are attained by birth (Keller 1991).

  20. The szlachta, accounted for about eight to ten percent of the population. It included Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Christian Poles, and converted Jews. While elites could have dual nationalities, Polish was the nationality, culture, and language of the state. (Wandycz 1974, p. 5, 20).

  21. The church held a monopoly on education since the Counter-Reformation (Hillar 1992, pp. 190–191).

  22. The anonymous author of “Ciąg dalszy uwag ogólnych nad stanem rolniczym i miejskim [The continuation of general remarks about the state of agriculture and cities]” argues for the necessity of the dissemination of “natural” rights to all inhabitants of the Commonwealth as a means of ensuring the better functioning of the country and preserving the socio-economic distinctions on which the Commonwealth’s society was built (1789, printed in Wolinski and Rostworowski 1955, Vol. I, p. 121–133).

  23. An anonymous author champions national education, claiming that it would “convince peasants that they have to stay (on land),” and that paying their pańszczyzna (labor duties) is “just work.” He notes that rather than trying to convince peasants to perform their duties themselves, elites should support national education, which would convince peasants of both the necessity of their work and of its fundamental benefit to themselves in a system of social interdependence (Anonymous 1788, “O poddanych Polskich roku 1788 [About Polish subjects in 1788]” Kraków: Grebl, Anonymous, printed in Woliński et al. 1955, Vol. I, pp. 3–68).

  24. In “Wszyscy błądzą: rozmowa pana z rolnikiem, Obaj z błędu wychodzą [All go astray: A conversation of a peasant with a lord, both see (leave behind) their mistakes]” the author discusses the “interconnectedness” of lords and peasants grounded in their distinction of “body and situation;” arguing that it should lead to mutual respect and love, as “one would not survive without the other” (Jan Jezierski, 1790, printed in Woliński et al. 1955, Vol. I, p. 284–302).

  25. It is important to note here that despite the clear intentions of Polish elites, if given the time to be successful, the endeavor to create a system of national education would have likely had long-term unintended consequences. The latter would have likely meant increasing the political value at the cost of the economic value of some kinds of Polish cultural capital. Such a re-valuation, however, could only take place after the dissolution of feudal rules.

    The disjunction between the clear intentions of Polish elites and the likely (post-feudal) long-term consequences that their actions would have had (if allowed to run their course) reiterates the fact that while the actions taken by elites—individuals or groups—are largely rooted in their capital conflicts, the results of those actions can sometimes, if not frequently, undermine an elites’ position that they were intended to protect.

  26. This inability was based, firstly, in feudal status-restrictions imposed by the state and, secondly, in the lack of depth in the cultural practices peasants shared with the nobility. While Polish elites fostered the notion of a cultural community, they were not willing to share their aristocratic Polish cultural capital (dress, literacy, mannerisms) with peasants; they were even less willing to share with peasants the legal right to convert their cultural capital into economic gains.

  27. Jewish inhabitants of the Commonwealth often held prestigious administrative positions on Polish manors (Rosman 1990); thus they already benefitted from supporting the economic value of their Polish cultural capital (and of the Polish state that upheld its value). Promises of an improved socio-political standing, and with it more spatial and employment mobility, provided Polish Jews with further reason to support Polish rule.

  28. Ruch, Warszawa July 5, 1862, printed in Kieniewicz and Miller (1966, pp. 332–335). Translations and emphases are mine.

  29. Ibid.

  30. The difference in how Polish elites saw and treated “assimilated” members of the Jewish minority suggests what an improvement in political and social status would have meant for this elite in terms of its potential for social and economic advancement under a Polish state. This distinction can be seen in Janowski’s writings, who, when describing a “Jewish-patriot” who was a key member of the uprising and his friend, felt the need to comment how his friend’s character and behavior—referring to his acculturation—“distinguished him from typical members of his religion” (Janowski 1925, pp. 165–166).

  31. An overproduction of the intelligentsia in the 1870s and 1880s further increased competition for such positions (Micińska 2008, pp. 22–23).

  32. 1897 Russian census statistics Vol. 51 (1904), Table XXII, pp. 192–195, 206–207.

  33. The National Democrats also won the next election after a fierce battle with socialist and democratic parties (Łukawski 1967, pp. 75–77).

  34. Approximate Jewish population in Congress Poland in 1910 (Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915, p. 37, Table 29).

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Acknowledgements

This article benefited greatly from discussions with and comments from Bart Bonikowski, Christopher Chambers-Ju, Julia Chuang, Peter Evans, Angela Fillingim, Cristina Florea, Chris Gratien, Zachary Howlett, Paul Roger Lichterman, Michèle Lamont, and Ann Swidler. While support from the National Science Foundation and Fulbright-Hayes made this research possible in the first place, the ACLS/Mellon Dissertation Completion Fellowship and Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies enabled that research to crystalize into the findings presented here.

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Kurjanska, M.M. The political value of cultural capital: nationalism, ethnic exclusion, and elites in 19th-century congress Poland. Am J Cult Sociol 7, 350–381 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41290-018-0063-0

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