‘Beyond military might’: Boko Haram and the asymmetries of counter-insurgency in Nigeria

Abstract

Boko Haram insurgency has presented a peculiar theatre of unconventional warfare. The combat dynamics of the belligerents have oscillated between the asymmetries of hard and soft violence. While the insurgents have been able to sustain their violent campaign mainly through tactical opportunism based on irregular strategies, including suicide terrorism, the government forces have been locked in intractable counter-insurgency operations where their military might has often been demystified and overwhelmed by the irregular strategies of the insurgents. This has resulted in a precarious and protracted counter-insurgency scenario in which the dynamics of violence tend to have put the government forces under sapping pressure, whilst the insurgent forces have prevailed in an asymmetrical advantage. The way out of this intractable violence is for the government to be pragmatic in its current combat-offensive counter-insurgency by adopting a hybrid approach that is capable of countering both the military and non-military dimensions of the terror-insurgency conundrum.